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Abstract 
The  objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the processes of  governance 
and accountability of a large professional accountancy body based on the case of the Council of 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). The research questions 
examined how the ICAEW Council is governed, how it exercises accountability to the 
membership and other stakeholders and how the variety of interests of the Council members 
are shaping the governance of the ICAEW.  As governance structures and processes determine 
the criteria for obtaining a professional qualification and attaining membership of professional 
accountancy bodies, it is important to understand their structures of governance and 
accountability practices. 
A Bourdieusian analytical framework was used to provide insight into the following key themes 
of the thesis: the governance structures of the ICAEW, the vested interests of those forming the 
Council, the claims to act in the public interest, and the approach to  balance the competing 
interests of the members. Empirical evidence was collected through a series of 25 semi-
structured interviews with members of the ICAEW Council.   
The findings reveal that the public accountability of the ICAEW to its membership and other 
stakeholders is constrained by its structures, which lead to imbalances in the interests 
represented within the Council. This challenges the Council’s ability to adequately reflect the 
public interest in the policy making process. At the same time, the ICAEW deploys the concept 
of public interest as a legitimating tool in its accountability discourse with stakeholders to 
maintain and enhance its symbolic power. 
In addition, the findings also demonstrate that the composition of the ICAEW Council aims to 
symbolise its accountability and inclusivity to its membership. For instance, the findings reveal 
that the District Society network is a conduit to accountability for elected members. Finally, the 
study emphasises that the increasing heterogeneity of the membership will intensify the 
pressures on the governance and accountability structures. Therefore, the continuous 
development and transformation of the current governance and accountability practices is 
required to maintain the symbolic power of the ICAEW and its capacity to represent the 
profession as a whole. 
  
v 
 
Table of contents 
Contents 
Declaration ..................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iv 
Table of contents ........................................................................................................................... v 
Figures and tables .......................................................................................................................... x 
Figures x 
Tables x 
List of abbreviations and acronyms ............................................................................................. xii 
Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction, motivation of this study, research questions, contribution and organisation of 
this thesis ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2. Motivation for the study ............................................................................................... 2 
1.3. Research questions ....................................................................................................... 3 
1.3.1. Research Question 1: How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? ............... 5 
1.3.2. Research Question 2: What are the interests of Council members and how do 
they shape the governance of the ICAEW? .......................................................................... 5 
1.4. Contribution to literature, theory, policy and practice ................................................ 6 
1.4.1. Contributions to the literature .............................................................................. 6 
1.4.2. Contributions to theory ........................................................................................ 7 
1.4.3. Contributions to practice ...................................................................................... 7 
1.5. Structure of the thesis .................................................................................................. 8 
1.5.1. Chapter 2: The governance of the accountancy profession ................................. 8 
1.5.2. Chapter 3: A Bourdieusian lens on the accountancy profession .......................... 8 
1.5.3. Chapter 4: Research methodology and methods ................................................. 8 
1.5.4. Chapter 5: The structure and governance of the ICAEW ...................................... 8 
1.5.5. Chapter 6: Council members’ appointment, interests and the implications on 
governance and accountability ............................................................................................. 9 
1.5.6. Chapter 7: Discussion and analysis of findings ..................................................... 9 
1.5.7. Chapter 8: Conclusions ......................................................................................... 9 
1.6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 9 
vi 
 
Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................................................... 11 
The governance and accountability of professional accountancy bodies .................................. 11 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 11 
2.2. Roles of professional accountancy bodies in organisations and society .................... 12 
2.3. What is meant by governance and accountability of professional membership 
bodies? .................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.3.1. Political accountability of Council members ....................................................... 16 
2.3.2. Public accountability of professional accountancy bodies ................................. 16 
2.4. The field of professional accountancy bodies in the UK ............................................. 20 
2.4.1. The context of the UK accountancy profession .................................................. 20 
2.4.2. The Big Four and their extended influence in the field ...................................... 22 
2.4.3. The governance and accountability of the ICAEW .............................................. 23 
2.5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 30 
Chapter 3 ..................................................................................................................................... 32 
A theoretical framework for understanding the governance of the ICAEW .............................. 32 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 32 
3.2. Constructs of Bourdieusian theory ............................................................................. 33 
3.2.1. Field ..................................................................................................................... 33 
3.2.2. Capitals ................................................................................................................ 34 
3.2.3. The bridging concept - habitus ........................................................................... 36 
3.2.4. Symbolic power and violence ............................................................................. 38 
3.3. Translation – the import of theory ............................................................................. 39 
3.4. Applying Bourdieu – translation to a professional body context ............................... 43 
3.4.1. RQ1: How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? ........................................ 44 
3.4.2. RQ2: What are the interests of Council members and how do they shape the 
governance of the ICAEW? ................................................................................................. 45 
3.5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 48 
Chapter 4 ..................................................................................................................................... 49 
Research methodology and methods ......................................................................................... 49 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 49 
4.2. Research paradigms .................................................................................................... 49 
4.2.1. Positivist paradigm in accounting research ........................................................ 51 
vii 
 
4.2.2. Alternative paradigms in accounting research ................................................... 52 
4.2.3. Selection of a critical paradigm ........................................................................... 53 
4.3. Research methods ...................................................................................................... 57 
4.3.1. Bourdieu’s framework and research methods ................................................... 58 
4.3.2. Ethics ................................................................................................................... 60 
4.3.3. Reflexivity ............................................................................................................ 61 
4.3.4. Single case study ................................................................................................. 64 
4.4. The case study – the ICAEW ........................................................................................ 65 
4.4.1. The structure of the ICAEW Council .................................................................... 67 
4.4.2. The interview process ......................................................................................... 69 
4.4.3. Pilot study ........................................................................................................... 72 
4.4.4. Main study .......................................................................................................... 73 
4.5. Data analysis ............................................................................................................... 78 
4.6. Triangulation of results ............................................................................................... 79 
4.7. Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 82 
Chapter 5 ..................................................................................................................................... 83 
The structure and governance of the ICAEW ............................................................................. 83 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 83 
5.2. The creation of a market for professional accountancy services – the role of a Royal 
Charter .................................................................................................................................... 84 
5.3. How is ICAEW governed? ............................................................................................ 86 
5.3.1. The governance role of the Council .................................................................... 87 
5.3.2. Accountability to the membership ..................................................................... 88 
5.3.3. The accountability of the committee structure to the Council .......................... 98 
5.3.4. Accountability beyond the membership ........................................................... 101 
5.4. To what ends is the ICAEW governed? ..................................................................... 105 
5.4.1. Symbolic power maintenance ........................................................................... 106 
5.4.2. Withstanding symbolic violence ....................................................................... 110 
5.4.3. Symbolic power and violence in furthering agendas ........................................ 112 
5.5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 117 
Chapter 6 ................................................................................................................................... 119 
Council members’ appointment, interests, and the implications on governance and 
accountability ............................................................................................................................ 119 
viii 
 
6.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 119 
6.2. What interest groups do Council members represent? ........................................... 120 
6.2.1. Election processes: establishing political accountability .................................. 121 
6.2.2. The interests co-opted members ...................................................................... 133 
6.3. How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW? .. 139 
6.3.1. Elected members: capital accretion through Council membership ................. 143 
6.3.2. Council members: the investment required and its influence on the interests 
served 147 
6.4. Implications – the dysfunctional consequences on the governance and accountability 
of the ICAEW ......................................................................................................................... 150 
6.5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 151 
Chapter 7 ................................................................................................................................... 153 
Discussion and analysis of findings ........................................................................................... 153 
7.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 153 
7.2. How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? (RQ1) ............................................ 154 
7.2.1. How is the ICAEW governed? ........................................................................... 155 
7.2.2. To what ends is the ICAEW governed? ............................................................. 161 
7.3. What are the interests of Council members and how do they shape the governance 
of the ICAEW? (RQ2) ............................................................................................................. 164 
7.3.1. What interest groups do Council members represent? ................................... 164 
7.3.2. How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW?
 167 
7.3.3. Implications: the dysfunctional consequences on the governance and 
accountability of the ICAEW ............................................................................................. 169 
7.4. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 170 
Chapter 8 ................................................................................................................................... 172 
Summary, conclusions and implications of the research ......................................................... 172 
8.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 172 
8.2. Summary of the thesis chapters ............................................................................... 172 
8.3. Summary of the main findings .................................................................................. 174 
8.3.1. How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? .............................................. 175 
8.3.2. What are the interests of the Council members and how do they shape the 
ICAEW’s governance? ....................................................................................................... 175 
ix 
 
8.4. Overview of the main contributions of this study .................................................... 176 
8.4.1. Theory ............................................................................................................... 176 
8.4.2. Literature........................................................................................................... 177 
8.4.3. Policy and practice ............................................................................................ 177 
8.5. Limitations of the research ....................................................................................... 178 
8.6. Suggestions for future research ................................................................................ 180 
8.7. Implications of the research findings ........................................................................ 181 
8.7.1. Theory ............................................................................................................... 181 
8.7.2. Literature........................................................................................................... 181 
8.7.3. Policy and practice ............................................................................................ 182 
8.8. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 182 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 184 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................ 199 
Appendix 1 Participant information sheet ............................................................................ 199 
Appendix 2 Participant consent form ................................................................................... 201 
Appendix 3 Outline interview questionnaire ........................................................................ 203 
Appendix 4 Member mailings from 2019 election campaign ............................................... 206 
Appendix 5 Social media images from 2019 election campaign .......................................... 207 
Appendix 6 Thematic analysis of candidate election statements (2015 and 2017) ............. 209 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
Figures and tables 
Figures 
 
Figure 2.1The UK field of professional accountancy bodies ....................................................... 22 
Figure 4.1 Governance structure of the ICAEW .......................................................................... 68 
Figure 5.1 Age profile of global membership of the largest UK domiciled professional 
accountancy bodies .................................................................................................................. 107 
Figure 6.1 Extract from candidate statement guidance ........................................................... 123 
Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Forms of accountability .............................................................................................. 15 
Table 3.1: Bourdieu’s concepts in relation to RQ1……………….…………………………………………………44 
Table 3.2: Bourdieu’s concepts in relation to RQ2 ..................................................................... 45 
Table 3.3: Forms of capital in the case context .......................................................................... 47 
Table 4.1: Case research methods, sources and purpose ………………………………………………………66 
Table 4.2: Relationship between research questions, interview questions and Bourdieu’s 
concepts ...................................................................................................................................... 71 
Table 4.3: Pilot study details ....................................................................................................... 73 
Table 4.4: Main study details ...................................................................................................... 74 
Table 4.5: Interviewees grouped by experience (i.e., decade of qualification) .......................... 76 
Table 4.6: Interviewees grouped by employment sector (as at June 2017) ............................... 76 
Table 4.7: Interviewees grouped by mode of appointment ....................................................... 77 
Table 4.8: Interviewees grouped by gender ............................................................................... 77 
Table 4.9: Research questions, empirical findings and concepts addressed .............................. 79 
Table 4.10: Analysis of secondary data, rationale and timing .................................................... 80 
Table 5.1: Elected Council members by sector………………………………………………………………………..92 
xi 
 
Table 5.2: Composition of the ICAEW’s membership (excl. retirees) ......................................... 92 
Table 5.3: Interview pool by sector ............................................................................................ 92 
Table 5.4: Contested Council seats ............................................................................................. 96 
Table 6.1: Contested seats in recent ICAEW elections…………………………………………………………..127 
Table 6.2: Themes extracted from 2017 election statements .................................................. 128 
Table 6.3: ICAEW Council election success by gender .............................................................. 133 
Table 6.4: Ex-officio/Co-opted members of the ICAEW Council as at June 2017 ..................... 136 
 
  
xii 
 
List of abbreviations and acronyms 
AAA  American Accounting Association 
ACA  Associate of the ICAEW 
ACCA  Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
AIA  American Institute of Accountants 
AICPA  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
APC  Auditing Practices Committee 
ASCPA  American Society of Certified Public Accountants 
Big Four Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC (taken together) 
CAWW  Chartered Accountants Worldwide 
CAI  Chartered Accountants Ireland 
CGA-Canada Certified General Accountants Association of Canada 
CICA  Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
CIMA  Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
CIMA-AICPA Chartered Institute of Management Accountants – American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants 
CIPFA  Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
CMA Canada Certified Management Accountants of Canada 
CPD  Continuing Professional Development 
EU  European Union 
FCA  Fellow of the ICAEW 
FRC  Financial Reporting Council 
GAA  Global Accounting Alliance 
HMRC  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
IASB  International Accounting Standards Board 
ICAEW  Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
xiii 
 
ICAS  Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland 
IFAC  International Federation of Accountants 
IRB  Institute Regulatory Board 
ISC  ICAEW Student Council 
SDG  Sustainable Development Goals 
UK  United Kingdom 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction, motivation of this study, research questions, 
contribution and organisation of this thesis 
1.1. Introduction 
‘Accounting, because it is a central social phenomenon of capitalist modernity, is at the heart 
of economic processes’ (Chiapello & Baker, 2011, p. 158). 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the governance and accountability of a 
professional accountancy body. The processes and structures of the accountancy profession 
seek to foster a trust relationship between accountants and those who rely upon their work 
(Macdonald, 1995). The trust relationship is a central pillar contributing to the credibility of the 
profession and its members. However, it is periodically subject to high profile shocks (e.g., 
Worldcom, Enron, Carillion) where professional practice is brought into the public consciousness 
and the accountability of the profession is scrutinised. Such events frequently result in a 
readjustment of the relationship between the profession and the state in the form of additional 
legislation (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley) designed to regulate the activities of accountants.  
Professional bodies typically hold their members to account through enforcing the norms of 
membership (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) e.g. Codes of Ethics. However, the 
privilege of professional bodies to self-regulate is increasingly subject to attrition in response to 
contemporary views on the incompatibility of membership functions from regulation, e.g., the 
Law Society and the Solicitor’s Regulatory Authority.  
Membership of professional bodies is typically achieved by proving one’s worthiness by means 
of adherence to the norms of entry in exchange for the designation as a professional (Willmott, 
1986). Admittance as a member enables individuals to secure access to certain areas of work, 
e.g., audit, or to command a superior price for their output (Matthews, 2017).  
In the UK, the state has legitimated professional groupings by means of Royal Charters; this 
creates the constitutional framework for such organisations:  
‘it would greatly promote the objects for which the said societies have been instituted 
and would also be for the public benefit if the members thereof were incorporated as 
one body as besides other advantages such incorporation would be a public recognition 
of the importance of the profession and would tend to gradually raise its character and 
thus to secure for the community the existence of a class of persons well qualified to be 
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employed in the responsible and difficult duties often devolving on Public Accountants.’ 
(ICAEW, 1880)  
The grant of a Royal Charter provided accountants with a ‘Chartered’ status. Later, when the 
Charter was extended, a commitment of the body to act in the public interest as a 
counterbalance to the self-interest of its members was introduced (ICAEW, 1948). This 
additional accountability is problematic as the Royal Charter provides limited and, to date, 
largely unchallenged means of recourse (Mitchell & Sikka, 2004; Sikka, Willmott, & Lowe, 1989). 
The governance and accountability mechanisms of professional membership bodies are of 
interest  (Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 1993) as the work of these bodies and their members is a 
significant contributor to societal stability, e.g., law, accountancy, journalism, and architecture. 
Governance of professional membership bodies necessarily differs from the corporate (Brennan 
& Solomon, 2008), public (Osborne, 2010) and charity sectors (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009), 
where clearly defined codes and structures have been constructed to define lines of 
accountability, e.g., to shareholders and donors.  
The governance structures of professional membership bodies typically draw upon those 
empowered as the representatives of the wider membership. Accountability to the membership 
is typically instituted through democratic processes that persist despite often low levels of 
engagement with the processes by the wider membership (Knoke & Prensky, 1984). The 
imbalances in representation created by the election processes lead to co-options.  
This thesis focuses on the governance and accountability of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW); this is a leading accountancy professional body in 
the United Kingdom with over 149,000 members globally (FRC, 2018a). It draws on Bourdieu’s 
relational concepts of capitals, habitus, symbolic power and violence (Bourdieu, 1998) to 
empirically examine the governance and accountability of the ICAEW. It is significant as it 
addresses questions of public accountability to the membership and beyond as well as the 
political accountability of the individual Council members. Imbalances in representation can 
result in the amplification of certain interests in the governance processes and threaten the 
symbolic power of the ICAEW as a whole. 
1.2. Motivation for the study 
The accounting profession occupies a significant position of power in society by both 
constructing the narratives through which the economy and society operate (Hines, 1988) and 
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through its employment of significant numbers of graduates (High Fliers Research, 2019). It 
trains graduates and other aspiring members in the tools and techniques of accounting 
(Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, & Nahapiet, 1980), as well as providing them with an 
enabling qualification as members of a professional body. The qualification (the ACA) provides 
access to a range of roles facilitating increased earning potential in comparison to similar 
candidates who do not hold the qualification (Matthews, 2017). 
The mechanisms of governance and accountability of the profession, both to its members and 
the wider stakeholders, are important in furthering our understanding of the role of the 
profession in an evolving social, economic and political landscape (Sikka, 2001). However, 
limited existing research has addressed these issues from the perspective of governance and 
accountability of a professional body (exceptions include Noguchi & Edwards, 2004, 2008a, 
2008b; Ramirez, 2009). This thesis aims to address the gap in our knowledge of the governance 
and accountability of professional accountancy bodies through the study of the ICAEW. The 
study focuses on two aspects of accountability (Sinclair, 1995); public accountability to the 
membership and beyond; and, the political accountability of Council members to their 
constituencies. This helps to frame the research questions to focus on structure and agency 
within the context of the case study. 
Whilst some studies have shed a degree of light on the ‘black box’ of the ICAEW’s governance 
processes, they do so primarily from an historical perspective (Willmott et al., 1993). The 
contemporary insight into the perceptions of those who form part of the governing Council, 
provided by means of adopting an interview-based research method and situating the discussion 
within a Bourdieusian framework, is novel. It contributes to better understanding accountability 
and power relationships within the context of a professional membership body.  
The ICAEW represents an important site for studying governance and accountability due to its 
significant role in shaping the policies and practice of accountancy within the UK (Broadbent, 
2002). It is also important in a wider context as other accounting bodies have used it as a role 
model for their own organisation (Chua & Poullaos, 1993).  
1.3. Research questions 
Professional bodies differ from both corporate and charity structures, as they are membership 
bodies, sustained and governed by their members. This governance model is common to many 
not-for-profit bodies including trades unions and co-operatives. However, a distinct structural 
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difference for professional bodies is that many in the UK are incorporated by means of a Royal 
Charter granted by the Privy Council (The Privy Council, 2017). This specialised framework 
creates a barrier to the formation of other competitor bodies, at least in the short term, but also 
carries with it a ‘public interest’ role for the Charter’s recipient.  
The institutionalisation of a commitment to the public interest requires a careful balance to be 
drawn between the economic self-interest of members and the reputational power of the body 
to which they belong (Lee, 1995). The contemporary environment has seen an increase in 
heterogeneity in the once homogenous membership base of the ICAEW. In part, the growth of 
large, international multi-disciplinary professional services firms, known as the Big Four, has led 
to an increased gap between the norms, work undertaken and reward mechanisms of the elite 
within the profession and the remainder (Carter & Spence, 2014; Ramirez, 2009). At the same 
time, the field of employment of members has evolved over time and the majority are now 
employed in the business sector rather than in a practice (FRC, 2018a). As a result, the 
professional identity of a Chartered Accountant has also adapted to contemporary working 
practices (Hanlon, 1998); however, it is unclear the extent to which the governance and 
accountability of the ICAEW has also adapted to reflect these changes.  
External influences increasingly redraw the boundaries and shape the structure and governance 
of the profession in the form of external regulators, e.g., through local regulators (Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC)), through the EU’s role in approving accounting and auditing standards, 
and through the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), which has an increasingly global 
role in setting standards for Education, Auditing and Ethics alongside the International 
Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) role of developing accounting standards. These socio-
politico factors have continued to erode the traditional power of the professional bodies, 
resulting in a redefinition of their boundaries and attempts to extend their members’ work into 
new areas, e.g., legal services. 
Two research questions have been posed to address governance and accountability through a 
case study of the ICAEW. The first relates to the public accountability of the ICAEW and the 
second relates to the political accountability of the individuals who comprise the Council of the 
ICAEW. The questions are interrelated and seek to explore the relationship between structure 
and agency within the context of the case study through a Bourdieusian lens. The research 
questions are discussed in the sections below. 
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1.3.1. Research Question 1: How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends?  
How is the ICAEW governed? 
This research question addresses the public accountability (Sinclair, 1995) of the ICAEW to its 
membership and beyond. 
Accountability to the membership is established through the mechanisms of representation and 
the hierarchical committee structure. This helps to expose the imbalances within the Council 
which lead to the amplification of certain interests. In addition, accountability differences are 
brought to light between co-opted and elected Council members. 
Accountability beyond the membership is examined through the concept of the public interest 
and its role in the governance processes of the Council. 
The governance structures are instrumental in maintaining the delicate balance between the 
self-interest of members in furthering their accumulation of economic capital (Matthews, 2017; 
Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007) and the commitment of the professional membership 
body to the public interest (Lee, 1995).  
To what ends is the ICAEW governed? 
The governance structure is oriented to maintain the symbolic power of the ICAEW and the ACA 
credential. The pursuit of strategies to maintain the symbolic power require the assent of the 
governance structure. It is important therefore that the governance structures are accountable 
to the membership who is affected by changes in the symbolic power of the ICAEW in the form 
of reduced earnings potential, increased competition or constraints to their scope of operations 
for example. In this respect, the governance structure seeks to repel external incursions into its 
boundaries. 
1.3.2. Research Question 2: What are the interests of Council members and 
how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? 
What interest groups do Council members represent? 
This sub-question relates to the political accountability of the Council members to their 
constituencies. It focuses on the mechanisms of representation for Council members. The 
election process is the primary mode of establishing accountability to the membership. 
However, in its current form, it leads to an imbalance in the interests represented within the 
Council. In part this is due to the processes of candidature and nomination which tend to favour 
certain profiles. 
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The imbalances result in the need for co-options to supplement the elected Council members 
and add legitimacy to the Council’s governance structures. 
 An analysis of the election statements helps supplement the interview evidence. 
How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW? 
This sub-question seeks to compare the capital profiles of elected members and how they 
influence the governance of the ICAEW. Elected members typically seek capital accretion 
through accessing new networks and marketing themselves as Council members. It is recognised 
that members’ capital profiles are not static and evolve over their career (Carter & Spence, 
2014), often resulting in those who are more established being able to evidence the capitals 
required to the electorate. 
Co-opted members are typically co-opted as a result of their established capitals and therefore, 
are instrumentalised in this process by the ICAEW, lending the governance processes an external 
legitimacy. 
1.4. Contribution to literature, theory, policy and practice 
The thesis contributes in a variety of ways to the literature, theory, policy and practice. The 
distinct areas of contribution are outlined below. 
1.4.1. Contributions to the literature 
This thesis contributes to the opening of the ‘black box’ on the governance and accountability 
of the ICAEW by means of semi-structured interviews with those participants in the governance 
structure or the Council, and thereby provides an important contribution to our understanding 
of the ICAEW and its governance and accountability mechanisms in contemporary terms. This 
approach contrasts with many historical studies of professional body minutes and other public 
documentation (see for example, Noguchi & Edwards, 2004, 2008b, 2008a; Ramirez, 2009). 
Insight is offered into the Council members’ perspectives and the extent to which they converge 
in place of the professional body’s own ‘official account’, which is often documented in the 
literature.  
The research explores two forms of accountability (Sinclair, 1995): public accountability to the 
membership and beyond; and the political accountability of the members of the ICAEW Council 
to their constituencies. In so doing, it contributes to a greater understanding of the concept of 
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the public interest and its rhetorical adoption by the ICAEW as part of its technical core (Oakes 
et al., 1998). The interview process revealed the absorption of the term into the governance 
structures of the ICAEW. 
In line with the framework developed in Brennan & Solomon (2008), this thesis extends the 
boundaries of corporate governance research into the field of professional membership 
organisations through the study of the Council and its composition. It adds to existing studies 
that adopt qualitative techniques to understand core governance bodies, e.g., Boards 
(Tremblay, Gendron, & Malsch, 2016). In doing so, the work explores a single case study centred 
on the ICAEW, also contributing to a broadening of the methodological approach in this field.  
1.4.2. Contributions to theory 
The study also contributes to the growing body of literature within the domain of accounting, 
using Bourdieu’s framework to help to explain governance and accountability concepts (Lukka 
& Vinnari, 2014). The application of Bourdieu’s analytical framework to the sub-field of a 
professional body is novel, and it helps to structure and deepen the analysis through 
consideration of aspects of governance and accountability mechanisms of the ICAEW and their 
participants.  
1.4.3. Contributions to practice 
The study reflects on the contrasts in accountability between elected and co-opted members, 
together with the structures that control the processes of appointment. Elected members are 
accountable to their local constituency and the accountability mechanism is the District Society, 
however co-opted members do not share the same accountability to the sector that they 
ostensibly represent. As such, they do not represent the views of their sector. The prima facie 
balance that they bring does not increase the political accountability of the Council, which is 
only attached to elected members. 
The path to election has been shown to be closely aligned to the District Society structure; this 
is predominantly practice-based thereby leading to an imbalance in representation of the 
membership within the Council, and the use of co-options as a means of addressing the 
imbalances. These imbalances in representation may have contributed to the detachment of the 
majority of the membership, evidenced through low engagement with the democratic processes 
(Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). 
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1.5.  Structure of the thesis 
To answer the research questions posed, this thesis is organised as follows: 
1.5.1. Chapter 2: The governance of the accountancy profession 
The governance of the accountancy profession is outlined in Chapter 2 through an examination 
of the role played by professional accountancy bodies in organisations and society. It examines 
what is meant by governance of such membership organisations and to whom they are 
accountable. In doing so, the tensions between the self-interest of the members and the public 
interest commitments of the professional body are examined to further understanding of the 
accountability of the profession. 
1.5.2. Chapter 3: A Bourdieusian lens on the accountancy profession 
This chapter outlines Bourdieu’s relational theory and examines how aspects have been 
translated into the accounting literature before detailing how a Bourdieusian lens will be applied 
in this study. The case for the application of Bourdieu’s theory is made through the 
establishment of the accountancy profession as a field of analysis and the ICAEW as a relevant 
sub-field. This analytical framework enables the examination of the professional body at both 
the structural and agency level with the linkages made through the more ephemeral concept of 
the habitus. 
1.5.3. Chapter 4: Research methodology and methods 
The research paradigm adopted is a critical one, and the implications of this methodological 
approach are examined from an ontological and epistemological perspective. This is linked to 
the selection of a qualitative method to facilitate a critical approach: the researcher’s 
positionality is examined as part of this process. Data were secured through a series of semi-
structured interviews with the members of the Council. Secondary data were also used to 
supplement interview findings from publicly available information. The case study choice is 
outlined and justified by reference to its leading position as a professional accountancy body 
and the rich data obtained through an in-depth study of the governance structure. 
1.5.4. Chapter 5: The structure and governance of the ICAEW 
Chapter 5 answers the first research question: How and to what ends is the ICAEW governed? 
The empirical findings at the structural level are outlined in this chapter, which examines the 
accountability of the ICAEW to its members and beyond through its governing Council. In so 
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doing, this chapter considers the composition of the Council and the mechanisms that facilitate 
or constrain the representation of, and accountability to, the membership as a whole. The 
changing contemporary environment is shown to have influenced the governance aims of the 
ICAEW as it responds to the globalisation of accounting regulation, and its limited international 
footprint in comparison to other rival accountancy bodies, e.g., ACCA, AICPA-CIMA. This chapter 
draws on empirical evidence obtained from interviews and secondary data analysis. 
1.5.5. Chapter 6: Council members’ appointment, interests and the 
implications on governance and accountability 
Chapter 6 answers the second research question: What are the interests of Council members 
and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? In so doing, it examines the political 
accountability aspects of Council membership. Political accountability is established through the 
election processes, which are investigated through an analysis of election statements combined 
with interview evidence. The resultant imbalance leads to co-options to secure the input from 
established leaders in certain sectors. 
 A comparison of the capitals of the different types of Council member is undertaken to help 
explain the ways in which the interests of those members shape the governance of the ICAEW. 
1.5.6. Chapter 7: Discussion and analysis of findings 
A discussion and analysis of findings from the empirical chapters is undertaken in Chapter 7 by 
drawing on elements of Bourdieu’s framework to help frame a better understanding of the sub-
field of the ICAEW. It critically examines the challenges and tensions involved in governing a 
professional body as well as the motives of, and incentives for, those participating in the process 
of governance. 
1.5.7. Chapter 8: Conclusions 
The final chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis, summarising the prior chapters and the 
main empirical findings, as well as outlining limitations in the research and identifying suitable 
areas for future research. It also outlines the implications for policy and practice resulting from 
the PhD thesis. 
1.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a background to the research and the motivation of the researcher to 
undertake the study. It has outlined the two research questions and how they were answered. 
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The chapter also outlines the various contributions made by the thesis to theory, policy and 
practice, before outlining the structure of the remainder of the thesis. The next chapter provides 
an overview of the literature on the governance of the field of the accountancy profession 
before focusing on the sub-field of the ICAEW. 
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Chapter 2 
The governance and accountability of professional accountancy 
bodies 
2.1. Introduction 
Accountants are powerful social actors who play an important role in determining what is 
accounted for, to whom, and for what purposes (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Willmott, 1986). 
Accountants create and control the financial narrative on which society moulds its behaviour. 
Not only is the output of the accountants’ work significant, but accountancy remains a significant 
contributor to ‘UK economic activity’ (Radcliffe, Cooper, & Robson, 1994, p. 607). In so doing, 
the accountancy profession and its tools assume a privileged position of trust in society: ‘There 
is no full picture. We make the picture. That is what gives us our power: people think and act on 
the basis of that picture!’ (Hines, 1988, p. 254). 
The structures that enable and regulate this privileged position are therefore of particular 
interest to modern society (Abbott, 1988; Friedson, 2001; Macdonald, 1995). Whilst much 
attention has been paid to the governance of private sector entities and charities, the 
governance of the professional associations, housing and regulating groupings of those classified 
as professionals has been relatively under-researched (Ramirez, 2009). The governance and 
accountability of professional bodies is important from the perspective of their role in society 
and the legitimacy of their processes in the eyes of the membership and the sectors they serve.  
The necessary tension between maintaining the structures that reinforce the position of 
accountants, and the wider accountability of the profession to its stakeholders, is examined 
through the role of professional accountancy bodies (Willmott et al., 1993). This requires a 
continual balancing of the public and political accountability of the professional body to 
perpetuate the trust that society places in accountants whilst maintain legitimacy amongst the 
membership.  
This chapter outlines the roles of professional accountancy bodies in organisations and society 
in Section 2.2, considering the governance and accountability of such. The field of UK 
professional accountancy bodies is then reviewed in Section 2.3. In this section the governance 
and accountability of the ICAEW is problematised through an examination of significant historic 
events (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a; Shackleton & Walker, 2001). Section 2.4 concludes the 
chapter. 
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2.2. Roles of professional accountancy bodies in organisations and society 
‘Professional associations are primarily, but not exclusively, political bodies whose 
purpose is to define, organise, secure and advance the interests of their (most vocal and 
influential) members’ (Willmott, 1986, p. 556) 
Professional accountancy bodies create professional identity through managing members 
interests’, including ‘the status associated with the differentiation of “professional” from other 
types of labour’ (Willmott et al., 1993, p. 1). The designation of ‘professional’ elevates the 
position of those claiming this title (Willmott, 1986) and fosters a trust relationship with those 
who seek their services. As the recipients of such services are often reliant on their execution 
for regulatory purposes, e.g., financial accounts, taxation and other filings, the work product and 
its quality is somewhat intangible in contrast to the goods sold, for example, by retailers 
(Macdonald, 1995). The work of accountants is therefore significant, as management and 
owners place their trust in them to provide high quality, reliable information on which they can 
take strategic and operational decisions, both internally within organisations and externally 
within capital markets. 
To foster this trusting relationship, professionals are subject to a test of competence in the form 
of professional examinations, supplemented by a period of practice before they can seek entry 
to a professional body (IFAC, 2015). Moreover, as members of a professional body, qualified 
accountants are required to abide by the rules and regulations thereof, for example, Codes of 
Ethics (IFAC, 2018b), and continuing professional development requirements (IFAC, 2018a). 
Other characteristics that have often been accepted as distinguishing professions remain under 
discussion. For example, closure is often cited as a mark of profession, both in relation to 
membership and market (Larson, 1977). For UK accountancy, however, this has remained 
problematic as there have always been multiple routes to membership of professional 
accountancy bodies in the UK and the Royal Charters do not exclude alternative groupings, 
rather distinguishing between qualified and unqualified accountants (ICAEW, 1880). In practice, 
in the early stages of the profession the educational requirements may have acted to prevent 
large sections of the public from being eligible to become accountants (Kirkham & Loft, 1993). 
Some commentators have focused on the mutual economic benefits derived from membership 
of professional bodies rather than the service and altruistic aspects that are often emphasised 
in the literature on the professions (Macdonald, 1995). 
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‘The pronounced aims of early societies in promoting the improved status and prestige 
of the profession often sounds like a drive for collective upward social mobility, but 
could be construed as a desire for economic advantage.’ (Matthews, 2017, p. 315) 
This economic focus is supplemented by the three important tasks performed by professional 
bodies as membership organisations. First, they offer an internal space where interaction can 
take place and sub-groupings can represent themselves in the negotiation of norms. This is an 
important aspect of the governance process. Second, they represent the profession to external 
bodies, e.g., the state, other professions. Finally, they perform a monitoring role ensuring that 
members adhere to the normative rules created, and disciplining those who do not (Greenwood 
et al., 2002).  
In the UK, the professional bodies are constituted through a special instrument, a Royal Charter, 
issued by the Privy Council and are subject to oversight by this body (The Privy Council, 2017). 
One of the conditions of the grant of a Royal Charter is that it should be in the ‘public interest’. 
In many other jurisdictions, e.g., the US, the professional accountancy body is constituted by 
means of differing enabling legislation but has similarities in the content of such a constitutional 
framework, including a responsibility to the public interest (e.g., AICPA). The discussion of the 
public interest is often interlinked with the economic self-interest of members (Lee, 1995; 
Matthews, 2017). The specific enactment of the public interest has been much debated in both 
the academic (Sikka et al., 1989) and professional sphere (Izza, 2017), and it is a concept that 
has the capacity to influence the mode of governance (Willmott et al., 1993); this is discussed 
further in Section 2.2.3. The next section considers what is meant by governance of professional 
membership bodies and how it differs from other governance structures. 
2.3. What is meant by governance and accountability of professional 
membership bodies? 
‘Governance has been defined to refer to structures and processes that are designed to 
ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, equity and 
inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based participation. Governance also 
represents the norms, values and rules of the game through which public affairs are 
managed in a manner that is transparent, participatory, inclusive and responsive. 
Governance therefore can be subtle and may not be easily observable. In a broad sense, 
governance is about the culture and institutional environment in which citizens and 
stakeholders interact among themselves and participate in public affairs. It is more than 
the organs of the government.’ (UNESCO, 2017)  
The concept of governance has risen in prominence over recent years as popular focus has been 
directed to corporate governance in the wake of various corporate scandals. In part, the reaction 
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to corporate failure and the rhetoric of accountability helped fuel increased managerialism and 
the expansion of governance tools and frameworks to the public (Osborne, 2010), charity 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009), and not-for-profit sectors (Cornforth, 2003). Despite the 
increasing body of research into governance beyond corporate structures, it remains the case 
that the concept of governance is most closely linked with corporate governance; this includes 
the activities of the Board of Directors or body representing the owners or the key stakeholders 
of the entity. In professional membership organisations, the distinction between those who 
govern and the manner in which stakeholders benefit from good governance is more 
problematic as trust in the work of professionals is hard to quantify and professional bodies are 
typically self-governing thereby disciplining their own members.  
Historically, within professional bodies there was little difference between the values of the 
volunteers, full-time staff and members as they all shared the same professional grounding as 
members of the grouping. However, as the professional bodies themselves have become 
professionalised (Friedman & Mason, 2006) and experts have been brought into the executive 
function, e.g., marketing, policy and events, the mediating role of the governing body has 
evolved to represent the views of the membership in the political sphere, to resolve conflicts of 
opinion between users of services provided by the body and those charged with the provision 
of such services (Brennan & Solomon, 2008). This governance gap (between object and subject 
of governance (Friedman & Mason, 2006)) is likely to continue to widen as membership grows 
and the administration becomes increasingly complex. Unlike corporate governance, which is 
dominated by an agency perspective (Brennan & Solomon, 2008), the relationships within the 
governance structures of professional bodies would appear to be less easily quantifiable. 
To date the study of governance has been extended by adapting existing theories to different 
structures of governance (Christopher, 2010). The multi-theoretical governance approach has 
been adopted in relation to co-operatives and mutual associations (Cornforth, 2004), the non-
profit sector (Stone & Ostrower, 2007), and democratic member-based organisations (Spear, 
2004). In the context of professional membership bodies, the accountability structures are 
important contributors to the legitimacy of the governance process. Accountability is commonly 
understood to mean ‘being called to account for one’s actions’ (Mulgan, 2000, p. 570). It is the 
taking responsibility for actions and providing relevant explanations (Roberts & Scapens, 1985). 
Three features are identified as important when establishing accountability, the external nature, 
an interaction between those giving an account those calling for the account which is accepted 
as legitimate and a form of authority over those called to account e.g. sanctions (Mulgan, 2000).  
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Accountability can be expressed as a construct of governance. Research has identified a 
broadening of the scope of concept leading to a ‘chameleon quality’ (Sinclair, 1995, p. 219). For 
example, Sinclair lists five forms of accountability; political accountability, public accountability, 
managerial accountability, professional accountability, and personal accountability (Sinclair, 
1995). In this analysis, the final two forms of accountability are personal or internal therefore in 
keeping with Mulgan’s (2000) concept of responsibility. Managerial accountability takes place 
both within the organisation as well as between the organisation and those with whom it 
contracts (Messner, 2009) so has a dual nature straddling the internal/external. 
This thesis focuses on two forms of external accountability derived from the literature, the 
political accountability of the individual Council members and the public accountability of the 
Council to the membership and those beyond. Whilst the Council is also responsible for 
overseeing managerial accountability via the Board this is not a focus of the thesis.  
‘Accountability can be framed by four interrelated questions (who, to whom, for 
what and by which means)’ (Joannides, 2012, p. 244). 
The table below uses the questions outlined by Joannides (2012) to help frame the 
accountability of the Council as a collective and the accountability of the individuals who 
comprise the Council. 
Table 2.1: Forms of accountability 
Accountability questions 
Form of accountability Public Political 
Who The Council Council members 
To whom Membership; broader 
stakeholders 
Constituency 
For what Ensuring the objects of 
the professional body are 
met 
Representation of views from 
across the profession 
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By what means Membership ratification 
e.g. AGM, special votes; 
constitutional framework 
Appointment processes 
Source: Devised by author from Joannides (2012) 
2.3.1. Political accountability of Council members 
Political accountability is achieved through the governing Council’s composition with geographic 
constituencies electing representatives (Friedman & Mason, 2006) and co-options being used to 
fill gaps in representation. The representative nature of the Council is important as the failure 
to structure the governance mechanisms effectively to reflect the self-interest or sectoral 
interests of members may lead to an undermining of the overall system of governance (Willmott 
et al., 1993). 
As a result, the processes of representation are of interest in understanding the manner in which 
the elected Council members are representative of their constituency and the extent to which 
they are accountable to the constituents that they purport to represent. As the membership 
increases in heterogeneity the capacity of the Council to effectively represent the interests of 
the membership becomes increasingly important (Ramirez, 2009). 
The existing literature has not yet addressed the political accountability of the Council members:  
‘the operation of mechanisms intended to represent the membership of professional 
bodies and foster participation in institutional life have hardly been addressed at all’ 
(Ramirez, 2009, p. 382) 
Through examining the political accountability of the Council members and the appointment 
processes this thesis adds to our understanding of the representation and accountability 
mechanisms of professional accountancy bodies.  
2.3.2. Public accountability of professional accountancy bodies 
As outlined in the prior section the public accountability of professional accountancy bodies is 
twofold: firstly to the membership and secondly to other stakeholders. The Council is 
accountable for ensuring that the professional body operates within its constitutional structures 
and is held to account by its membership via membership votes, the annual general meeting or 
by other stakeholders through enforcement of its constitutional structures. For example, there 
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have been a number of occasions where members of the ICAEW have challenged the authority 
of the Council through lack of support for proposals to merge with other professional 
accountancy bodies (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). Noguchi and Edwards (2008b) attribute the 
rejection of the merger proposal to the lack of representation of the concerns of the general 
membership within the Council. This has also been the case with other professional accountancy 
bodies, however the dissent was subsequently overcome and successful mergers took place e.g. 
Canada (McFarland, 2014); AICPA and CIMA (AICPA, 2016) 
Public accountability beyond the membership derives from the constitutional structures of 
professional accountancy bodies which include commitments to the public interest, for example 
the 1988 AICPA Code of Conduct (Mintz, 2018) or IFAC (IFAC, 2012). The understanding that 
accountancy serves the public interest (Willmott, 1990) is often repeated within the literature 
on the professions, without a clear exposition of what the public interest actually is.  
Willmott et al. identify two primary ways that the profession may be considered to serve the 
public interest (Willmott et al., 1993). Firstly, the capital markets perspective whereby 
accountancy can be argued to serve the public interest by facilitating the smooth operation of 
the market by following the appropriate standards of professional behaviour (Dellaportas & 
Davenport, 2008) i.e. a normative approach. Secondly, a wider conception of the nature of 
accountancy and therefore the public interest which incorporates interest group ideas from 
political theory. However, accountability beyond the membership is problematic as it is difficult 
to frame who the relevant public is and what interests are deemed relevant along with the 
processes of accountability (Joannides, 2012). Accountability to multiple interested groups 
reflects the aggregative approach to the public interest (Cochran, 1974) and is acknowledged to 
suffer from the inability to specify an appropriate means of aggregating the interests of those 
beyond the membership (Bozeman, 2007a). Some professional accountancy bodies have 
attempted to address wider interests by appointing public interest Council members e.g. ICAS 
(ICAS, 2018) although this step suffers from criticisms related to the interests of those members. 
The public interest focus of the thesis is on extent to which the ICAEW can be held accountable 
for its actions by means of its Royal Charter and members’ adherence to the Code of Ethics. 
Public accountability – constitutional structures 
For the constitutional structures to create meaningful governance frameworks, professional 
bodies must be publicly accountable to their members and others who seek to invoke their 
provisions. For example, the Royal Charters afforded to UK professional membership bodies 
contain various commitments in exchange for the Chartered designation.  
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There is a paucity of research on the public accountability of professional membership bodies 
resulting from two factors, first, the objects of the Royal Charters afforded to Chartered bodies 
are wide and open to interpretation, and second, the processes of recourse are limited. As a 
result they have rarely been explored by researchers and only in the context of one body, the 
ACCA (Sikka et al., 1989). 
In theory, at least, public accountability to the membership is less problematic than for those 
beyond. Any member may table ‘resolutions at annual general meetings, or by organising 
extraordinary general meetings, and directing policies.’ (Mitchell & Sikka, 2004, p. 399). 
However, Mitchell and Sikka (2004) also reflect that this is not realistic due to the practical 
aspects of undertaking such tasks. 
Sikka et al. sought recourse for what they perceived to be a breach of the terms of the ACCA’s 
Royal Charter however, ‘when contacted the Privy Council Office stated there were no clear 
procedures or a policy for monitoring compliance with Royal Charters’ (Sikka et al., 1989, p. 62). 
This is reiterated by the Privy Council: 
‘If you believe that a Chartered body is in breach either of its Charter or of the general 
law then the correct recourse is to the body itself, in the first instance, via the body’s 
own complaints procedure, details of which can usually be found on its website.’ (Privy 
Council, 2020)  
The mode of enforcement of the Charter objectives has also been somewhat unclear. In the 
past, where a dispute has arisen with members, it was held that the courts could not intervene 
as the professional body (ACCA) was constituted under Royal Charter and was therefore subject 
to a different form of redress whereby a ‘Visitor’ is appointed by the Lord Chancellor on behalf 
of the sovereign (Mitchell & Sikka, 2004). However, in a subsequent case, ACCA supported an 
argument that the prior case had been decided incorrectly and the courts were indeed the 
appropriate forum (Mitchell & Sikka, 2004). This uncertainty has been clarified by the Privy 
Council’s current guidance which indicates that recourse should be to any relevant Regulator 
after exhausting the Charter holder’s complaints processes and ultimately via the courts (Privy 
Council, 2020). In practice, the accountability mechanism is via the political accountability of the 
Council members. 
Public accountability – self-regulation of the profession 
The Council is accountable to the membership and stakeholders beyond members’ adherence 
to the norms of membership of the professional body as outlined by the constitutional 
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framework. This privilege of the UK profession to self-regulate remains contingent upon political 
confidence in the conduct of the profession (Robson, Willmott, Cooper & Puxty, 1994). Whilst 
some emphasise that accountants see this as an essential characteristic of what it means to be 
a professional (Robson et al., 1994), self-regulation remains the subject of an ongoing 
negotiation between the profession and the government. Periodically the government has 
redrawn the boundaries of the profession and its’ activities through the expansion of its own 
regulatory role (Radcliffe et al., 1994; Robson et al., 1994) e.g. the creation of regulatory bodies 
including the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which has an oversight role over certain areas of 
operation. As such, further external lines of accountability have been enforced upon 
professional accountancy bodies and their members. 
Self-regulation includes ensuring that members work is of an acceptable level through the 
setting of educational requirements, continuing professional development policies (Paisey & 
Paisey, 2018), the provisions of the ethics code, and attendant disciplinary procedures (ICAEW, 
2011, 2017). It is this monitoring role (Greenwood et al., 2002), by means of formal processes, 
that ensures that individual members’ pursuit of self-interest is restrained and which protects 
the collective enterprise of the profession. 
Research on codes of ethics identifies that they also play a part in defending the organisational 
self-interest. Parker’s model of self-interest identified five functions of a code of ethics: 
professional insulation, interference minimisation, self-control, professional authority, and 
socio economic status preservation (Parker, 1994).  
‘Specified disciplinary processes and periodically observable disciplinary actions may be 
invoked by the accounting profession as symbolic actions designed to demonstrate the 
profession’s supposed ethical attitudes and commitments to outsiders. This 
phenomenon could be described as disciplinary symbolism.’ (Parker, 1994, p. 516) 
The effectiveness of the disciplinary processes has been questioned in the literature, often in 
response to crises precipitated by high profile failures to adhere to these norms, e.g., AICPA 
(Lee, 1995), ICAEW (Willmott et al., 1993), CAI (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2001; O’Regan & Killian, 
2014). Lesage, Hottegindre and Baker (2016) extend research on ethical codes from the Anglo-
American countries to the state regulated French environment finding that there was a linkage 
between offences that were visible that were punished more severely than those which were 
not.  
In response to the criticisms of the disciplinary processes of the professions in general in the UK, 
political pressure has resulted in a dissociation of the disciplinary processes from norm setting 
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role of professional bodies, with independent regulatory bodies created, e.g., for UK solicitors 
(SRA, 2019). The dissociation of disciplinary processes from the professional body is intended to 
increase public accountability for enforcing the regulatory processes of the professions in 
response to the criticisms outlined above. 
This section has outlined and problematised the nature of governance and accountability of the 
accountancy profession. Political accountability of professional bodies to their membership 
requires effective processes of representation and engagement of the membership with these 
processes to ensure that their interests are adequately represented. The public accountability 
of the Council is achieved through pursuance of the objects of the professional body. These 
objects are enforceable by members through the processes of governance e.g. the AGM and 
wider stakeholder groups by means of the complaints and disciplinary procedures.  
The next section will consider the specific landscape of the UK accountancy profession and 
introduce the case study body, the Institute of Chartered Accountants England and Wales 
(ICAEW). 
2.4. The field of professional accountancy bodies in the UK 
This section explores the field of professional accountancy bodies in the UK, highlighting some 
unique features of the UK accountancy profession. It is important to understand how the 
proliferation of professional accountancy bodies in the UK affects the market for accountancy 
services and the wider interactions with external stakeholders and the membership. 
Consideration is also paid to the global role of the ‘Big Four’ in their relationships with the 
professional bodies. Finally, the case study body is introduced and its importance as the focus 
of the study is outlined. 
2.4.1. The context of the UK accountancy profession 
The UK is unusual in the persistence of multiple professional accountancy bodies largely 
differentiated by status (Johnson & Caygill, 1971) and geography in the case of the ICAEW, CAI 
and  ICAS. Further, the large international footprint of two of these bodies (ACCA and CIMA) sets 
them apart from the pattern experienced in other countries. In part this was facilitated by the 
historical development of accountancy in the Empire and Commonwealth (Annisette, 2000). A 
strategy of international expansion has been argued to have enhanced the status of these bodies 
who focused on early international expansion as a response to the barriers created within in the 
UK field of accountancy (Johnson & Caygill, 1971). 
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The UK professional accountancy bodies represent an important site for study as the UK also 
differs significantly from many other countries who have entrenched professional accountancy 
training within the university field (Annisette & Kirkham, 2007). Instead, those who seek to enter 
the profession can enter by a variety of routes, of which the graduate route has been the most 
dominant since the 1960s following the expansion of the university sector (Hopper, 2013). 
Rather than requiring a specific accounting or business-related degree, entrance to training for 
any of the bodies is open to all graduates. In this sense the profession has developed a 
relationship with the university as a whole rather than a specific department (Annisette & 
Kirkham, 2007). Annually, the accountancy and professional services sector employs 
approximately 4,500 graduates in the UK (High Fliers Research, 2019). 
Further, in contrast to many jurisdictions, the UK has not limited entry to the profession to 
graduates alone and other routes to entry continue to exist. It is possible that such routes to 
entry may experience an upsurge in numbers following government policy to encourage the use 
of apprenticeships by employers in an attempt to drive greater social mobility into what it terms 
the ‘elite professions’ (Social Mobility Commission, 2019). 
The outcome is that the profession registers students across a variety of sectors with certain 
professional bodies dominating various sectors (Figure 2.1). To date, the Big Four have been 
amongst the most influential graduate recruiters in the UK and have typically favoured the 
practice-oriented qualifications offered by ICAEW, CAI and ICAS. To some extent this is evolving, 
and other accountancy qualifications are now offered by these firms reflecting their diverse 
business lines. At present they remain secondary qualifications. In order to expand their 
footprint and reflect the increasing heterogeneity of the field of accountancy and the 
membership base, many formerly practice -oriented professional bodies have expanded their 
training to other sectors.  
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Figure 2.1The UK field of professional accountancy bodies 
Source: Devised by author 
2.4.2. The Big Four and their extended influence in the field 
Within the UK context therefore the Big Four have been a powerful historic influence on ICAEW 
and ICAS. This stems from the interaction of their founding partners with these bodies and 
extends to the modern day control of listed company audits, spanning 99% of the FTSE100 and 
96.7% of the FTSE250 in 2017 (FRC, 2018, p. 47), and graduate training. The experience of 
auditing quoted companies is important to help guide the work of the relevant professional 
bodies in defending and retaining this important area of expertise. As regulators have a market 
focused perspective, trust in audit is a critical consideration in their drive to create market 
transparency and stability. The importance of audit as an income generator has declined over 
time for the Big Four as they have expanded their services across a broad range of disciplines, 
but the relationships built in this area often lead to additional work. According to the FRC, in 
2017 audit represented 20% of income with non-audit services to audit clients adding a further 
10% to Big Four revenues (FRC, 2018a, p. 43). 
It is important to the standing of the professional body to retain the engagement of the Big Four; 
this is because it has been shown in the US context that a lessening of engagement with this 
stakeholder group reduced the power of AICPA as a gateway to prominence in the sector with 
others filling the resultant gap (Sellers, Fogarty, & Parker, 2015). In essence, the increased 
diversity in the leadership of AICPA came at the price of a reduction in prominence of the body 
as a whole .  
In relation to the ICAEW, the view has been expressed that: 
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‘The Institute has in fact long been suspected to be the creature of the bigger firms, the 
only ones able to second full-time staff to it and with the necessary networks and 
influence to carry the voice of the profession’ (Ramirez, 2009, p. 403)  
Whilst members do not appear to be formally seconded from the Big Four, they do participate 
in much of the committee work that feeds into policy and consultation responses. This is not 
necessarily reflected in the composition of the ICAEW Council to which the Big Four members 
tend to be co-opted rather than elected. This view appears to elevate the status of members in 
practice (and specifically the Big Four) and marginalises the 66% of working membership (FRC, 
2018a) who are working outside practice.  
As the Big Four now operate at a global multi-disciplinary level, it may be that a regulatory gap 
has opened up between national regulators (professional bodies) and the transnational 
regulatory bodies, e.g., IASB, IFAC (Suddaby et al., 2007). The Big Four are arguably increasingly 
autonomous from the professional bodies (Malsch, Gendron, & Grazzini, 2011) yet still need 
national legitimacy to be able to influence practices (Ramirez, Stringfellow, & Maclean, 2015). 
This need for legitimacy drives engagement with the local professional bodies to protect their 
interests, but also in turn benefits the professional bodies through large amounts of expert input 
from volunteers that would otherwise have been difficult to secure. 
2.4.3. The governance and accountability of the ICAEW 
In this section, the existing literature investigating the governance and accountability of the 
ICAEW is evaluated with a focus on the central concepts of public and political accountability, 
which form the basis of the research. 
Whilst the early literature on the professions took the form of a trait-based analysis detailing 
the collection of attributes required to be accepted as a profession (a functionalist approach), 
this approach gave way to an interactionist approach whereby the professional body is viewed 
as a ‘basic organisational element for defining and securing a respectable and valued social 
identity’ (Willmott, 1986, p. 557). More recently, a critical approach has been adopted that, at 
least in its initial framings, linked the professional bodies to social mobility (Willmott, 1986); it 
has since been advanced through studies of state-profession power and interest relationships 
(Matthews, 2017; Robson, 1991; Walker, 2004). The critical approach has created a framework 
within which the study of the profession can be advanced through the examination of 
interactions in the context of the wider environmental factors, e.g., social, political and 
economic. As the external environment remains dynamic, the professionalisation project ‘is 
continually being managed and reproduced’ (Radcliffe et al., 1994, p. 603).  
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The governance and accountability aspects previously addressed in the literature are appraised 
in relation to the focus of this thesis. 
Public accountability to stakeholders 
Professional accountancy bodies emerged in England in the second half of the 19th century in 
response to the disturbance of existing jurisdictions created by the Bankruptcy Act 1869 
(Walker, 2004). The Act enabled accountants to assume the role of creditor-appointed trustees 
in bankruptcy. This was an important step against a backdrop of significant losses from 
bankruptcy that were of a national concern (Walker, 2004). The establishment of the 
accountancy profession in England followed a similar pattern to events in Scotland, and the 
formation process has been described as ‘little more than a series of copy-cat events as local 
accountants sought the credibility and authority of Scottish chartered accountants’ (Lee, 1995, 
p. 51). Therefore, a motivating factor in the establishment of membership bodies in England was 
to protect the existing work of accountants and extend their jurisdiction to bankruptcy work. 
Whilst they were originally formed on a regional basis in London, Liverpool, Manchester and 
Sheffield in differing manners (Walker, 2004), they soon consolidated (Lee, 1995) and the 
grouping gained a Royal Charter in 1880 (ICAEW, 1880). This provided legitimacy to the 
professional body and afforded it a position of public accountability, protecting the public from 
unscrupulous practitioners (Walker, 2004; Willmott et al., 1993).  
The Royal Charter established the governance framework and entrenched the right of the ICAEW 
to control admission through examinations and a period of practice, and to regulate its 
members. In so doing, the status of members was elevated and the ‘symbolic values of the 
profession – expertise, altruism, autonomy’ could be leveraged to secure improved 
remuneration (Willmott, 1986, p. 559). However, the significant barriers to entry have often 
resulted in new challengers to ICAEW in the form of the alternative professional accountancy 
bodies formed by those excluded, and by nature of the stringent entry requirements in the form 
of articles or location of members (Annisette, 2000; Cooper & Robson, 2006). In particular, this 
led to an opportunity for ACCA and its predecessor organisations to expand internationally 
(Annisette, 2000; Briston & Kedslie, 1997). 
Later, the state granted ICAEW members exclusive rights over the audit of companies by way of 
the Companies Act 1900 (Sikka & Willmott, 1995), and which was extended to a monopoly in 
the Companies Act 1948. This exclusivity over audit formed the backbone of the ICAEW 
members’ work, as there is no protection of the term ‘accountant’. Public accountability of the 
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ICAEW for the work of accountants has diminished as other competing bodies have gained Royal 
Charters and the resulting legitimacy, e.g., ACCA, CIMA. In addition, audit thresholds have 
increased, resulting in a contraction of the market for audit services.  
Public accountability to the membership 
Members form a heterogeneous grouping (Radcliffe et al., 1994) working in a wide range of 
settings ranging from practice large and small, business, third sector, government and academia. 
As such, effective representation of members’ interests is often a balancing act achieved 
through the composition of the Council (primarily an elected body of regional representatives) 
and the committee structure (Ramirez, 2009).  
The apparent disconnect between the leadership (the Council) and the wider membership of 
professional accountancy bodies has been catalogued through a number of historic analyses 
(Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a; Shackleton & Walker, 2001). In part, these events have been tied 
to a strong identification on the part of members of the more prestigious body rejecting mergers 
or amalgamations with other bodies, which they viewed as of a lower status (Walker & 
Shackleton, 1995, p. 482). In this respect, it is notable that it is often the smaller practitioners 
who are trading on their credentials as members of a particular body who have been particularly 
active in rejecting such proposals (Ramirez, 2009). 
In the international context, a similar disconnect was illustrated by means of the 2004 merger 
failure between the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the Certified General 
Accountants of Canada (CGA-Canada) and the Society of Chartered Management Accountants 
of Canada (CMA Canada) (Guo, 2018; Richardson, 1997), also of AICPA’s global credential (in 
conjunction with CIMA) (Fogarty, Radcliffe, & Campbell, 2006). However, both liaisons were 
subsequently agreed, with the Canadian bodies merging in 2014 (McFarland, 2014) and the 
AICPA and CIMA link-up being formalised through the creation of a new body in 2016 (AICPA, 
2016). The recent trend for merging into a larger professional body confirms the belief that this 
will translate into professional influence (Halliday, 1985); indeed, this has been shown in the 
historical context of the merger of AIA and ASCPA (Detzen, 2018). However, it remains unproven 
whether an international merger, e.g., AICPA and CIMA, will translate into increased 
professional influence on the international stage. 
With the emerging research focusing on the execution and aftermath of the Canadian merger, 
Guo (2018) alludes to the perceived superiority of titles creating an initial barrier to merger 
‘There appeared to be a sense of self-elitism among many CAs and, to a lesser extent, CMAs and 
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CGAs as well.’ (p. 2). The Canadian merger created a new designation: Chartered Professional 
Accountant (CPA). In common with prior mergers, an underlying theme of recent mergers has 
been to secure political power and leverage (Detzen, 2018), either nationally or internationally. 
There are two major incidents in ICAEW history where the membership has rejected the plans 
of the leadership. The first was a scheme of merger presented in 1970 that had already been 
approved by five of the six bodies in the UK (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b; Shackleton & Walker, 
2001). This rejection was closely linked to fears of brand dilution (Shackleton & Walker, 2001) 
from the admittance of members from other bodies and resulted in 64.1% of the membership 
taking part in the vote (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). Noguchi and Edwards assert that the 
outcome of the vote was in part attributable to the under-representation of certain groupings 
of members on Council, which was ‘dominated by the big London firms’ (p. 21). Following this 
event, the electoral system to Council was overhauled to enable district society-based elections 
by postal ballot (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). However, postal ballots did not lead to increased 
engagement but continued member apathy, with elections from 1973-1994 reported to have 
‘turnouts ranging from 15.2%-24.1%’ (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b, p. 33) and the most recent 
Council election in 2017 reporting a turnout of 5.8% (Electoral Reform Services, 2017). This calls 
into question the legitimacy of mandate of those elected by so few of the membership (Spear, 
2004). Noguchi and Edwards (2008b) go as far as to claim such events ‘highlight the persistent 
lack of authority of the Council’ (p. 2), citing a series of debacles that continued to challenge 
Council in the period to 1998. 
The poor engagement of the membership has been attributed to an oligarchic leadership 
(Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). However, Noguchi & Edwards focus on the Council as a proxy for 
leadership whilst in the current structure it may be the case that it is the Executive function that 
is acting as a counterbalance to the oligarchic tendencies. As discussed in Section 2.3 the 
managerial accountability of the Executive is not a focus of the thesis. 
Following the failed merger attempts, two reports were commissioned in quick succession to 
examine the governance of the ICAEW, known as the Tricker report (Tricker, 1983) and the 
Worsley report (Worsley, 1985) after their chairmen. The discourse surrounding the reports has 
been analysed as opening the black box of governance, which is often taken for granted in 
research on the professions (Willmott et al., 1993). Of ‘significance is the belief that internal and 
external pressures in the Institute were, and are, exerting potentially disabling effects on its 
governance’ (Willmott et al., 1993, p. 73). The Tricker report (1983) suggested structural change 
to reflect the segmentation of members on Council thereby strengthening perceived 
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weaknesses in political accountability. The Worsley report (1985) recommended the creation of 
new mechanisms in the form of Faculties and Representative Boards that would appease the 
diversity of interest without unsettling the fundamental structure of the Council, thereby 
seemingly addressing public accountability concerns without affecting the underlying structure. 
These limited reforms were those adopted. 
According to Noguchi and Edwards (2008b), an underlying factor in maintaining the traditional 
structure of Council in the ICAEW was the desire to maintain political influence in negotiating 
with the government on professional matters (Richardson, 1997).  Low participation levels of 
themselves may not be indicative of oligarchy and may highlight a tacit acceptance of the status 
quo.  
Even following the implementation of the recommendations from the Worsley report, it appears 
that the public accountability of the ICAEW was not been strengthened, as hoped. Again, when 
situations of strategic importance have been presented to the membership for ratification, the 
remoteness has been shown to result in revolt, e.g., merger proposals involving CIPFA in 1990 
and 2005 that generated votes of 36% and 44% of members (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b).  
The tension between maintaining the membership base and addressing public accountability 
concerns, through securing a voice on the world stage comprising increasingly large 
international accountancy bodies, may be mediated to some extent through a more active 
management of the looser alliances, e.g., CAWW (Chartered Accountants Worldwide), GAA 
(Global Accounting Alliance). This would enable some level of catch-up across the membership 
bodies and facilitate a critical mass, without reopening the hierarchical issues of merging with 
other UK-based bodies (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014). 
‘in establishing effectively “institutional networks of support”, usually centred around 
particular policy issues or common areas of concern, they can also enable participating 
bodies to gain a louder voice and influence within national, regional and global 
regulatory circles. This can reinforce and respond to any detected faltering in existing 
homogenising tendencies but can also redirect homogenising priorities around new or 
revised sets of international standards, which are seen to be more closely aligned to the 
interests of the particular collective and reinforce (and extend) the status of global 
professional elites’ (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014, p. 923) 
The risks associated with a consultation of the membership may be circumvented in this 
manner. Adopting this strategy would allow the ICAEW to access some of the benefits of scale, 
without the costs associated with a full-scale international expansion or merger, and serve to 
28 
 
maintain the status of the qualification thereby maintaining public accountability to both the 
membership and wider stakeholder groupings. 
Political accountability – representation of the membership 
The literature charts the drive for engagement of new and emerging groupings of members has 
though historic analyses (Noguchi & Edwards, 2004, 2008a) illustrating systematic dominance of 
members in practice in developing strategies and ensuring their passage through Council. Three 
groupings have been researched to date, the small practitioner (Ramirez, 2009; Ramirez et al., 
2015), members in business (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a), and the Big Four (Suddaby et al., 
2007). 
The profession tends to be treated as cohesive when in fact there is a complex interplay between 
unity and heterogeneity (Ramirez et al., 2015). This notion raises questions regarding a common 
identity and interests and the possibility of domination by certain segments who act to define 
the membership as a whole either through their size or reach. This is important, as the 
professional bodies play a significant role in institutional change processes as a product of their 
regulatory responsibilities and could lead to inadequate policies or recommendations from 
committees. The implied 'intra-organisational conflict between sections of the membership of a 
professional accountancy body is an under-explored research area' (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a, 
p. 124). 
Some segments, including the small-practitioner segment, are considered under-represented 
through the official representation channels as they have insufficient resources ‘to afford to be 
represented at these institutions’ (Ramirez et al., 2015, p. 1355). This can lead to policies that 
do not reflect the concerns of the membership, for example, the process of implementation of 
audit monitoring indicates that the hierarchy led to the processes being unsuitable and overly 
onerous for the smaller practitioner (Ramirez, 2013). 
The limited changes designed to better reflect and engage the membership have generated little 
underlying change and may have contributed to the continued disaffection with the 
representative processes on the Council. For example, the percentages of those participating in 
the elections to the Council have continued to decline from 15% (Worsley, 1985, p. 41) to the 
lower levels experienced today (Electoral Reform Services, 2017). However, apathy is commonly 
observed in other democratic membership organisations, with Spear reporting that only 1-5% 
of members of UK consumer co-operatives participated in board elections (Spear, 2004), and 
Parker also observing that ‘very few association members ever offered themselves for election 
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to the board’ (Parker, 2007, p. 1464). The representative nature of the Council is further 
explored in Chapter 6 to help answer Research Question 2. 
Expanding governance and accountability mechanisms 
The tension between the public accountability to the membership and other stakeholders has 
led to a number of instances, charted by the literature, where the ICAEW adopted a reactive 
stance to changes in its operating environment.  The first led to a lesser role internationally, the 
second to a delayed response to changing social norms and the final one to a continued 
disaffection of members in business.  
A restrictive approach to training and admittance stems from the original charter and the desire 
not to open membership to accountants in the Commonwealth countries. Annisette (2000) 
characterises the ICAEW as a ‘status’ body founded on exclusionary tactics based on 
competence, social class, gender, nationality and wealth, reinforced by a series of demanding 
examinations and lengthy apprenticeships or articles (Annisette, 2000; Johnson & Caygill, 1971).  
The ICAEW’s overseas strategy led to the ICAEW playing a ‘less significant role in the 
Commonwealth than it has in Britain’ (Johnson & Caygill, 1971, p. 160). First, the significant 
number of members who already practiced in the Commonwealth was a significant contributor 
to the ICAEW strategy overseas (Johnson & Caygill, 1971). ICAEW members were frequently 
‘exported’ to Commonwealth countries to oversee British corporate interests or perform 
governmental functions. In many countries there was no local stock exchange, creating a 
demand for audit or financial reporting until the years following the transition to self-
government. As a result, ICAEW accountants frequently trained local staff to join ACCA, who had 
adopted an international expansion strategy in contrast to that pursued by ICAEW, which was 
slow to adapt its examination and training requirements to facilitate international membership 
growth (Annisette, 2003). The comparatively small international footprint has led to the ICAEW’s 
reduced influence with the international standard setters and therefore in its accountability to 
both members and stakeholders for its contribution to accounting standards. 
Second, the admittance of women to ICAEW was finally executed through a change in legislation, 
i.e., the Sex Discrimination (Removal) Act 1919 passed in the wake of the First World War, rather 
than in response to the extended lobbying of female accountants and the decision to admit 
women in 1909, e.g., Mary Harris Smith who became a member in 1920 (Walker, 2011). The 
analysis of this change in policy highlights the protectionist approach adopted by ICAEW and the 
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resistance to social change that led to other bodies admitting women significantly earlier than 
ICAEW. 
‘An overtly separatist solution was also propounded by Ethel Ayres Purdie, who in 1909 
became the first woman to be admitted to a (lesser status) professional organisation, 
the London Association of Accountants.’ (Walker, 2011, p. 205) 
The failure to reflect changing social norms led to the forced changes by means of legislation 
creating public accountability. For example, the reactive nature of the ICAEW may lead to further 
regulation to separate its disciplinary processes or change the composition of the Council to 
include independent members. 
Finally, the recognition of the trend for significant numbers of members to work in business was 
not initially embraced, requiring members to ‘leave the profession’. Noguchi and Edwards traced 
the trend for members to leave practice and work in business and the resultant struggle for 
representation in Council (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a). The marginalisation of members in 
business was effected through the initial requirement that members resign when they left 
practice, and the later requirement for only Fellows (a designation bestowed on those who had 
worked in practice for five continuous years) to be eligible for Council (Noguchi & Edwards, 
2008a). The intra-organisational conflict between business and practice-based members reflects 
the evolution of professions from autonomous individuals, e.g., partners in legal or accountancy 
practice and doctors, to employees of wider structures, e.g., companies and the NHS (Hanlon, 
1998). The tension continues to grow as practice members now form a smaller grouping than 
those outside of practice yet the public accountability of the ICAEW remains primarily focused 
on practice members.  
2.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the concept of governance and accountability in relation to 
professional accountancy bodies. It outlined the focus on public and political accountability 
adopted in this thesis and the selection of the ICAEW as an individual case study, reflecting its 
position as a leading professional accountancy body in the UK. 
The interplay of governance and accountability of the profession to members and the broader 
stakeholders of the ICAEW have inspired the research questions. Therefore, central to an 
understanding of the governance and accountability of the ICAEW Council, is developing an 
insight into how and to what ends the body is governed (Research Question 1). This question is 
concerned with the public accountability aspects of the Council. It is also important to 
31 
 
understand the interests of the Council members and how those interests contribute to shaping 
the governance of the ICAEW (Research Question 2). This research question focuses on the 
political accountability of the Council. This PhD thesis seeks to provide answers to these 
important questions. 
This chapter has provided an understanding of the governance and its implications for 
accountability of professional membership organisations by drawing on themes originating in 
the sociology of the professions, governance and accountability of democratic membership 
organisations to problematise governance and accountability at the ICAEW and develop the 
research questions. The next chapter outlines the theoretical lens adopted by this thesis which 
serves to enrich and deepen the analysis. 
  
32 
 
Chapter 3 
A theoretical framework for understanding the governance of the 
ICAEW 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter draws on aspects of Bourdieu’s relational theory to provide a skeletal framework 
for understanding governance and accountability of the ICAEW Council. Bourdieu’s theory helps 
deepen the analysis by making linkages between the structural aspects of the ICAEW Council 
and the agency of those who comprise its membership. In so doing, it helps address the public 
and political accountability questions that are central to the thesis. In this context, Bourdieu’s 
analytical tools serve as a method theory or lens through which the workings of the ICAEW 
Council can be better understood (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). 
Bourdieu’s position as a leading sociologist and political activist has influenced the work of social 
scientists over a sustained period. His work developed a contemporary critique through 
uncovering and foregrounding the accepted power relationships and interests embedded in 
daily life, thereby embracing a critically and politically engaged epistemology, e.g., his earlier 
works focusing on the Algerian war (Bourdieu, 1962). The social analysis advanced by Bourdieu 
acknowledges the fluidity of the current state of affairs; this is achieved through the compliance 
of the actors, thereby providing a means of bridging the gap between the structures and the 
agency of individual actors in the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  
Bourdieu’s writings have been used as a framing device in the literature across a range of 
professions to provide insight into the relationships between the actors and the structures that 
house them, e.g., law (Bourdieu, 1986a), architecture (Stevens, 2002), politics (Davis, 2010), and 
journalism (English, 2016). In the study of accounting, Bourdieu’s concepts have been used to 
help explain and further our understanding in a variety of areas, e.g., accounting academic elites 
(Fogarty & Zimmerman, 2019; Lee, 1999), social mobility (Ashley & Empson, 2016; Duff, 2017), 
the work environment (Lupu & Empson, 2015), and the import of business planning techniques 
into the arts (Oakes et al., 1998).  
Bourdieu’s analytical tools assist in theorising the capitals of those who engage with the 
governance of the ICAEW as Council members, and the ability of the professional body 
governance structures and processes to exercise symbolic power and violence over certain 
factions of its membership and external actors, thereby reproducing the status quo. This 
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approach therefore offers ‘a way of conceptualising the relations between accounting 
associations, relevant publics and lay members’ (Neu, Friesen, & Everett, 2003, p. 73).  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section outlines the primary 
elements of Bourdieu’s theory that will be adopted in this thesis. Section 3 outlines how 
Bourdieu’s theory has been translated into the accounting literature. Section 4 outlines the 
translation of Bourdieu’s theory adopted to answer the research questions posed. Section 5 
provides a summary of the chapter. 
3.2. Constructs of Bourdieusian theory 
‘The notion of profession is dangerous because it has all appearances of false neutrality 
in its favour’ (Wacquant, 1989, p. 37) 
The framework advanced by Bourdieu comprises a theory of social structure or field, power 
relationships or capitals, and the individual or habitus (Chiapello & Baker, 2011). The field is 
considered a useful framing concept to help explain the multiple interactions of the social world. 
However, the field boundaries can be delineated differently depending on the perspective of 
the inquiry (Shenkin & Coulson, 2007). This section explores the ideas of field, the concepts of 
capital and habitus, and the interplay between symbolic power and symbolic violence in field 
maintenance. 
3.2.1. Field 
The concept of field is refers to a structured space which is organised around a collection of 
capitals. The management of the field is an ongoing endeavour. Bourdieu argues that the 
concept of a profession is socially constructed; this goes some way to explaining why the general 
theories of professionalisation do not apply uniformly (Abbott, 1988; Friedson, 2001; Larson, 
1977). 
Rather he invites us to look beyond: 
‘instead of taking the notion of “profession” at face value, I take seriously the work of 
aggregation and symbolic imposition that was necessary to produce it, and if I treat it as 
a field, that is a structured space of social forces and struggles’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992, p. 243)  
In this view, the appropriate unit of analysis of the professions is at the field level (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). The method for analysing a field has been articulated by Bourdieu to include 
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three steps. First, an analysis of the field in relation to the field of power or state; second, a 
mapping of the relationships between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions 
competing within the field; and third, an examination of the habitus of agents (Wacquant, 1989). 
3.2.2. Capitals 
‘The strategies of agents depend on their position in the field, that is, in the distribution 
of the specific capital’ (Wacquant, 1989, p. 40) 
In Bourdieu’s conception, agents are a bespoke mix of what is termed capital. Capital is 
intertwined with the concept of field and cannot exist independently (Malsch et al., 2011), i.e., 
the field attributes its own value to various forms of capital. Capitals include economic capital 
(funds), social capital (connections and relationships), cultural capital (which is a mix of 
embodied capital, e.g., etiquette, speech and manners), objectified capital (which is the material 
items reflecting class, e.g., clothing, accessories), and institutional capital (e.g., credentials) 
(Wacquant, 1989). The capitals are fluid and can combine and substitute for each other, enabling 
those endowed with such capitals to ultimately convert them into economic capital (Malsch et 
al., 2011). The amount and type of capital the actors have differentiates their positions within 
the field’s hierarchy (Golsorkhi, Leca, Lounsbury & Ramirez, 2009). The hierarchical structure of 
the field results in certain positions that can only have one occupant but which command the 
structure (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Within the Council, these positions could be the 
President and other officeholders. 
In each field, the balance of capitals differs, creating a unique structure (Oakes et al., 1998) and 
the field deploys its symbolic powers to regulate the capital exchanges of participants. Part of 
the power of the field is transferred to professionals by means of the institutional capital; this 
signifies belonging or credentials that can lead to clashes in strategies to increase the value of 
these credentials, both at the group and individual level (Wacquant, 1993a, p. 27).  
Social capital 
Social capital relates to the benefits to individuals from participation in groups and the attendant 
sociability used to create the group itself (Portes, 1998). Social capital enables actors to access 
other capitals but itself requires the ‘investment of both economic and cultural resources’ 
(Portes, 1998, p. 4). Social capital can be increased both spontaneously through interaction and 
consciously through networking (Richardson, 2017).  
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The sources of social capital are found in others with whom the actor associates rather than 
being inherent in the individual himself (Portes, 1998). The motivation of field members to 
provide the essential links to others is variable and can range from the instrumental to the 
transactional (Portes, 1998). The transactional view represents a collection of obligations that 
can be repaid in various forms. Whilst the majority of social capital research focuses on the 
positive effects of social capital, there are also negative consequences, including ‘exclusion of 
outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward 
levelling norms’ (Portes, 1998, p. 15).  
Social capital research has informed a wide range of disciplines across sociology, political 
science, economics and organisation studies (Adler & Kwon, 2002). This breadth reflects the 
reality that social ties obtained in one form can often be used for other purposes (Coleman, 
1988).  
Cultural capital  
‘Bourdieu introduces the concept of cultural capital in order to interpret individual 
tastes as an accumulated stock of knowledge. Individuals adopt strategies that enable 
them to acquire the required cultural capital to secure particular positions in the social 
hierarchy.’ (Trigg, 2001, p. 113) 
Cultural capital comprises elements of embodied capital, objectified capital and institutional 
capital. The possession of the various forms of cultural capital required by the field enhances 
the credibility of the actor as a full member rather than a peripheral member. Each form of 
cultural capital helps to establish an actor’s claim to credibility within the field. Embodied capital 
refers to how the actor presents itself, in other words it is closely bound to the body (Bourdieu, 
1986b) and appearance (Carter & Spence, 2014). Objectified capital reflects the impression that 
the actor makes through material presentation, e.g., the office environment (Carter & Spence, 
2014). Institutional capital reflects the credentials that field members possess (Bourdieu, 
1986b), including the education that participants in the field have received and includes 
university degrees as well as professional qualifications. 
Differential cultural capital can be helpful in framing ideas of exclusion i.e. four forms of 
exclusionary behaviour: ‘self-elimination, over-selection, relegation, and direct selection’ 
(Lamont & Lareau, 1988, p. 158). This can help deepen an understanding of the reasons why 
differential forms of engagement exist across the membership of a field. 
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Economic capital  
Economic capital is the final form of capital accumulation and can be realised by owners by 
means of translating other forms of capital.  
‘while economic capital is not necessarily a “trump card” on all fields, economic capital 
is one of the easiest forms of capital to translate into other forms of capital and is 
therefore always important’ (Cooper & Coulson, 2014, p. 243).  
Bourdieu asserts that this is the most important form of capital (Bourdieu, 1986b) as it enables 
individuals to access more exclusive forms of education and occupation and so perpetuate their 
capital reproduction. 
3.2.3. The bridging concept - habitus  
‘The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the 
perception of practices, but a structured structure: the principle of division into logical 
classes which organizes the perception of the social world is itself the product of 
internalization of the division into social classes.’ (Bourdieu, 2010, p. 166)  
Wacquant explains the habitus in more detail by splitting it into an individual and institutional 
habitus. The individual habitus is dependent on the unique combinations of attributes and 
experiences. The attributes form the basis of selection for membership of groupings and 
institutions. At the institutional level ‘settings that inculcate, cultivate, and reward distinct but 
transposable sets of categories, skills and desires among their participants can be fruitfully 
analysed as sites of production and operation of habitus’ (Wacquant, 2014, p. 120). 
Habitus is the most widely criticised part of Bourdieu's theoretical framework. The criticisms 
focus on different aspects of the concept: the implied inevitability, the contradictions perceived 
in Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, and through the idea of misrecognition. 
The impression can be formed that the agent is an almost passive product of an inevitable 
process, implying that the actors have little opportunity to determine their own destinies 
(Burawoy, 2012). Bourdieu argued that individuals can ‘step back and gain distance from 
dispositions’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 136).  
Others consider that there are two separate and contradictory strands to Bourdieu’s theory. 
First, the habitus that appears to place agents in objective structures, and second, his ‘practical 
theory’ that may provide a means of navigating the structure-agency conundrum (King, 2000, p. 
417). 
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‘Under practical theory, individuals are constrained by being embedded in social 
relations with other individuals, whose opinions decide upon and inform the legitimacy 
of their actions but they are not determined by rules which exist prior to social 
agreement’ (King, 2000, p. 421) 
Social position is continually being negotiated and renegotiated ‘which allows for 
intersubjectively meaningful but creative social action’ (King, 2000, p. 431). Therefore, the 
interaction between actors has been argued to be more significant than suggested in Bourdieu’s 
writings as it helps shape dispositions and is central to the formation of dispositions, formed by 
and forming habitus: ‘the habitus of an organisational or professional actor therefore becomes 
attached to the organisational or professional field in which they operate’ (Duff, 2017 p.1088).  
Habitus has also been criticised through studies of domination in both capitalist and socialist 
regimes (Burawoy, 2012). These studies claim that the notion of misrecognition is important to 
the habitus concept. ‘Mystification is the term we use to describe the social process that 
produces the gap between experience and reality for all those who enter a specific set of social 
relations’ (Burawoy, 2012, p. 191) 
Burawoy goes on to differentiate between the universal nature of mystification and outlines 
that misrecognition ‘is the result of an individual's internalized habitus (that in turn mediates 
and reflects social processes)’ (Burawoy, 2012, p. 191) 
‘Symbolic domination through misrecognition, however being universal cannot 
discriminate between societies. Bourdieu falsely generalises from his conception of 
contemporary France and precapitalist Kabyle to all social orders. He cannot – and, 
indeed, makes no attempt to – explain how it is that state socialism collapses whilst 
advanced capitalism endures.’ (Burawoy, 2012, p. 192). 
In contrast to symbolic domination through misrecognition derived from the habitus, symbolic 
domination may be achieved through mystification derived from continuing social relationships. 
In this analysis, Burawoy (2012) argues that capitalism requires mystification creating stability 
whilst socialism cannot sustain a protracted hegemony and therefore flitted between coercion 
and legitimation. 
‘In the final analysis, habitus is an intuitively appealing concept that can explain any 
behaviour, precisely because it is unknowable and unverifiable. Bourdieu never gives us 
the tools to examine what a given individual's habitus might be. It's a black box. We infer 
the habitus from behaviour - a shop lifter is a shop lifter because she has the habitus of 
a shop lifter. We only know the habitus from its effects; there's no theory of its 
components or how they are formed as in psychoanalytical theory. In short, habitus is 
not a scientific concept but a folk concept with a fancy name - a concept without content 
that might equally well be translated as character or personality. We can contest the 
38 
 
notion of habitus as being unfalsifiable and unscientific, but I have taken the even 
stronger position, namely that we can dispense with any such deep psychology when it 
comes to understanding the breakdown of social orders.’ (Burawoy, 2012, p. 204). 
The common theme is that the habitus is adaptive to the field under consideration and it is 
created through the belief system of the participants within the field that the field is legitimate 
and the game is worth playing (Carter & Spence, 2014). Without this 'mystification' or belief 
system, the field breaks down. As a result, the field must continually work to legitimate itself, 
offering benefits to the actors for their participation. It can be thought of as a framework in 
which actors direct their actions towards practical functions (the game) and thereby achieve 
certain benefits within the hierarchical field (structure) (Shenkin & Coulson, 2007).  
3.2.4.  Symbolic power and violence 
Symbolic power and violence offer a means of regulating the field and maintaining the field 
specific capitals whilst defending the boundaries and excluding outsiders. 
‘The state is at the bottom of the great reservoir of symbolic power, the central bank of 
symbolic credit which vouchsafes acts of consecration, such as the granting of an 
academic title, an identity card or a certificate – so many acts whereby the authorised 
holders of an accredited authority asset that a person is what he or she is, establish both 
what the people are and what they have a right to be’ (Wacquant, 1993a, p. 39). 
Bourdieu’s conception of power differs from other established theories of power relationships 
by combining a structural and agency-based perspective, e.g., Althusser’s theory imposing onto 
individuals and the bottom-up approach that envisages power diffused through networks, e.g., 
Foucault (Wacquant, 1993b). There is some agreement with Foucault in the following respects: 
first, power is inherent in social relationships and the fabric of the actors, second, it takes 
multiple forms, and third, it can be enacted both consciously and unconsciously. However, 
Wacquant (1993b) observes there are some key differences. First, Bourdieu prioritises the 
institutions that replicate economic and cultural capitals through state approved processes. 
Second, power operates through control of internalisation of symbolic violence by actors, often 
without their acknowledgement of the state of affairs. 
Field level struggle is characterised as symbolic violence with ‘non-physical limiting influences 
exerted on individuals’ (Gracia & Oats, 2012, p. 307). It creates order through the disguise of 
legitimacy and is therefore reliant on the authority to which the actors defer (Gracia & Oats, 
2012). This enables the symbolic acts of violence to appear normal and acceptable to those 
within the field (Tremblay et al., 2016).  
39 
 
‘Resistance is, however, highly problematic because symbolic domination is absorbed 
like air and represents and invisible pressure to which individuals are perfectly adapted’ 
(Stringfellow, McMeeking & Maclean, 2015, p. 89). 
Examples that are often used to illustrate symbolic violence include gender relations (where 
women are portrayed as weaker), and class relations (where the upper classes are portrayed as 
more intelligent than working class). 
3.3. Translation – the import of theory 
‘Translation involves a dual transformation process: both the idea and the actors’ 
interests in the idea change along the way’ (Chiapello & Baker, 2011). 
The import of theory from another discipline naturally involves some transformation and 
adaptation to the context at hand (Killian, 2015). This creates a translation gap that can vary in 
significance (Chiapello & Baker, 2011). Some approaches that have been adopted in the 
accounting literature to date are discussed below with a view to informing the translation of 
Bourdieu’s concepts into this thesis. 
The existing accounting literature citing Bourdieu indicates that a variety of approaches has been 
adopted towards incorporating his analytical framework. Some researchers present a critical 
analysis of the author’s position in the social field (Neu, 2006; Oakes et al., 1998), whereas others 
offer a more limited discussion of the method adopted (Duff, 2017). There is also evidence that 
some of the literature adopts a relational approach (Stringfellow et al., 2015), whereas other 
work overlays a Bourdieusian analysis onto historic artefacts (Gracia & Oats, 2012). It has also 
been remarked that:  
‘The citation of French authors in AOS1 may therefore be somewhat ritualistic, 
manifesting the authors belonging to and participation in a particular field rather than 
providing a central argument for the articles’ (Chiapello & Baker, 2011, p. 149). 
Malsch et al. (2011) also identify a divide between politically engaged studies and those that are 
less politically engaged. The politically engaged studies are ‘politicized through the ways in which 
it problematizes power relationships and mechanisms involved in the production and 
reproduction of domination within fields’, whilst the less politically engaged studies ‘remain less 
socially and politically committed when discussing and problematizing domination’ (Malsch et 
al., 2011, p. 208). Examples of studies that problematise domination include those focusing on 
 
1 AOS – Accounting Organizations and Society (A leading accounting journal) 
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the reproduction of elites in US academic accounting (Fogarty & Zimmerman, 2019) or the 
executive committee of the American Accounting Association (AAA) (Lee, 1999). 
Prior research has also used Bourdieu’s writings to complement other theories. For example, 
power dynamics have been explored by researchers who have drawn on both Bourdieu and 
Foucault to advance understanding of the operation of power (Malsch et al., 2011). Others have 
employed Bourdieusian concepts of field and capital to enhance institutional analysis (Oakes et 
al., 1998). However, some commentators consider Bourdieu’s concepts to be relational and 
therefore set an expectation that they are adopted holistically to be effectively translated into 
contemporary research contexts, criticising a piecemeal approach (Malsch et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, it is also argued that advances in understanding and theory stem from 
innovation and creativity rather than the rigid adherence to existing structures (Malsch et al., 
2011). Malsch et al. find that many studies omit the habitus in their literature review and point 
to the complex nature of the concept, discussed in Section 3.2.3, which evolved over time in 
Bourdieu’s own work. In fact, they note that it was primarily used in theorising rather than in 
empirical work by Bourdieu himself.  
Field 
The dynamic nature of the field has been studied through the linkage of a change in policy to a 
rebalancing of the field and the capitals within it, finding that both the types and amounts of 
capital changed as new groupings were created within the field (Neu, 2006). 
‘the analysis highlights how the ability of accounting to change social groupings may 
mean that accounting is not only constitutive of public spaces but of notions such as the 
public interest itself ’ (Neu, 2006, p. 392) 
Field analysis has also been applied to historical events to understand the construction of 
practitioners in France (Ramirez, 2001). In doing so, Ramirez demonstrates that the actors’ 
position in the field is dependent on their capital mix.  
‘As far as professional fields are concerned, legitimacy in a particular field is, therefore, 
the outcome of both collective actions such as intra-professional disputes and the 
specific way assets constituted in other fields (e.g. credentials, experience acquired in 
other professional fields) are translated and enacted in the professional field.’ (Ramirez, 
2001, p. 393)  
By adopting a field analysis, Ramirez benefits from the more flexible nature of the concept in 
contrast to class, which tends to have a fixed nature. The ongoing field maintenance project 
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encompasses the fluidity of the external and internal forces relevant to the profession, as well 
as the internal and external hierarchies (Ramirez, 2001). The importance of this ongoing field 
maintenance project has also been researched in relation to specialisations, e.g., the tax field 
(Gracia & Oats, 2012). 
Capitals 
Bourdieu’s capitals have also been adopted as constructs to help structure research on social 
mobility in terms of entry to the profession. Despite the recruitment rhetoric based on 
objectivity:  
‘the reality is that the requisite capital profile is associated with attendance at an 
independent school, or a highly rated state school in a middle-class locale, family links, 
or in Bourdieusian terms, economic, social and cultural capitals. These capitals combine 
to create a field-specific form of symbolic capital: reputational capital.’ (Duff, 2017, p. 
1103) 
It is this reputational capital that enables those at the Big Four to convert their capital mix to 
economic capital with more ease than those at lower ranked firms. The study identifies two 
distinct sub-fields, the Big Four and the mid-tier. It also alludes to the recruitment of school 
leavers on apprenticeship schemes as indicating that reputational capital can be created without 
recourse to the high levels of social, institutional or cultural capital envisaged by Bourdieu.  
Research has also identified a changing capital mix during an actor’s career as accountants move 
through the hierarchy with commercial pressures of foremost importance for partners (Carter 
& Spence, 2014). The mix required to accede to partnership has changed over time, and 
continues to evolve in response to both internal and external pressures. They found that the 
traditional values of the profession, e.g., independence and technical excellence, are ever more 
in tension with the commercial embodiment of the partnership for which there is strong 
competition to prove the most commercial (Carter & Spence, 2014). 
At a field level, Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital enables a review of the delineation 
between the undisputed rules or knowledge base and the adaptation to changes in the field: 
‘For Bourdieu, a practice that is deemed ‘technical’ is one that has gained the status of 
being taken for granted. It is technical because it is not challenged. The ability to claim 
a practice as taken for granted or technical is part of the cultural capital of a field. It is 
part of what those in the field are able to define as natural and legitimate.’ (Oakes et al., 
1998, p. 263) 
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Drawing parallels from the curatorial profession studied by Oakes et al. (1998), the accountancy 
profession’s technical core is reflected in the body of knowledge amassed by members who have 
gained the institutional capital and legitimacy of attaining membership; this is also evidenced in 
the professional ethics and the commitment to the public interest. The shift created by the 
adoption of business planning techniques created a form of external imposition of tools and 
techniques into the field; this resulted in an adjusted value system for the creation of symbolic 
capital through revenue generation by business units (Oakes et al., 1998). The power of the 
business planning techniques is attributed to the unacknowledged symbolic violence they have 
imposed on the field in question, i.e., museums and cultural sites. ‘The power of pedagogy lies 
in actors’ complicity in their own control, not only changing themselves but also what is valued 
in the field in which they operate.’ (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 288) 
These findings that actors changing themselves to fit the evolving value system within the field 
are also reflected in the findings that actors evolve to match the field metrics of success (Carter 
& Spence, 2014), and often do so with extreme and unquestioning levels of commitment (Lupu 
& Empson, 2015). 
Habitus 
The habitus of the accounting profession has been researched through the tacit understanding 
of the meaning of a true and fair view (Hamilton & Ó hÓgartaigh, 2009). The habitus of an 
accounting professional is marked by the process of education that members undertake as well 
as the group norms that are absorbed by the members of the profession e.g. Codes of Ethics. 
Habitus has been shown to adapt as accountants progress their careers e.g. (Spence & Carter, 
2014) rather than remaining fixed throughout. 
Lupu and Empson found that the mid-career professionals in their study had the capacity to 
reflect on their sacrifices to progress their careers but that they present them as inevitable 
rather than a trigger for fundamental change. As a result, ‘those who are successful at playing 
the game will only engage in a form of reflexivity that is permitted within the rules of the game’ 
(Lupu & Empson, 2015, p. 1333), and, as such, normalise behaviours and practices that outsiders 
to the field may view differently. 
Symbolic power and violence 
Symbolic capital and violence concepts have been used to provide a framework for analysing 
the imperial field of accountancy (Poullaos, 2016). The symbolic power of the designation ‘CA’ 
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as a marker of quality and prestige was examined through attempts by the British professional 
bodies to retain exclusive use of the term, using it as a type of violence against those who were 
not ‘CAs’ and portraying them as lesser accountants (Poullaos, 2016). Importantly the presence 
of the state as a powerful actor capable of providing legitimacy to the profession is identified by 
the analysis. The loss of control of the ‘CA’ designation by the British professional bodies led to 
a weakening of the symbolic power of the British, and contributed to an emergent hierarchy of 
‘CA’ bodies. The fine line between symbolic power and symbolic violence is an important 
contribution to the literature on the professions. 
Research has shown that actors are often complicit in the process of symbolic domination 
through their practices, e.g., banks’ lending practices, professional bodies’ re-classifying smaller 
practitioners as ‘business advisors’ (Stringfellow et al., 2015).  
‘Acting as the representative voice of its members, professional institutes participate in 
legitimising and ensuring the misrecognition of its members to processes of naming that 
diminish the ‘professional’ identity of smaller practices by classifying them as business 
advisors. The Big Four already dominate in audit, tax and insolvency (considered to be 
specialist knowledge areas of accounting work), and the actions of professional 
institutes serve to further secure the Big Four’s ascendancy and symbolic power over 
the field’ (Stringfellow et al., 2015, p. 95) 
Through the external adjustments, groups of actors in the field increase symbolic capital whilst 
reducing that of others in response to the backdrop of attrition of legally protected work (audit) 
and increasing competition from other types of accountants. Professional bodies have been 
complicit in the programmes of symbolic violence against groups of members.  
3.4. Applying Bourdieu – translation to a professional body context 
‘Every group has its more or less institutionalized forms of delegation which enables it 
to concentrate the totality of the social capital, which is the basis of the existence of the 
group (a family, a nation, of course but also an association or party), in the hands of a 
single agent or a small group of agents and to mandate this pleni-potentiary, charged 
with plena potestas agenda et loquendi [full power to act and speak], to represent the 
group, to speak and act in in its name and so, with the aid of this collectively owned 
capital, to exercise a power incommensurate with the agent’s personal contribution.’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 251) 
In the case study context, the ICAEW Council is charged with representing the membership and 
at the same time is accountable both individually (political accountability) and collectively 
(public accountability) to the membership and a wider grouping of stakeholders. The ability to 
investigate the relationship between research questions related to both structure and agency 
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using Bourdieu’s concepts helps to deepen the analysis by helping to make visible the processes 
of marginalisation experienced by some groupings within the seemingly objective processes of 
governance and accountability.   
3.4.1. RQ1: How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends?  
This research question comprises two parts, a) how is the ICAEW governed, and b) to what ends 
is the ICAEW governed. As outlined in Chapter 2 this research question helps to further our 
understanding of the public accountability of the ICAEW to its members and broader 
stakeholders through is governance structure. Bourdieu’s concepts in relation to the two parts 
of RQ1 are shown in Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3. 1: Bourdieu’s concepts in relation to RQ1 
 How is the ICAEW governed? To what ends is the ICAEW 
governed? 
Bourdieu’s concepts  Symbolic power/violence Symbolic capital 
maintenance 
Source: Devised by author 
Chapter 5 helps to answer these questions from the interviews with members of the Council 
who explicate the relationship between the governance structure and the public accountability 
of the ICAEW to its membership and to those beyond through the Royal Charter framework. 
a) How is the ICAEW governed? 
This part of the research question is answered in four sections in Chapter 5. Section 5.3.1 details 
the governance role of the Council, Section 5.3.2 outlines the empirical findings related to the 
accountability to the membership, Section 5.3.3 includes interviewee responses in relation to 
the accountability of the committee structure to the Council and Section 5.3.4 presents findings 
in relation to accountability beyond the membership. 
Concepts of symbolic power and violence are used to help explain the governance structures of 
the ICAEW and its public accountability to the membership and its stakeholders. The governance 
processes may serve certain interest groupings within the membership due to the imbalances 
created within the Council which leave it susceptible to marginalising certain groupings of the 
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membership through its actions e.g. naming and categorising subsets of the membership 
(Ramirez, 2009).  
b) To what ends is the ICAEW governed? 
The governance of the ICAEW is primarily directed to performing three tasks and which are 
highlighted by the interview quotes in Section 5.4: symbolic power maintenance (Section 5.4.1), 
withstanding symbolic violence (Section 5.4.2) and the symbolic power and violence involved in 
managing agendas internally (Section 5.4.3).  
Significant maintenance work continues to be devoted to the continued symbolic power of the 
‘Chartered Accountant’ designation (Poullaos, 2016) to ensure continued status and economic 
capital for the membership as a whole. This is also manifested in the ongoing boundary 
maintenance (Chua & Poullaos, 1993) required in response to the continual erosion of the right 
to self-regulation and formal legislative interventions recalibrating the field, e.g., increasing 
audit thresholds, apprenticeship levy, and the resulting reorientation to a commercial ethic 
(Suddaby et al., 2007). 
3.4.2. RQ2: What are the interests of Council members and how do they shape 
the governance of the ICAEW?  
This question is also addressed through two sub-questions, What are the interests of the Council 
members and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? As outlined in Chapter 2 this 
research question seeks to further our understanding of the political accountability of the 
Council members to their constituents. Bourdieu’s concepts in relation to RQ2 are outlined in 
Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Bourdieu’s concepts in relation to RQ2 
 What interest groups do 
Council members represent? 
How do the interests of 
Council members shape the 
governance of the ICAEW? 
Bourdieu’s concepts  Capitals Capital accretion 
Source: Devised by author 
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a) What interest groups do the Council members represent? 
To answer this sub-question, the research evaluates the mechanisms of political accountability 
through the different capital mixes of elected and co-opted (including ex-officio) members. For 
elected members, the establishment of credibility with the local electorate is important to 
secure both nomination and election. 
An analysis of the election process is undertaken in Section 6.3.1 and the capitals presented to 
the membership are mapped through an evaluation of the election statements and the 
instructions provided to potential candidates by ICAEW (ICAEW, 2018a). These instructions, 
combined with the requirement to source a number of nominations, may be construed as a form 
of symbolic violence as those who cannot comply with the forms of credentialism may exclude 
themselves from the process (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). As such, potential entry is effectively 
blocked. 
This specific genre of social capital within the geographic electoral constituency must be 
cultivated at a local level, and the ICAEW district society structure has traditionally provided the 
means to achieve this (Ramirez, 2009). Further, for those who aspire to officeholder positions, 
the Council acts as an electoral college; therefore, developing social capital within this elite 
grouping is important. As this grouping changes significantly every two years through elections, 
the work is ongoing and rivals may appear through co-options, e.g., David Matthews, ICAEW 
Vice President 2018/19, is a Senior Large Firm Partner co-optee. 
Institutional capital in the form of education is expected to be relatively homogenous for 
candidates as the majority have passed through university and all have achieved membership of 
the ICAEW, which itself results in the grant of the institutional capital of the ACA (FRC, 2018a). 
Other forms of institutional capital that are often used to differentiate between members 
include a large firm background (and have been through the socialisation processes adopted by 
such firms) (Carter & Spence, 2014), and membership of the District Society. 
This secondary analysis is supplemented through understanding the Council members’ own 
views of the critical success factors. The insights of those who were unsuccessful would 
contribute to additional clarity into what it takes to be elected or co-opted, and represents a 
limitation of the study.  
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The analysis also investigates the capitals of those co-opted (including ex-officio) to the Council 
in Section 6.2.2 and the interests they represent as well as their accountability. This enables a 
comparison between the two types of Council member to be developed. 
b) How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW? 
The interests of the Council members in capital accretion and transition through the sub-field 
serve to shape the governance of the ICAEW. Section 6.3.1 outlines the elected Council 
members’ capital accretion strategies whilst Section 6.3.2 reflects upon the significant 
investment made by all members of the Council to the ICAEW. 
In part understanding the influence of the interests of the Council members also requires 
understanding their personal context, including other volunteering commitments, family status, 
career stage, employment type and distance from the centre (Nesbit & Gazley, 2012). For many, 
the employer is an important intermediary who may seek to further their own interests through 
enabling professional volunteering or constrain professional volunteering where they do not 
perceive an increase in the capitals of the individual which can be transformed into economic 
capital (Wilson & Musick, 1997). As a result those who are self-employed are often less 
constrained by such considerations and more inclined to volunteer professionally (Nesbit & 
Gazley, 2012).  
Table 3.3: Forms of capital in the case context 
Form of capital Example in the ICAEW sub-field 
Economic capital Service within ICAEW seen as a means of 
furthering the likelihood of promotion with 
employer or increasing client base 
Social capital Network of influential members who are at 
the centre of the strategic decision-making 
process who may provide business or 
career opportunities 
Linguistic capital (subset of embodied 
cultural capital) 
Learning when to speak, what to say, and 
furthering interests/influencing the 
decision making process 
Symbolic capital Status as a member of Council, committee 
member or officeholder which can be 
leveraged to gain credibility with others 
outside the group. 
Source: Devised by author 
48 
 
Table 3.3 above outlines potential capital accretion strategies that may be adopted by Council 
members to help explain how different strategies may shape the governance of the ICAEW. 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the constructs of the Bourdieusian analysis and the translation to the 
field of accounting through the existing literature. The problematic nature of the ‘habitus’ is 
highlighted together with the major criticisms. The result has been that habitus has often been 
excluded in translation to the field of accounting. Whilst the use of both singular concepts and 
the relational approach has been adopted in the accounting literature with success, it is 
proposed to use the concepts of capitals and symbolic power/violence to help explain the 
governance and accountability of the ICAEW Council.  
Drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts in this thesis helps to strengthen the analysis by deepening it 
through the use of the theoretical concepts which facilitate an examination of both the 
membership and the structure of the ICAEW Council. This is important within a membership 
organisation where the agents are both the subjects of governance and those with the power 
to govern.  
The next chapter outlines the research methodology and methods adopted. 
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Chapter 4 
Research methodology and methods 
4.1. Introduction 
This thesis seeks to investigate the governance and accountability of a professional accountancy 
body by means of a case study of the Council of the ICAEW. In so doing the following research 
questions have been designed and answered by the empirical work detailed in Chapters 5 and 
6: 
1. How is ICAEW governed and to what ends? 
2. What are the interests of Council members and how do they shape the governance of 
the ICAEW? 
Drawing on Bourdieusian concepts to structure the study (Chapter 3) and the existing literature 
on the field of accountancy outlined in Chapter 2, the public accountability of the ICAEW to 
members and broader stakeholder groupings is investigated by answering the first research 
question. The second research question helps to address the political accountability of the 
Council members to their constituency. This chapter evaluates the methodology and methods 
employed in conducting the research and answering the research questions of this thesis. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the various 
research paradigms within the field of accounting and outlines the selection of a critical 
paradigm for the research. The following section discusses and justifies the research methods 
employed in the study to collect data, and the alignment between the paradigm and methods 
adopted. Finally, the case study is detailed with an extended description of the interview 
process, together with analysis of the coverage profile of the selected pool of interviewees. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the methods and methodology adopted to answer the 
research questions. 
4.2. Research paradigms  
‘Paradigms are about several things, most notably about what is to be studied, what 
kinds of research questions are supposed to be formulated in relation to these subjects, 
with what methods these studies should be conducted, and how their results should be 
interpreted’ (Lukka, 2010, p. 111) 
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In their original conception, Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggested that the research paradigm will 
depend on three key questions, the ontological question, the epistemological question and the 
methodological question, with each filtering in a coherent manner to the next (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). Classification of research paradigms is necessarily a simplification and is adopted to help 
explain the general characteristics of different research paradigms. Ontology refers to the 
researcher’s understanding of reality and is important as it helps define the viewpoint adopted 
by the research in terms of how things are and what we know. Epistemology is interlinked with 
a researcher’s ontology as it is the way in which we know things. It ‘represents the philosophical 
underpinnings about the nature or theory of knowledge in various research traditions’ (Haynes, 
2017, p. 284). Research paradigms reflect the belief system of the researcher. 
The categorisation of paradigms has been subject to expansion since Guba and Lincoln’s original 
categorisation in 1994 to include positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, constructivism and 
participatory approaches (Guba & Lincoln, 2005b). The paradigms are presented as somewhat 
of a continuum, with each reflecting specific ethics or axiology, ontology, epistemology and 
methodology (Guba & Lincoln, 2005a). Although not included in the original categorisation, 
Guba and Lincoln now argue that axiology should be reflected in the paradigmatic discussion 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2005a, p. 200). They argue that to do so incorporates values and ethics within 
the framework, leading to an improved convergence of interpretivist paradigms.  
The epistemological scale ranges from objectivity (most closely associated with positivism) to 
co-creation (most closely associated with constructivist research). Critical research displays 
diversity in its epistemology (Gendron, 2018a) rather than a single approach.  The ontological 
scale ranges from realism to relativism, with the positivist view that reality can exist 
independently from the researchers often considered naïve (Guba & Lincoln, 2005a). Positivist 
methods tend to be data sample driven and are believed to be generalisable to the full 
population, often employing statistical analysis to establish the veracity of certain hypotheses. 
It has been observed that ‘the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism- which lies at 
the heart of the original typology [Morgan and Smircich 1980]- has been disputed’ (Cunliffe, 
2011, p. 651).  
As a means of addressing the complexity, Cunliffe proposed moving from the continuum 
presented by Morgan and Smircich to knowledge problematics; objectivism, subjectivism and 
inter-subjectivism (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Objectivism equates to positivist research as it 
assumes a realist ontology and an objectivist epistemology enabling the researcher to detach 
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themselves from the researched (Haynes, 2017). Subjectivism considers knowledge to be 
socially constructed and the researcher has a role in creating the reality.  
‘Researchers, therefore, need to ask research participants how they experience time, 
place, and progress (historicity) because these are human experiences accomplished in 
practices, interactions, or discourses in a variety of ways (recursive, ruptured, or 
hegemonic).’ (Cunliffe, 2011, p. 656)  
The intersubjective position draws on a relational ontology in which ‘meanings are made during 
interactions with others, thus are multiple, shifting and always embedded in a time and place’ 
(Haynes, 2017, p. 287). In this conception, the research methodology enables the researcher to 
be a primary part of the sense making process resulting from the subjective epistemology. 
Whilst the fluidity between paradigms is acknowledged, the discussion that follows will focus on 
the accepted accounting paradigms to add clarity to the distinctions in research technique. 
Research in accounting spans a variety of paradigms but does not combine different paradigms 
as to do so would reflect differing underlying beliefs. However, within each paradigm a mixed 
method approach can be adopted (Guba & Lincoln, 2005a). The next section will outline the 
dominant paradigm in accounting research, outlining why this has not been adopted in this 
thesis. Section 4.2.2 introduces the alternative paradigms used in accounting research, and 
Section 4.2.3 outlines the rationale for the selection of a critical paradigm. 
4.2.1. Positivist paradigm in accounting research 
Whilst the positivist paradigm remains dominant in the United States, outside of the United 
States there is now a broader range of paradigms contributing to publications. The positivist 
view reflects a specific ontology, epistemology and methodology that distinguish it from other 
research paradigms. The prevailing ontological belief is one of ‘realism’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 
p. 109) inferring that it is possible to uncover a single truth. This is paired with an objectivist 
epistemology that assumes that the researcher can study ‘the object without influencing or 
being influenced by it’ (ibid. p. 110). This leads to the ability to produce research that can be 
reproduced by following the methods prescribed. The methodology employed by positivist 
researchers is to test hypotheses or ideas about how things work and limiting (controlling for) 
external influences that may affect the study. To some extent this has given way to post-
positivism under which the ontology, epistemology and methodology have been modified 
somewhat to reflect and control for the imperfections associated with realism and objectivism 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
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Much accounting research is characterised by a narrowly defined US centric mainstream that is 
focused on the positivist paradigm (Lukka, 2010). Positivists assert that empirical observations 
can lead to the formation of general rules in the research field. The growth in positivist research 
was made possible as a result of the expansion of statistical techniques fuelled by advances in 
computing power, the availability of large databases of corporate information, and the 
dominance of economics-based academics in the accounting subject area. Often, researchers 
adopting a positivist paradigm do not consider any alternative approach (Lukka, 2010). The 
dominance of this methodological approach typically ‘emulates the hard sciences’ (Inanga & 
Schneider, 2005, p. 227), but has little impact on practice. As a result, the positivist approach is 
often criticised, as it does not take into account the contextual effects that can help to explain 
the studied phenomena. 
The reliance on positivism in accounting is in contrast to other branches of the social sciences, 
as illustrated by the quote: ‘while positivism is completely passé in the philosophy of science, it 
still seems to underpin the dominant mode of accounting research’ (Lukka, 2010, p. 112) 
The effect of the historic dominance of the positivist research tradition has been an increasing 
homogeneity in the research output with the following consequences. First, contributions are 
often marginal, and second, a large range of unexplored data is created but not followed up as 
it falls outside the standard methodology (Lukka, 2010). Others go as further, questioning the 
methods: ‘we contend that the reported research is nothing more than correlation analysis’ 
(Inanga & Schneider, 2005, p. 228). 
The substantial reliance on datasets derived from survey and databases risks reinforcing the 
status quo (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997). Further, the methodology prescribes the use of certain 
research instruments (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997) thereby restricting the creativity and insight 
possible through a pluralist approach. For these reasons, it is not proposed to adopt a positivist 
approach in this thesis. The research questions seek to understand the operation of power in 
relation to an in-depth case study of one professional accountancy body. This necessarily 
involves rejecting the positivist approach for a contextual analysis recognising the inherent 
subjectivity of all research. 
4.2.2. Alternative paradigms in accounting research  
Two major alternative paradigms are present in accounting research, the constructivist and the 
critical paradigm. Constructivism reflects a relativist ontology whereby: ‘realities are 
apprehended in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and 
53 
 
experimentally based, local and specific in nature, and dependent for their form and content on 
the individual persons or groups holding the constructions’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). In 
this case the epistemology is subjectivist with the research findings being created as the work 
progresses. Methodologies are dialectical and hermeneutical (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The 
constructivist approach seeks to understand and interpret constructions through research. 
For Guba and Lincoln (1994), critical theory is used as a ‘blanket term’ covering a range of 
paradigms whilst constructivism reflects a move to ‘ontological relativism’ (p. 109). Specifically, 
critical theory adopts an historic realism ontology whereby the structures of society are taken 
as real (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Gendron (2018a) argues that critical accounting research 
presents a diversity of epistemologies and is continually evolving, defining and redefining its 
boundaries.  
Some categories the methodological approach is ‘dialogic and dialectical’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 
p. 110) reflecting the interaction between the researcher and the subject to uncover power 
relationships whilst others are more open to a variety of research methods which seek to 
uncover the processes of marginalisation at work in society (Gendron, 2018a).  
‘A critical understanding of the role of accounting processes and practices and the 
accounting profession in the functioning of society and organisations with an intention 
to use that understanding to engage (where appropriate) in changing these processes, 
practices and the profession.’ (Laughlin, 1999, p. 73) 
The fundamental difference between a positivist paradigm and a critical one relates to the 
imperative for change derived from research. Positivists view action as an injection of 
subjectivity to an objective study (Guba & Lincoln, 2005a). Analysing the status quo is not 
sufficient for critical researchers who seek to uncover the conflicts within society, identify 
potential for change and, as a consequence, to stimulate action (Lukka, 2010).  
The following section outlines the rationale for this approach for adopting a critical research 
approach for this thesis and its fit with the theoretical lens adopted for the research. 
4.2.3. Selection of a critical paradigm 
Critical accounting research serves two purposes; to improve our understanding of how 
accounting is experienced in society; and, to increase awareness of how accounting forms 
incursions into our lives thereby stimulating reflection and change (Roslender & Dillard, 2003). 
Whilst critical accounting research is not prescriptive in its approach (Gendron, 2018b) there are 
some common themes which help to define its boundaries including its challenge to accepted 
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practices and beliefs, better understanding the operation of power in society and its 
consequences which marginalise some groups.  
Critical research can therefore:  
‘be conceived of as a pluralistic arena made up of qualitative studies2, essays, and certain 
types of quantitative research. The theoretical lenses used by critical scholars vary 
greatly, from Marxism to more contemporary thinkers such as Michel Foucault.’  
(Gendron, 2018a, p. 2) 
This thesis adopts a critical paradigm as it seeks to better understand the governance and 
accountability of the ICAEW. It is important as the policies and practices of the profession affect 
not just the membership but wider society due to the trust placed on the work of accountants, 
which forms a basis for transactions, financing and employment amongst other things. 
It draws on elements of Bourdieu’s theory to help uncover the power relationships and organise 
the analysis by bringing to light the consequences of existing practices (Chua, 1986). The ICAEW 
is in effect an ‘organized interest group’ (Chua, 1986) with an agenda to secure increasingly 
lucrative work (Matthews, 2017). In so doing, it operates with certain structures that derive from 
its constitutional documents. The research questions seek to identify and reflect upon the 
conflicts that are created by the existing processes of governance and accountability, which 
result in the marginalisation of certain groupings of the membership and the amplification of 
others. 
Situating the research in a case study helps to provide rich contextual detail informed by theory 
and problematising the status quo. To gain insight into the extent to which the members of the 
Council accept the existing processes the primary research method was interview based. As the 
researcher has adopted a relatively subjectivist approach a qualitative approach contributes to 
‘seeing the social world from the point of view of the actor’ (Bryman, 1984, p. 77). 
Critical researchers seek to highlight the functions of accounting and also to transform practices 
(Neu, Cooper & Everett, 2001). Neu et al. expand on the transformative goal through explaining 
that: ‘most of us “intervene” in a myriad of ways- for teaching, to letters-to-the editor, 
involvement in politics, commentaries in the media, to other forms of community service’ (Neu 
et al., 2001, p. 736). The goal of this thesis is to inform the governance and accountability of the 
 
2 ‘a certain type’ of qualitative study. Not every qualitative study can be critical. 
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ICAEW, and other professional accountancy bodies, through drawing attention to the 
domination of certain interests and the resultant dysfunctional consequences. 
The contribution of critical researchers to changing practices is important. For example, 
Bourdieu contributed to the furtherance of ideas related to interventions by researchers 
through his later actions and writings (Cooper & Coulson, 2014). Those categorised as collective 
intellectuals demand co-ordinated engagement in social interventions amongst academics and 
other activists (Cooper & Coulson, 2014). For this grouping, the challenge is to consider the 
politics of the field rather than one’s own self-advancement. In this approach ‘researchers must 
disseminate their work beyond the academic field’ (Cooper & Coulson, 2014, p. 242). This 
approach has been embraced by a number of leading academics who have communicated their 
insights beyond the academic world including Puxty (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997), Sikka (Sikka, 
2018) and others. There is no one approach to engaging in the processes of change and 
intervention is necessarily a long-term outcome: 
‘I view intervention from a broad perspective, including the dissemination of studies and 
essays in academic and non-academic journals, comments made in the classroom, 
commentaries made on blogs and more traditional media, and so on.’ (Gendron, 2018a, 
p. 8) 
Building networks is important for some critical researchers i.e., to enhance social capital to 
ensure that the researcher’s voice will be heard (Neu et al., 2001, p. 758). Bourdieu’s own belief 
that the academic field would suffice to diffuse social change altered over time and led to a 
change of strategy to take on the role of an activist or agitator for change, in part due to the 
confluence of a number of environmental changes in France at that time (Cooper & Coulson, 
2014).  
It is important to recognise that intellectuals are usually part of the dominant class and that the 
utmost they can do is to use their power to provide a forum for the dominated. This is because 
they cannot fully comprehend their situation or the investment that those dominated agents 
have in the status quo (Neu et al., 2001).  
‘”Critical” accounting research is dominated more than we would surely like to be by 
white, male, Western, Anglo-Saxon and middle class researchers. The perspectives of, 
for example, women, the poor, the working class, ethnic minorities, those beyond the 
English-speaking world, those form “developing” countries, those of the indigenous 
peoples, those of the “emotional” – the perspectives of those most unlikely to write 
critically and interpretatively on accounting- are surely still very much under-
represented and under-played if not entirely absent.’ (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997, p. 79).  
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The thesis adds to the existing work on the professions by providing an in-depth case study of 
the governance structures and accountability processes of one leading professional accountancy 
body. In so doing, the contribution offered is to what is termed ‘domain theory’ within the 
accounting profession (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). The contribution is therefore to the body of 
knowledge of professional membership bodies set within the context of the accountancy 
profession. The rich data generated by adopting the interview method was in part possible due 
to the position of the researcher. This is carefully considered in relation to the research subject 
in the methods section. 
Whilst it has been debated which theoretical perspectives can provide a useful lens for 
structuring critical accounting research (Chiapello & Baker, 2011), the appropriateness 
(Llewelyn, 2003), extent and accuracy of such intellectual borrowing has also been called into 
question (Laughlin, 1999). In response to these methodological issues, Llewelyn (2003) offers a 
framework to provide clarity on the linkage between the conceptual framing of qualitative 
accounting research and theory. Whilst conceptual framing is important in offering a means to 
understand and order empirical findings, it is unclear how the ‘grand theories’ offered by 
prominent philosophers can be applied in empirical settings (Llewelyn, 2003). The adoption of 
Bourdieu’s relational theory accords with what Lukka and Vinnari term a method theory, helping 
to frame the study and develop an understanding of the object of the study within a different 
domain (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). The new understanding generated through conducting the 
study offers the opportunity to contribute to domain theory (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). In 
accordance with this view, the research is focused on contributing to the field through adopting 
Bourdieu’s concepts as a method theory. It is also acknowledged that there remains a continuing 
lack of consensus on what may be termed a theoretical contribution (Lowe, De Loo, & Nama, 
2016). Whilst Lowe et al. (2016) disagree with the prima facie clarity provided by Lukka and 
Vinnari, they consider that localised translations of method theories can generate a relevant 
contribution, such translations can also contribute to the partial loss of foundational concepts 
from the method theory (Kamla & Komori, 2018). Additionally, they draw attention to the 
evolving body of the method theory, for example, due to new publications, e.g., Latour (Latour, 
2018), or exploration of new areas of the author’s publications, thereby indicating that there 
may be some mutual dependence between method and the domain. However, the original 
authors refute this claim by asserting that the separation was clear in the original study (Lukka 
& Vinnari, 2016). 
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The approach adopted in this PhD research study accords with applying a method theory (Lukka 
& Vinnari, 2014) to the domain of the professional accountancy body and therefore also fits with 
what Llewelyn characterises as theorising settings: ‘Level four explains specific social, 
organisational or individual phenomena in their settings’ (Llewelyn, 2003, p. 674). 
The research methods that were employed to conduct the investigation and answer the 
research questions are now considered in the following section. 
4.3. Research methods 
A critical paradigm does not prescribe the research method, rather this research is driven by: 
‘the concern to challenge and ultimately change existing social structures by denaturalizing the 
power relations that are embedded within them’ (Annisette & Cooper, 2017, p. 90) 
A qualitative approach has been adopted as it complements a critical paradigm that seeks to 
uncover power relationships, which are often hidden in the official accounts of various bodies 
and individuals. Through a dialogic approach, those participants who are dominated by the 
existing structures may be able to reflect better on their own submission and thereby foster 
action.  
The research methods outline the empirical evidence collection processes adopted to answer 
the research questions. The methods are qualitative as the questions seek to understand the 
context of governance of the ICAEW and are dependent on the contextualisation of the 
information (Lee & Humphrey, 2006). By selecting an interview approach, theory can be used to 
help make sense of the observed problem and is useful in cases where the internal dynamics are 
not readily transparent. 
A recognised limitation of adopting a critical approach is that it tends to be embraced by a 
certain social, ethnic and gender group that assumes that the researcher themselves is 
emancipated and can reflect on their position in the process. To some extent this is mitigated 
through the reflexive practices outlined in Section 4.3.3. 
This section is structured as follows: first, the methods adopted in critical accounting research 
invoking Bourdieu’s theories are reviewed to identify the suitability of certain methods and how 
the researchers obtained access to the field of study, together with any positionality concerns. 
The following section (Section 4.3.2) discusses the ethical issues raised by this research; this 
leads to Section 4.3.3 that considers the reflexivity of the researcher in addressing the 
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positionality matters related to the research project. Finally, in Section 4.3.4, consideration is 
paid to the case study method and its limitations in terms of generalisability in contrast to the 
depth of understanding and contextual analysis that would not otherwise be achieved. 
4.3.1. Bourdieu’s framework and research methods 
Bourdieu’s analytical framework has been used in conjunction with a variety of research 
methods within the critical accounting research community. A review of a selection of articles 
published in the critical accounting research journals of Accounting, Organisations and Society, 
Critical Perspectives in Accounting and Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal for the 
qualitative research methods adopted indicates the following approaches adopted by some of 
those papers which adopted a Bourdieusian lens (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). 
Archive analysis is often undertaken where an historical or critical event, e.g., Gracia & Oats 
(2012), is being examined and the researcher wishes to identify and capture the responses at 
that time, either through the ‘official accounts’ or through less formal oral histories. This is 
typically framed as a case study. Some notable examples and the context in which they are used 
include Neu et al. that uses discourse contained in the Canadian Chartered Accountant magazine 
to examine ethical discourses (Neu et al., 2003). They use the magazine as it was both official 
and timely (monthly). They argue that character-based ethical discourses are a type of embodied 
cultural good, in contrast to rule-based ethics that are an objective cultural good. Poullaos 
(2016) uses an historical analysis based on comparing the ICAEW and the Canadian profession, 
drawing on symbolic capital and symbolic violence from Bourdieu. The empirical data comprise 
primary sources from the archives.  
‘Analysis of the material is based upon i) Pierre Bourdieu’s remarks about names and 
credentials in conjunction with ii) his theorisation of the state’s power over naming and 
iii) his notions of symbolic capital and symbolic violence, applied both at ‘state’ and 
profession level; and iv) a chronological tracking of the manifestations of and 
interactions between the above elements; and other contextual factors impinging upon 
the events under analysis.’ (Poullaos, 2016, p. 16) 
Another research method undertaken in Bourdieu-inspired studies is an interview based 
approach, e.g., Duff (2017) and Lupu & Empson (2015); this is often supplemented by reference 
to documentary evidence, e.g., Stringfellow et al. (2015). The incorporation of documentary 
evidence can help to reinforce themes arising from the interviews. However, it should also be 
recognised that documentary evidence might not always be a desirable mode of corroboration 
as it forms an official account, and some of Bourdieu’s concepts are focused on the agent’s 
perceptions of themselves and the field in which they are positioned. For example, the symbolic 
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power relationships uncovered by Stringfellow et al. (2015) where the interview approach was 
adopted to uncover the domination of the individuals by the field of accountancy: 
‘problematic issue that such agents were unlikely to be able to articulate the 
mechanisms of domination and symbolic violence themselves, and the researcher must 
seek to unmask these taken-for-granted power relations’ (Stringfellow et al., 2015, p. 
90). 
As the actors are part of a complex web of institutional relationships rather than individuals, 
submissions to an official enquiry were suitable supplements for uncovering the wider web of 
dominance. In their study, Lupu and Empson (2015) undertook interviews with professionals to 
determine their experiences of work-life pressures within the field of accountancy to examine 
Bourdieu’s ideas of habitus and illusio within firms. With their selection of interviewees, who 
were mid to late career, they were able to reflect to some degree on the drivers of overwork 
and the sacrifices that they had undertaken in the quest for recognition as a master player, i.e., 
the battle for symbolic capital (Lupu & Empson, 2015, p. 1332). It is clear that, for employees in 
the early career phases, it is difficult to recognise the fact they are caught up in the game: ‘As 
they work relentlessly long hours they have no time for the reflexivity required to question how 
things are done. As a result, unable to resist, they comply with and perpetuate the rules of the 
game’ (Lupu & Empson, 2015, p. 1330). 
A third notable section in methods discussions adopting Bourdieusian theories relates to the 
position of the researcher in relation to the field of research. In some papers, cursory detail is 
provided of the methods used and the rationale for their adoption. Notably, this discussion 
appears more developed beyond the main critical accounting journals e.g. Oakes et al. (1998) 
discuss the fact that the methods adopted in the study put the researcher in the role of a:  
‘‘peripheral member’ not only conducting formal interview by also talking with insiders 
over coffee and beer, sharing the occasional meal, and attending workshops and 
meetings about planning and performance measurement, although not participating in 
the actual work of the participants’ (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 265) 
This is in contrast to the more assimilated group member role that others have adopted (Parker, 
2007). The methods section also discusses the practice of reflexivity and the role of the 
researchers in drawing parallels between their experiences within academia and the field 
researched. Neu (2006) also discusses his positionality within the research methods section: 
‘Given that the ability to undertake this research was clearly related to my position in this social 
field, it is important to acknowledge this social positioning’ (Neu, 2006, p. 397). 
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Both papers mentioned above adopt a range of methods to supplement the interview methods 
and possible bias arising from the researcher’s position. Notably, Neu (2006) discusses how he 
mapped the field both pre- and post-reform and the sources used to undertake this task. 
Killian (2015) also discusses that the adoption of a Bourdieusian analysis to a new setting is 
effectively a translation with the attendant adaptation to the circumstances of the research 
project. It is not, and cannot ever be, a replication of Bourdieu’s work. This is due to a range of 
factors, including the breadth of Bourdieu’s writings, the fact he wrote in French rather than 
English, and the differing contexts in which his field work was conducted, both in time and 
setting, e.g., his field work, the political environment. As such, even an holistic adoption of 
Bourdieu’s framework is only ever a form translation (Kamla & Komori, 2018; Malsch et al., 
2011). 
Bourdieu’s framework has therefore been adopted in the accounting literature in a variety of 
different ways and does not dictate the research method adopted. The following sub-section 
outlines the importance of following the protocols of research ethics of the University and how 
they were applied to the field work part of the research. 
4.3.2. Ethics 
As a researcher, I am continually aware of the ethics of research and my position in relation to 
those I wish to interview. I applied for and obtained ethical approval to conduct research 
interviews following the University of Sussex ethical guidelines. The approval was granted under 
reference ER/SS706/11 on 7 June 2017. All participants were provided with an information sheet 
about the research and advised of their ability to withdraw their contribution at any time; they 
were also asked to sign a consent form acknowledging their participation in the research 
(Appendices 1 and 2). 
The fact that I have a shared experience with the interviewees, in terms of the professional 
qualification and membership of the ICAEW Council, elicited a trust relationship rather than a 
hostile one where the researcher is viewed with scepticism (Dunne, Pryor & Yates, 2005). All 
respondent identities will be kept confidential and only their general characteristics will be 
disclosed in the research so as not to identify their contribution. 
However, I also have a background of knowledge that may drive my questioning, even though it 
is not directly incorporated into my research. This provided the potential to guide my research 
into areas that are not apparent to the external observer. The reflexive process facilitated 
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through a research diary has helped me to address this potential bias to some extent, combined 
with triangulation of data and corroboration through interview transcripts. The following sub-
section explores the underlying need for researcher reflexivity in this research context. 
4.3.3. Reflexivity 
‘empirical research will be partial, despite any truth claims to the contrary, and thus it 
would be better to be clear about the biases and exclusions before launching into 
empirical detail’ (Laughlin, 1995, p. 65). 
Reflexivity is concerned with how I, as a researcher, reflect the data collection process and the 
sensemaking process attached to it (Haynes, 2017). The goal of reflexivity goes beyond reflective 
practice and, whilst they are often used interchangeably, they have different meanings, being 
more of a continuum from reflection to critical reflection to reflexivity (Finlay, 2008). Reflexivity 
can be used in a variety of ways depending of the ontology, epistemology and methodology of 
the researcher (Haynes, 2017). The common approach to reflexivity includes an examination of 
the researcher’s role in the various stages of research and how this interacts with the object of 
the research (Alvesson & Skoldburg, 2009). As such, the practice of reflection, being self-aware 
and critically evaluating one’s own responses to research settings forms part of the researcher’s 
own life-long learning journey (Finlay, 2008).  
I adopt a subjectivist view of reality that acknowledges my position in the research process and 
the construction of meaning at a particular point in time (Haynes, 2017). This approach 
acknowledges the fact that as a member of the ICAEW, I have direct experience of the 
organisation and the designation of Chartered Accountant is part of my identity. As such, this 
enables me to use interviews as my primary research method, helping to facilitate ‘an inside 
view’ (Bryman, 1984, p. 78). 
Further, I am an active member who has recently held the position of President within the 
District Society organisation (May 2016-April 2018). In June 2017 I was elected to the Council of 
the ICAEW, the body I am researching. I need to be conscious of my position of power in relation 
to the research and any preconceptions that I bring to it. However, my position places me in a 
position to offer a unique insight (Burawoy, 1998) into how the membership body operates and 
the decision-making processes. My ability to undertake this research is closely linked to my 
position within the field, in common with Neu (2006). As research cannot be value free, I have 
adopted a reflexive approach to bring these issues to the fore (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) and kept 
a research diary to facilitate this process. 
62 
 
To fulfil the objective of my thesis I mobilised a range of methodological instruments (Parker, 
2014) and I found keeping a research diary useful. It is important for a qualitative researcher to 
keep reflective notes while performing the interviews to identify methodological issues e.g. 
around the interview questionnaire as well as supplementing the interview transcription (Nadin 
& Cassell, 2006). The research diary supplemented my interview notes and recorded my 
impressions of the interview experience, the attentiveness of the interviewee and any 
distractions or barriers created by the environment in which the interview took place. This 
helped me to adjust my interview style for different participants and take into account a variety 
of factors which may not be captured from the transcripts and interview notes alone e.g. where 
the interview was conducted (neutral space, their office, skype), how open or defensive the 
participant was to the interview process. However, the research on reflexivity cautions the 
tendency towards self-indulgence in reflexive accounts (Nadin & Cassell, 2006). As such, whilst 
the research diary supported my work it is not used as a direct source of quotes in this thesis. 
For example, reviewing the research diary following the pilot interview phase in conjunction 
with the interview transcripts and notes helped guide my decision to adjust the interview 
schedule to provide an increased focus for the main study through the decision to exclude theme 
3 (section 4.4.5). During the writing up phase it helped guide my selection of quotes from 
interviewees with an increased reliance placed on those who were fully attentive to the process 
rather than distracted or guarded in their response. As an illustration interviewee 24 had clearly 
forgotten that the interview had been scheduled and was slightly flustered. The more personal 
questions at the start of the interview guide typically put interviewees at ease, and in this case, 
led to them opening up about their strategy for gaining election unopposed (Quote section 5.4). 
Interviewee 12 was a high-profile member who was under time pressure to get to their next 
appointment. As a result the interview was one of the shortest of all the interviews at just 40 
minutes (Table 4.4), but the focused nature provided some interesting perspectives on how the 
individual had benefitted from their position as a co-opted member to the Council (Quote 
section 6.2.2) along with insights into their capacity to represent the sector from which they 
were co-opted. 
Reflexivity has guided my consideration of the impact that I had on the choices and assumptions 
I have made from the perspective of ontology, theory and methodology (Haynes, 2017). I have 
been conscious of the power relationships between me as the researcher and the participants. 
The familiarity with me as a legitimate member of the Council enabled me to draw on a degree 
of empathy, which may have generated a deeper level of disclosure from participants. In 
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common with Haynes’ findings (Haynes, 2010) there was a dichotomy between the closure of 
the organisation (which embargoes minutes for a period of ten years) and the disclosure of the 
individuals who contributed to the research. 
Other research adopts a similar level of reflexivity to Guo, who examines the merger of the three 
Canadian accounting bodies from the perspective of members whilst highlighting his own 
membership of one of the bodies involved in the merger process (Guo, 2018). This potential bias 
was limited in the study through a reflexive approach and the inclusion of lengthy quotes and 
detailed explanations of how he interpreted them. An appreciation of the richness of quotes 
and their context helps to provide a sense of honesty (O’Dwyer, 2004), thereby encouraging the 
reader to put their trust in the rigour of the research. 
Parker also adopted a reflexive approach to his position researching boards of professional 
associations of which he was a member:  
‘Where research site access is opportunistic, as occurred with this study, the researcher 
already had familiarity with and a role in the research setting. On one hand the risk of 
‘culture shock’ in an unfamiliar world is greatly reduced but then the researcher must 
consciously work at developing their research role while aiming at ‘fresh’ research 
insights rather than resorting to intuitive interpretations as a pre-existing native.’ 
(Parker, 2007, p. 1462). 
In these instances the researcher was both an insider and outsider in the process as they were 
part of the research site, making it important to take account of the impact that the research 
may have on individuals in conjunction with the actual research process (Haynes, 2017). In this 
instance, the power of the researcher must be carefully considered as they progress their 
research. 
‘Reflexive methodologies link with ontology and epistemology to integrate ethical, social 
and political judgements on the research process and hence the use of reflexive practice 
can increase accountability for the knowledge that is produced, This is an important 
responsibility for reflexive accounting researchers – to consider not only the process but 
the outcomes of their research, and the possibilities for social benefit, emancipation and 
wellbeing that reflexive research might engender.’ (Haynes, 2017, p. 295) 
The following sub-section outlines how the choice to develop a single case study is an 
appropriate approach to help answer the research questions posed in this PhD. It seeks to 
outline the beneficial aspects of the case study approach, as well as the potential limitations 
that may be experienced by adopting this research method and how they might be mitigated. 
64 
 
4.3.4. Single case study 
‘The rise of case study methodology has been one of the significant trends in accounting 
research during recent years.’ (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995, p. 71) 
Case studies represent a means of explaining complexity in a specific social and organisational 
context. As such, a trade-off is made between generalisability and complexity (Lukka & Kasanen, 
1995) and ‘The difficulty for the researcher lies in attempting to differentiate between those 
aspects of behaviour that are potentially generalizable, and those that are context-specific’ 
(Berry & Otley, 2004, p. 233) 
Some argue that ‘there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in social science’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 223). As such, it is important not to overstate the case (Lukka & Kasanen, 
1995). However, Lukka and Kasanen (1995) also argue that the case study has a greater potential 
for generalisability than generally understood. They consider that issues of induction in both 
statistical and case study methodologies create a degree of inherent uncertainty in all empirical 
studies. Added to this, situational knowledge outside of the study is important in the generation 
of generalisable and relevant results (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995). In relation to the possibility of 
generalisation, in case studies the literature is divided into two extremes (denial of ability to 
generalise, denial of generalisation as a legitimate aim) and a moderating view. Those who deny 
the ability to generalise the limited study often find support in the literature as the limitations 
are often emphasised by case study researchers, thereby reinforcing this view of their work. At 
the other pole, the aim is often argued to be a deep understanding of the research object. This 
is supported by the addition of ‘single’ as a justified object of research in philosophy (Lukka & 
Kasanen, 1995, p. 77). Others argue that a quality case study can give rise to generalisation of a 
theoretical or analytical nature (Yin, 2013): 
‘within the practically achievable standards of accounting research, high quality case 
studies may produce credibly generalizable results. In descriptive case studies, 
contextual generalization rhetoric provides a way to move from isolated observations 
to results of a more general status. Therefore the researcher has to understand and 
communicate the real business context and uncover deeper general structural 
relationships. Contextual generalisation rhetoric rests on the convincing linkage of 
relevant history, institutions and markets around the case to the argumentation net of 
the study.’ (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995, p. 85). 
The case study provides a basis for rich insight ‘with a theoretically informed case study capable 
of being viewed as a story woven around a chosen theoretical framework’ (Humphrey, 2014, p. 
55), although not all agree with this statement, e.g. Lillis (2008) who considers a direct 
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theoretical contribution to be critical to the qualitative case study. Typically, a successful case 
study is characterised as one that ‘can convince the reader of the validity of the case description 
and analysis, i.e. it makes a credible impression’ (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995, p. 75). 
The use of a single case study as the focus of the fieldwork reflects the special nature of the 
ICAEW within the field of professional accountancy bodies (Siggelkow, 2007). To date it has been 
the focus of many case studies on the development of the profession in the UK in view of its 
close relationships with the Big Four and the political establishment. This has enabled inferences 
to be drawn and applied to other contexts and professional accountancy bodies (Siggelkow, 
2007). In so doing gaps in the existing knowledge of the governance and accountability of the 
ICAEW Council can be identified and start to be filled. Other considerations for the adoption of 
a single case include ability to access the field of research i.e. the Council of the professional 
body and the depth of the data that it was possible to collect by means of interviews with the 
Council members. It is unlikely that comparable access would have been possible with other 
professional accountancy bodies e.g. the Council of the ACCA. As a result a different study would 
likely have been undertaken which may have provided contrasting data but lacked the detail 
that the current study offers. 
Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts help to organise and deepen the analysis by providing an 
organising tool for the empirical study. This helps illuminate the relationship between the 
individual Council members and the structure of the Council and provides a means of relating 
the research questions to each other. 
4.4. The case study – the ICAEW 
As the professional bodies in the UK have often provided a template for the establishment of 
similar bodies in other countries, particularly the former Commonwealth, they have often been 
studied as single cases in prior research, e.g., Annisette (2000), Bakre (2014), Chua & Poullaos 
(2002), although the internal governance structures have, to my knowledge, not yet been 
researched.  
The ICAEW Council is the site for the research as it is ultimately responsible for the governance 
of the Institute. The committees could equally provide a fruitful site for future governance and 
accountability research. However, their membership and their appointment criteria are not 
publicly available with appointments subject to approval by the nominating committee. Further, 
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the hierarchical structure in place relates more closely to questions of managerial accountability 
rather than the political and public accountability focus of this thesis. 
It is accountable to the membership and beyond as the governance body of the ICAEW and its 
composition generates a political accountability for the Council members. The Council members 
are charged with three major roles as outlined in the Governance Handbook (ICAEW, 2017b) 
through the representative role, the holding to account role, and the approvals role. The 
representative role reflects the accountability to the membership, the holding to account role 
reflects the managerial accountability through the Board function (this is not a focus for this 
thesis) along with ‘upholding the public interest’. As outlined in Chapter 2, the public interest is 
typically upheld through the Code of Ethics and the related disciplinary processes. The process 
of debate within the Council is designed to operate as a mechanism to further the public 
interest, rather than the external monitoring of the Charter terms (Privy Council, 2020).  The 
third role is the approvals role that requires approval of certain proposals, including the 
operational plan and annual budget. 
As the Council members are charged with the roles outlined above, their experiences as part of 
this governance body are of interest in furthering an understanding of how the governance and 
accountability roles are discharged in practice. 
Table 4.1 outlines the methods and sources used in this case study along with the rationale for 
their use. 
Table 4.1: Case research methods, sources and purpose 
Methods Sources Purpose  
Semi-structured 
interviews (primary 
data) 
Council members – elected, 
co-opted (including ex-officio) 
• Insight into political 
accountability of Council 
members, processes of 
representation 
• Insight into the public 
accountability of the Council 
to members and beyond 
Analysis of documents 
(secondary data) 
Election statements 
 
 
• To help understand the 
mechanisms of 
representation and political 
accountability 
 Published profiles of the 
Council members 
• Provide detail on role, 
sector, geographic area, 
whether elected/co-
opted/ex-officio, year of 
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qualification to add to 
understanding of 
representation and 
accountability 
 Governance structure • Role of the committees and 
relative hierarchy  
 Charter and Bye laws • Governance and 
accountability framework 
Source: Devised by author 
 
4.4.1. The structure of the ICAEW Council 
The basic structure of the governing Council can be traced back to the Royal Charter (ICAEW, 
1880, 1948) and is predicated on a high involvement of engaged member-volunteers (Friedman 
& Phillips, 2004; Ramirez, 2009). The ICAEW governing Council is formed of up to 125 members 
comprised of elected, co-opted and ex-officio members. There are up to 85 elected members 
(Bye-law 32) representing geographic constituencies. For constituencies outside of the UK some 
members have been selected from an ‘electoral college’ as the transition is made to full 
elections.  
Up to 25 members may be co-opted to the body (Bye-law 36) typically to ensure representation 
from leading firms and to fill sectoral representation gaps in the elected Council. Up to 15 ex-
officio members may also be appointed by virtue of the other positions they hold and helping 
to bring continuity to the governance process (Bye-laws 36A, 36B). These ex-officio members 
are chairs of the ICAEW faculties e.g. Audit and Assurance, the Student Council and the Practice 
and Members Committees or have previously served as President of the ICAEW i.e. Past 
President, Immediate Past President. As the ex-officio members are co-opted by position, they 
are analysed as part of the wider co-opted group. 
The governance structure is illustrated in Figure 4.1 above and comprises a mix of governance 
committees, policy development committees and advisory committees. The Council is 
supplemented by the ICAEW Board (a mix of executives and elected members) as well as a 
Regulatory Board for specific areas under which ICAEW operates as a regulator e.g. in respect of 
legal services offered by members including probate. The ICAEW Board acts as the link between 
the strategic Council and the operational Executive function and therefore performs a role akin 
to a corporate board of directors, in holding the executive to account. It is composed of 17 
members, six executive directors, two non-executive directors, the three officeholders of the 
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day, three elected Council members and the three chairs of the major boards (Technical 
Strategy, Members and Commercial and Learning and Professional Development).  
The semi-detached Regulatory Board (‘IRB’) is comprised of 12 members – six lay members and 
six members who are not part of Council or the Board and reports directly to Council. The Council 
is supported by a network of committees considering areas such as Technical Strategy, Ethical 
Standards, Sustainability etc. and Council members contribute to those committees 
supplemented by additional volunteers and supported by specialist technical staff from the 
Executive function.  
Figure 4.1 Governance structure of the ICAEW 
Source: www.ICAEW.com 
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4.4.2. The research questions 
The research questions were developed alongside the literature review conducted in Chapter 2. 
Research on accountability emphasises the importance of its external nature, the legitimate 
interest of those calling for an account and a form of authority over those called to account 
(Mulgan, 2000). Whilst the concept of accountability has broadened over time the thesis focuses 
on two aspects of external accountability, political and public accountability (Sinclair, 1995) as 
related to the ICAEW’s Council. Table 2.1 answers the accountability questions raised by 
Joannides (2012) in relation to who is accountable, to whom, for what and by what means in the 
context of the ICAEW Council. To date the accounting literature has not explored the governance 
of the professional accountancy bodies by examining the governing Councils, their composition 
and the interests concerned. Rather, it focuses on official documentation e.g. minutes in the 
wake of specific events e.g. failed merger plans. This research adds to the existing literature on 
professional accountancy bodies, their governance and accountability through its focus on the 
Council of the ICAEW. 
This focus helped to organise the literature on the accountancy profession, leading to the 
formulation of the two main research questions and the sub-questions. The first research 
question asks: How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? It addresses the governance of 
the ICAEW Council and its public accountability both to its membership as well as its wider 
stakeholders. In so doing it seeks to address the tension between the self-interest of members 
and the public interest commitments of the Royal Charter framework within which the 
governance activities are conducted.  
The structure of the Council was outlined in section 4.4.1. It relies upon a geographic 
constituency network which forms the basis for elections to the Council. However, there are also 
members who are able to join the Council via other routes e.g. co-options or ex-officio. As these 
posts are not remunerated it is important to understand the interests that drive members to 
put themselves forward for election or co-option.  A better understanding of the interests of the 
Council members can help to explain extent to which the decision-making body represents the 
concerns of the membership in its work. The second research question asks: What are the 
interests of Council members and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW?  
Drawing on elements from Bourdieu’s theory helps to organise and deepen the analysis which 
seeks to address the interplay of structure and agency within the ICAEW Council. Other potential 
theoretical frameworks tend to focus on one aspect i.e. either structure or agency rather than 
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the relationship between them. The first research question addresses the structures of the 
ICAEW Council, and the second the agency of the Council members. 
4.4.3. The interview process 
As a member of the ICAEW Council (elected in June 2017), I approached existing Council 
members through my personal network, focusing on those who were at least mid-way through 
their first term rather than those elected in 2017 or recently co-opted. This was to ensure that 
the interviewees had some experience of participating in the ICAEW Council to draw on when 
answering the questions posed. Initial approaches were either made verbally at Council 
meetings or by email. Interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed so that they 
could be reviewed in detail should there be any ambiguities in interpretation. Interviews were 
planned using the ‘triptych of literature review-theoretical framework-research domain’ 
(Mahama & Khalifa, 2017, p. 324). This helped guide the sub questions for development through 
the interviews and the follow up questions asked during the interviews. The accounting 
literature that inspired the questions asked did so primarily as examples of the application of 
Bourdieu’s concepts to accounting research rather than providing detailed questionnaires that 
could be adapted by the researcher. 
The interview questionnaire (Appendix 3) was constructed to help answer the research 
questions. The questionnaire commenced with questions about the interviewee and their route 
to membership of the ICAEW Council prior to probing their employer’s perspectives in relation 
to membership of the Council and their perceptions of the benefits accrued from their position. 
It was decided to structure the interview guide to move from a focus on the individual to the 
broader structures of the ICAEW. The questions were expected to provide insight into the 
capitals of the Council members, members’ strategies to secure a position on the Council and 
the influence of various interest groups operating within the Council. This helped to provide a 
better understanding how representation of the membership occurs in practice. Follow up 
questions typically sought to substantiate the interviewee’s opinion. This helped answer the 
second research question regarding the political accountability of the Council members. 
The first research question was then addressed through interview themes 2, 3 and 4. Ultimately, 
following the pilot interviews (section 4.4.3) theme 3 was excluded in the main study (section 
4.4.4). Theme 2 asked questions about how the Council manages its accountability role moving 
from the general question in theme 2.1 ‘Why is Council important?’ to more specific questions 
about the member’s role on the Council and its governance. Theme 4 helped answer questions 
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related to the effectiveness of the governance of the ICAEW and the challenges it faces. Placing 
it at the end of the interview questionnaire typically resulted in an openness from the 
interviewee about the influences of the ICAEW’s governance and how it can reconcile the 
interests of its stakeholders. 
Table 4.2: Relationship between research questions, interview questions and Bourdieu’s 
concepts 
Accountability Research question Question (Theme, 
sub-question) 
Bourdieu’s concepts 
(Cpt 3) 
Public How is the ICAEW 
governed? 
2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 3.1, 
3.2, 3.3  
Symbolic 
power/violence 
To what ends is the 
ICAEW governed? 
2.2, 2.4, 3.4, 4.1, 
4.2 
Symbolic capital 
maintenance 
Political What interest groups 
do Council member 
represent? 
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 Capitals 
How do the interests of 
Council members shape 
the governance of the 
ICAEW? 
1.1, 1.5, 1.6 Capital accretion 
Source: Devised by author 
The adoption of interviews as a means of data collection provided the opportunity to collect 
information on the actor’s interests in three ways (Annisette & Cooper, 2017). First, to ascertain 
facts consistent with interest. Second, the data provided evidence of beliefs, and finally, the 
interviews provided insight into feelings. In using interview data in this way it is important ‘for 
the researcher to make a clear distinction between ‘fact’ and opinion/belief’ (Annisette & 
Cooper, 2017, p. 61). One means of doing so is to check information on past events back to 
source documentation. 
The interview process is likely to generate a number of contextual effects (Burawoy, 1998). First, 
interview effects, in which the interviewer’s profile and presentation or the manner in which the 
interview is conducted affect the responses elicited as part of the process. Second, respondent 
effects, in which different respondents interpret the questions differently based on their own 
experiences and position. Third, field effects are noted that recognise that the interview cannot 
be isolated from its socio-economic context or the period in which it is undertaken. Finally, 
situation effects can undermine the representativeness of the respondents in a range of ways. I 
attempted to mitigate these effects through the similarity of my profile as a member of the 
ICAEW to the respondents and my knowledge of appropriate behaviour within this context. This 
similarity to the interviewees also helps to address a number of the perceived weaknesses of 
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critical accounting research and the ability of the researcher to fully understand the 
environment of those they are researching (Neu et al., 2001). 
The use of a pilot study helped to ensure that the questions were sufficiently clear; further 
clarification could be sought during the course of the interviews if it became apparent that 
certain questions were problematic. It is difficult to mitigate the potential propensity of 
respondents to try to provide answers that please the researcher, however, the nature of the 
research was explained clearly to the interviewees and the confidentiality of their responses and 
anonymity was highlighted. 
The selection of a style of interview can affect the outcome of the research significantly and, as 
such, the rationale for selection of one method in preference to another is significant. There are 
three main types of interview: fixed, whereby the same questions are asked to all respondents 
in the same way without deviation, thereby facilitating comparability but at the same time 
constraining the ability to follow up interesting points (Burawoy, 1998); a narrative approach 
that allows respondents to lead the discussion (Mishler, 1991) but may compromise 
comparability and replicability, and finally, the semi-structured interview that has an outline of 
questions but enables follow up of emerging lines of enquiry (Qu & Dumay, 2011). I adopted a 
semi-structured approach in this thesis as it enabled me to investigate a certain range of themes 
but also provided sufficient flexibility to take the opportunity to further the questioning in 
response to the interviewee’s concerns. 
The following sub-section outlines the initial pilot study. This was comprised of five interviews 
designed to ensure that the questions posed were generating an appropriate type of response 
to help answer the research questions posed by the study. 
4.4.4. Pilot study 
A pilot study of five interviews with elected members was conducted in the period from 28 July 
to 20 September 2017 (Table 4.3). The interviewees for the pilot study were selected as more 
junior members of the Council who fitted the selection criteria and were elected rather than co-
opted (co-option is often reflective of the seniority of an individual). Interviews were conducted 
in person, typically in the ICAEW Business Centre or at the participants’ offices, except one that 
was conducted via Skype, and lasted around an hour. An interview guide was developed, guided 
by the research questions and elements of Bourdieu’s theory (Table 4.2). Each participant signed 
and dated a consent form after reading the information sheet for the study. This information 
sheet outlined the ability to withdraw at any time, as well as the anonymisation of the data 
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collected. Both documents are included in Appendices 1 and 2 to the thesis. Of the five members 
approached for interview all agreed. 
As the interviews progressed my interview technique became more developed and I found that 
my ability to follow up statements to elicit a greater understanding of the Council members’ 
responses improved. In addition, my research diary helped me to reflect on the demeanour of 
the participants and any external distractions at the time of the interview and my thoughts on 
whether they were using the interview to pursue a particular agenda. For example, interview 1 
was conducted via Skype and was the longest of all the interviews, primarily due to distractions 
around charging of devices and intermittent broadband connection. If the interview had taken 
place further into the series, I would have had more confidence to focus obtaining an in depth 
discussion on a sub set of the questions rather than persisting with the full interview guide. 
Table 4.3: Pilot study details 
Interviewee Date of interview Duration Gender Decade 
became 
member 
Elected/Co-
opted/Officeholder 
1 28 July 2017 76 minutes M 2010s Elected 
2 1 August 2017 46 minutes M 1980s Elected 
3 31 August 2017 57 minutes M 1980s Elected 
4 8 September 
2017 
55 minutes F 1990s Elected  
5 20 September 
2017 
64 minutes M 1980s Elected 
Source: Devised by author 
4.4.5. Main study 
Following a detailed review of the data collected during the pilot phase, some questions were 
refined and the remainder of the interviews were conducted under similar conditions (Appendix 
3). At this stage, Theme 3 relating to the Council-Executive relationship was excluded as 
interactions were mediated through the board by means of the managerial accountability 
structure as well as through direct interactions with the Council. 
The details of the interviews are provided in Table 4.4 below. I interviewed 25 members of 
Council (there were a total of 92 members as at June 2017) mainly at the ICAEW or in their 
offices. Interviews lasted between 37 minutes and 76 minutes. Overall, four interviews were 
conducted by Skype where members were based overseas, or it was not possible to arrange a 
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physical meeting. The selection of in was interviewees was informed by the overall profile of the 
Council, in terms of length of service, sector of employment, constituency, age, gender, 
ethnicity, etc. (McKinnon, 1988). Those appointed in the 2017 for the first time were excluded 
from the pool of interviewees as they had limited experience of the Council processes at the 
time of the interviews. This amounted to 16 new members who were either elected, stood 
uncontested or were co-opted for the first time. As such, the potential pool of interviewees 
amounted to 76 members (32% coverage). The interviews took place between July 2017 and 
June 2018.  
Table 4.4: Main study details 
Interviewee Date of 
interview 
Duration Gender Decade 
became 
member 
Elected/Co-
opted/Officeholder 
1 28 July 2017 76 
minutes 
M 2010s Elected 
2 1 August 2017 46 
minutes 
M 1980s Elected 
3 31 August 2017 57 
minutes 
M 1980s Elected 
4 8 September 
2017 
55 
minutes 
F 1990s Elected  
5 20 September 
2017 
64 
minutes 
M 1980s Elected 
6 12 October 
2017 
47 
minutes 
F 1980s Ex-officio 
7 20 October 
2017 
61 
minutes 
F 1990s Elected 
8 22 November 
2017 
49 
minutes 
M 1980s Co-opted 
9 12 December 
2017 
74 
minutes 
M 1970s Elected 
10 11 January 2018 54 
minutes 
M 1970s Elected 
11 11 January 2018 57 
minutes 
F 1980s Elected 
12 1 February 2018 40 
minutes 
F 2000s Co-opted 
13 22 February 
2018 
53 
minutes 
F 1970s Ex-officio 
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14  9 March 2018 44 
minutes 
F 1990s Elected 
15  13 March 2018 49 
minutes 
M 1990s Elected 
16  13 March 2018 59 
minutes 
M 1980s Elected 
17  22 March 2018 50 
minutes 
M 1980s Co-opted 
18  23 March 2018 58 
minutes 
F 1980s Elected 
19 25 April 2018 57 
minutes 
M 1970s Elected 
20  25 April 2018 37 
minutes 
F 1990s Ex-officio 
21  8 May 2018 50 
minutes 
M 1990s Elected 
22 9 May 2018 47 
minutes 
M 1980s Ex-officio 
23 10 May 2018 49 
minutes 
M 2000s Ex-officio 
24  14 May 2018 44 
minutes 
M 1970s Elected 
25  5 June 2018 54 
minutes 
M 2010s Co-opted 
Source: Devised by author 
A recognised challenge in data collection is the minimisation of the necessary selectivity involved 
to avoid the creating of a bias; this can be addressed through increasing the researcher’s 
exposure to the field of study to gather further primary data, e.g., longer observation period, 
more interviews (Messner et al., 2017). At the stage where additional interviews yielded little 
new information, the researcher was satisfied that a degree of saturation had occurred. A total 
of 25 interviews were deemed sufficient as this represented 27% of Council as at June 2017 (92 
members) and 32% of the defined pool of eligible interviewees. 
The representativeness of the sample in relation to the interviewee pool and the full Council is 
shown below in Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. 
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Table 4.5: Interviewees grouped by experience (i.e., decade of qualification) 
 Interviewees Interviewee 
pool 
Overall 
Council 
60s  0%  1%  1% 
70s  20%  18%  20% 
80s  40%  42%  37% 
90s  24%  24%  24% 
00s  8%  8%  10% 
10s  8%  7%  8% 
Source: Adapted by author, ICAEW, 2017a  
It is the case that the distribution of professional experience broadly matches the available 
interviewee pool, which differs from the overall Council profile through the recent election of 
an increased number of members who qualified in the 2000s. This was the product of a 
concerted campaign to encourage an increasing number of contested elections and is discussed 
more fully in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Table 4.6: Interviewees grouped by employment sector (as at June 2017) 
 Interviewees Interviewee 
pool 
Overall 
Council 
Practice  52%  55%  53% 
Business  28%  25%  24% 
Other  20%  20%  24% 
Source: Adapted by author, ICAEW 2017a  
The sectorial mapping is broadly representative of the interview pool, with a slightly higher 
weighting of business members selected for interview. This grouping is particularly under-
represented within Council; therefore, they represent an important group of informants when 
exploring the interests they represent and the barriers to a more representative sectoral 
participation. 
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Table 4.7: Interviewees grouped by mode of appointment 
 Interviewees Interviewee 
pool 
Overall 
Council 
Elected  64%  60%  62% 
Co-opted  16%  25%  25% 
Ex-officio  20%  15%  13% 
Source: Adapted by author, ICAEW 2017a  
The interviewee profile was also mapped by type of member, i.e., elected, co-opted and ex-
officio members. The pool of interviewees is broadly matched to the overall Council. The mix of 
co-opted to ex-officio members who were interviewed was slightly heavier in ex-officio 
members of Council. These are members who have been appointed by virtue of office held, e.g., 
Chair of a Faculty or an ICAEW Officeholder; they are therefore viewed as leaders within the 
Council. Their perspectives offer the potential to enrich the research through their experiences 
of such leadership positions and the interactions they have experienced within the Council of 
members. Throughout the remainder of the thesis the ex-officio members have been analysed 
as part of the group of co-opted members as they are effectively co-opted by their position. 
Table 4. 8: Interviewees grouped by gender 
 Interviewees Interviewee 
pool 
Overall 
Council 
Male  64%  71%  73% 
Female  36%  29%  27% 
Source: Adapted by author, ICAEW 2017a  
The gender split of interviewees was also mapped, with the interviewees comprising slightly 
more females than might be expected in relation to the overall Council gender mix. This may be 
attributed to the inclusion of three female ex-officio members to reflect the experience of 
holding office from both gender perspectives. As the overall membership of the ICAEW is 28% 
female (FRC, 2018a), although in contrast the overall student membership is 43% female (FRC, 
2018a), it appears reasonable to include a higher proportion of females in the interview pool. 
As might be expected, female members are typically younger. 
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4.5. Data analysis 
‘The analysis of interview data, as with all qualitative data, is a sense making and 
interpretive process that requires, creativity, sensitivity, diligence and rigour’ (Mahama 
& Khalifa, 2017, p. 334) 
A three stage method was adopted for the data analysis: data reduction, data display and data 
interpretation (O’Dwyer, 2004). The data reduction process involved engaging with the 
interview transcripts, the interview notes and other data in the form of reports and candidate 
election statements. The transcribed interview scripts were reviewed in detail to ensure 
familiarisation of the researcher with the full dataset and that the emergent themes were clearly 
identified. This was combined with the interview guide, notes taken by the researcher during 
the interview process, and reflections from the research diary.  Where the script was unclear 
the recording was replayed as a check on accuracy. This enabled me to ensure that the interview 
data were as accurately represented as possible.  
Following a general reading of the complete dataset and manual note-taking on developing 
themes, the data were then organised through a coding process developed by the researcher as 
part of an iterative process until no further concepts emerged (Mahama & Khalifa, 2017). NVivo 
software was used to facilitate the coding process and ultimate selection of quotes for inclusion 
in the empirical chapters of the thesis. This was followed by a period of reflection (O’Dwyer, 
2004). 
Data display is concerned with the presentation of the data through coding of emergent themes. 
The completeness of this process was significantly aided by NVivo, which collated the codes 
assigned within the programme. This enabled me to have easy access to the full range of 
responses within each code, facilitating the contextual comparison and selection of appropriate 
quotes. 
Data interpretation concerns the key findings arising from the data collected. Following a theme-
based analysis, the focused findings were detailed and contradictions in the data were 
identified. Bourdieu’s analytical tools helped to structure the sensemaking of the data and the 
analysis. 
Two rounds of candidate election statements (2015 and 2017) were also read, reviewed, coded 
into NVivo and incorporated into the analysis of the election process in Chapter 6. These 
comprised 46 candidate statements for 2017 and 34 for 2015. It should be noted that they do 
not cover every constituency (30 in 2017 and 33 in 2015 Table 5.4) as candidate statements for 
79 
 
seats that were not contested were not published. Limitations exist in drawing inferences from 
the election statements as it is not possible to know the criteria applied in the voting process by 
constituents, e.g. reference to the photos to make decisions, reading statements, effects of 
ordering of statements etc. or in fact whether extensive personal networks are more important 
in securing the votes required. In Chapter 6 notation has been used to depict 
successful/unsuccessful candidates. 
The data analysed was used to help answer the two research questions and are mapped in Table 
4.9 below. 
Table 4.9: Research questions, empirical findings and concepts addressed 
Research questions Empirical 
chapter 
Concepts Chapter sections 
1. How is ICAEW 
governed and to 
what ends? 
Chapter 5 Public accountability to 
membership  
 
Public accountability to 
broader stakeholders 
 
Symbolic power/violence 
5.3.2, 5.3.3 
 
 
5.3.4 
 
 
5.4 
2. What are the 
interests of 
Council 
members and 
how do they 
shape the 
governance of 
the ICAEW? 
Chapter 6 Political accountability 
 
Capitals 
6.2 
 
6.3 
Source: Devised by author 
A further strategy that can be used to add credibility to accounts is triangulation, which is 
discussed in detail below. 
4.6. Triangulation of results 
‘the convergence of data collected from different sources, to determine the consistency 
of a finding’ (Yin, 2013, p. 241). 
Triangulation can include additional data sources, methods, researchers and theories (Messner 
et al., 2017). The literature remains inconsistent on the importance of triangulating data. The 
proponents argue that the corroboration of certain data from multiple sources strengthens the 
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credibility of the study, e.g., Yin on case study methods (Yin, 2013). However, others argue that 
triangulation should be context specific and the extent may rely on the strength of the 
qualitative data collected: 
‘What data the researcher needs to make an argument about an organisation depends 
on the argument. Further data can support of question the relations made between the 
initial data and the argument. It is, however, misleading to call such support 
triangulation because it suggests that some certainty has been gained in the capture of 
an objective reality’ (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006, p. 834). 
‘Not all qualitative researchers are able to obtain sufficient access to organizations to 
engage in participant observation. Nor are they always able to collect multiple sources 
of data that are relevant to their question of interest. Such “failures” do not compromise 
the value of well‐executed, interview‐based qualitative research.’(Lillis, 2008, p. 240). 
It has been claimed that triangulation reflects a desire ‘to establish the credibility of qualitative 
data in quasi-positivistic terms’ (Baxter & Chua, 2008, p. 109). Therefore, it may be more 
appropriate to consider the plausibility of the accounts provided by informants and whether 
those accounts consistently detailed similar themes. Often critical researchers uncover 
domination that is legitimised in the official accounts through controlled information flows to 
external stakeholders, as well as internal legitimation rhetorics that seek to maintain the status 
quo. 
In this study, secondary data (Table 4.10) were used ex ante helped to shape the line of 
questioning and ex post to compare to interview findings (Yin, 2013). This was useful to help lay 
the foundation for the research as the Royal Charter and Bye-laws provide the framework under 
which the ICAEW operates. These publicly available documents provide an external view into 
the official governance framework of the body. Other secondary data, in the form of reports and 
other artefacts, were used to benchmark the official account created by ICAEW; therefore, the 
susceptibility of those documents to impression management techniques is recognised through 
the reflexive research process. 
Table 4.10: Analysis of secondary data, rationale and timing 
Analysis of documents 
(secondary data) 
Rationale Timing 
Election statements 
 
 
To help understand the 
mechanisms of 
representation and political 
accountability 
Ex ante to gain insight into 
elected members election 
statement prior to interview 
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Ex post to corroborate 
interview data 
Separate analysis of 
statements for analysis in 
Chapter 6 
Published profiles of the 
Council members 
Provide detail on role, 
sector, geographic area, 
whether elected/co-
opted/ex-officio, year of 
qualification to add to 
understanding of 
representation and 
accountability 
Ex ante to understand 
composition of the Council 
and guide selection of 
interviewees 
Governance structure Role of the committees and 
relative hierarchy  
Ex ante and ex post to 
confirm understanding from 
interviews 
Charter and Bye laws Governance and 
accountability framework 
Ex ante to understand the 
structure 
Ex post to confirm 
understanding form 
interview data 
Source: Devised by author 
In the analysis, based on the interests of the members of Council (Chapter 6), reliance was placed 
on the published election statements as this is the limited information that members receive on 
which to base their voting decision. The election statements are published on the ICAEW website 
and were collected for the past two rounds in 2017 and 2015, together with the voting results. 
However, the availability of quality secondary sources was limited as a result of the ten-year 
embargo on Council minutes, which meant that such data were not related to the time period 
discussed with interviewees. The nature of the ‘official account’, generated in a standard format 
and style, may also have shaped the research in a particular way through the creation of an 
officially cleansed version of reality (Rose, 1991). In the following empirical chapters, weight was 
placed on the participants’ own accounts of the processes of governance and the corroboration 
of themes as part of the interview process. The reliance on participants’ accounts is likely to 
provide insight into the processes of governance and accountability in a way that meeting 
minutes cannot. As a result, I do not believe that the integrity of the research has suffered. 
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4.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology and methods applied in this study. I adopt 
a critical paradigm after careful consideration of the ontological and epistemological 
implications of doing so. I am also mindful of Laughlin’s assertions that all empirical research is 
‘partial and incomplete’ and is influenced by the researcher’s choices in relation to theory and 
methodology (Laughlin, 1995, p. 65). The research methodology and method are designed to 
facilitate an improved understanding of the influence of power exercised through agents and 
structures on the governance of member-governed professional bodies. A case study was 
conducted of the ICAEW as a leading UK professional membership body in accounting. The 
selection of one professional body as the site for a sub-field analysis has led to a richer analysis 
of the governance and accountability dynamics within this setting and enabled me to identify 
the interests of participants within the structure.  
The primary research method was to undertake a series of semi structured interviews with 
members of the ICAEW’s Council over a period of 11 months from July 2017 until June 2018. 
Secondary data were also collected from a range of published sources to help shape the 
interviews and to provide corroboration for certain assertions made by participants. The 
interviews provide a level of insight into the governance and accountability of the ICAEW, which 
are not covered in the ‘official accounts’ produced by the body in relation to its governance 
processes e.g. minutes. This helped answer the two research questions of the thesis.  
The interview process was supplemented by an analysis of the election statements prepared by 
candidates in the last two rounds of Council elections. This additional analysis contributed to an 
understanding of the processes of representation and the political accountability of the elected 
members of the ICAEW Council. 
The following chapters present the empirical findings to help answer the distinct research 
questions, with Chapter 5 addressing research question 1 and Chapter 6 addressing research 
question 2. A discussion of the research findings follows in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5 
The structure and governance of the ICAEW 
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis aims to examine the governance and accountability within a professional 
accountancy body through focusing on the ICAEW as a detailed case study. The intention is to 
illuminate the power relationships operating within the governance structures of the 
professional body. This is relevant as the governance and accountability of the profession and 
the power of the large firms has recently come under renewed scrutiny in response to continued 
corporate failures, e.g., BHS (FRC, 2018b), Carillion (Competition and Markets Authority, 2018; 
Kingman, 2018). As the ICAEW is constituted as a professional membership body, the capacity 
of its governance structure to represent the membership and their interests is critical to its long-
term sustainability. 
 
This chapter answers the first of the two research questions, related to how the ICAEW is 
governed and to what ends. This is done through breaking the analysis into two sub-questions 
asking, first, how is the ICAEW governed and second, to what ends it is governed. The following 
chapter (Chapter 6) answers the second research question, i.e., what are the interests of Council 
members and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? 
 
Although previous work has addressed the history and structures of the ICAEW, e.g., Walker 
(2004), it has not focused on the role of the Council and Council members within the network of 
power relationships. My study addresses this gap through capturing the perspectives of the 
Council members who collectively govern on behalf of the membership. This is important 
because the Council is the ultimate decision-making body within the ICAEW, and therefore the 
perspectives of its members are relevant to an understanding of the governance process and 
the influence of power from a variety of sources on this group. 
 
It argues that the ICAEW’s governance structures privilege certain interest groupings whose 
voice is amplified within the Council, whilst other interests remain under-represented. In part, 
this is due to the historic position of the District Society network that can play a critical role in 
the selection and nomination of candidates for election to the Council. However, accountability 
ties to the wider membership are difficult to maintain without established mechanisms of 
representation. Co-options are used to partially remedy the representation deficits arising 
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within the Council and to help to reflect the wider membership composition. The interviews 
reveal that co-opted members are not accountable to the membership in the same manner as 
elected members who represent a specific geographic constituency. As a result, the extent to 
which the current governance structure is capable of reflecting the public interest in its 
deliberations is called into question. 
 
The ICAEW represents its members in the political sphere both nationally and internationally. In 
so doing, it balances both the self-interest of members and the public interest that relies on trust 
in the profession and the work of its members. It is argued that for the ICAEW to fulfil its public 
interest duty, it is important that it retains its symbolic power and scale to secure a voice in the 
various international standard setting bodies. 
 
Bourdieu’s relational theory was outlined in Chapter 3 to offer a possible explanation of how the 
structures of the ICAEW affects its governance. Chapter 4 outlined and developed the research 
methodology and method that has been adopted in this thesis. The semi-structured interviews 
undertaken with Council members form the basis of the empirical work and offer a unique 
insight into the governance processes within the ICAEW.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section outlines the origins of the current 
governance structure, while Section 5.3 explains how the ICAEW is governed and how public 
accountability is managed both to the membership and other stakeholders. Section 5.4 
addresses the second part of the research question by asking to what ends the ICAEW is 
governed, and offers some insights into the maintenance of the symbolic power of the ICAEW 
and both internal and external symbolic violence affecting the governance and accountability 
processes. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2. The creation of a market for professional accountancy services – the role 
of a Royal Charter 
The ICAEW is constituted as a membership organisation, meaning that it is governed by its 
members for the benefit of its members. Membership organisations are typically governed by a 
representative group of members, which in this case is the ICAEW Council. This governance 
group is principally elected from the membership through geographic constituencies. 
Professional membership bodies differ from other membership bodies in the UK as they have 
typically been constituted by means of a Royal Charter, which grants the use of the term 
‘Chartered’ in exchange for undertaking certain obligations. This is a form of state consecration 
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of a new form of capital, i.e., the ACA, creating what Bourdieu calls a nobility (Bourdieu, 1998). 
In other jurisdictions, similar protections have been afforded to professional groupings by the 
state by means of constitutional documentation, e.g., the AICPA. This is also the case for other 
professional bodies outside of the field of accountancy. 
The first Royal Charter was granted in 1880 and adopted the following rationale: 
‘it would greatly promote the objects for which the said societies have been instituted 
and would also be for the public benefit if the members thereof were incorporated as 
one body as besides other advantages such incorporation would be a public recognition 
of the importance of the profession and would tend to gradually raise its character and 
thus to secure for the community the existence of a class of persons well qualified to be 
employed in the responsible and difficult duties often devolving on Public Accountants.’ 
(ICAEW, 1880, p. 1) 
The grant of the Charter therefore created a field in Bourdieu’s terms for the provision of public 
accountancy services by creating a grouping of Chartered Accountants. This provided assurance 
to the public that members had demonstrated expertise in accounting through meeting the 
criteria of membership, including education and ethics. By granting a Royal Charter, the Privy 
Council segregated the accountancy market into those who were qualified, and thereby 
‘Chartered’, and those who were not. This enabled those accountants who had attained 
Chartered status to access more complex and lucrative work (Matthews, 2017). It also enabled 
the government to distance itself from the regulation of the market for accountancy services 
through transferring the responsibility to the professional body (Willmott et al., 1993). 
A Supplemental Charter was issued in 1948 that broadened the scope of activities to the wider 
accountancy market using the term ‘professional accountant’ (ICAEW, 1948) in place of the term 
‘Public Accountant’ adopted in the original Charter (ICAEW, 1880). The extension of scope was 
granted subject to the ICAEW submitting to further responsibilities. This was the first time the 
term ‘public interest’ was enshrined in the Charter.  
‘The principal objects of the Institute are:  
(i) to advance the theory and practice of accountancy, finance, business and commerce 
in all their aspects, including in particular auditing, financial management and 
taxation;  
(ii) to recruit, educate and train a body of members skilled in these arts;  
(iii) to promote and safeguard the rights and interests of its members in all matters 
affecting the profession;  
(iv) to preserve at all times the professional independence of accountants in whatever 
capacities they may be serving;  
(v) to maintain high standards of practice and professional conduct by all its members; 
and  
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(vi) to do all such things as may advance the profession of accountancy in relation to all 
or any professional services which may be provided by its members or by persons 
or bodies comprised wholly or partly of members, whether in public practice, 
industry, commerce and the public service.’ (ICAEW, 1948) 
Since the grant of the Supplemental Charter there have been significant shifts in the external 
environment that have put pressure on the ICAEW’s structures and governance mechanisms, 
e.g., the reduction in statutory protection of certain forms of work, the growth of 
multidisciplinary professional services firms, globalisation of the profession, and widespread 
competition from other professional bodies.  
These changes, combined with the growth in membership from 14,000 at the time of the 
Supplemental Charter (ICAEW, 1948) to the current 149,298 as recorded by the FRC (FRC, 
2018a), have led to a professionalisation of the Executive function and a redefinition of the 
relationship with the Council through the creation of the ICAEW Board. The Board acts as an 
important intermediary between the Council and the Executive, providing oversight of 
operational decision-making with both elected and ex-officio Council members present 
alongside the Officeholders and the Executive Directors. Elected members are charged with 
reporting back to the Council from the Board meetings. 
The next section examines how the ICAEW is governed within the constraints of the Royal 
Charter framework. 
5.3. How is the ICAEW governed? 
The governance of the ICAEW is important as the professional body undertakes various roles on 
behalf of the membership, including a representational role that protects and defends the 
collective (Ramirez et al., 2015), disciplining members who do not follow the rules of 
membership, and typically also undertaking some kind of wider duty to the public interest. This 
differs from other modes of governance in charities and corporates due to the power 
relationship between the professional membership bodies and those governed. Arguably, 
membership is an intrinsic part of members’ identity as professionals, enabling them to access 
various employment opportunities (Matthews, 2017) that are not available to non-members.  
 
The accountability of the professional body operates at two distinct levels; first to the members 
and second to a wider grouping of stakeholders as outlined in Chapter 2. The self-interest of 
members may not always be commensurate with the interests of stakeholders beyond the 
membership, or the public interest (Lee, 1995). The discourse of the ICAEW seeks to provide 
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members with the freedom to pursue individual self-interest subject to certain limitations, 
whilst its policies and representational role reflects the public interest (Izza, 2017). The tension 
between the self-interest of members and the professional body’s public interest responsibilities 
has been highlighted through extant research; this outlines the public interest cushion that 
softens the pursuit of the self-interest of individuals (Willmott et al., 1993). To date, research 
has examined these tensions from the outside rather than from the lived experiences of those 
forming part of the governance process. This thesis adds to the literature in this area through 
capturing these perspectives by means of interviews with Council members.  
 
The following sub-sections examine the governance role of the Council (Section 5.3.1), the 
Council’s accountability to the membership of the ICAEW (Section 5.3.2), the accountability of 
the committee structure (Section 5.3.3), and the Council’s accountability to the wider 
stakeholders of the ICAEW (Section 5.3.4). 
5.3.1. The governance role of the Council 
The governance structure places the Council in a pivotal role between the members and the 
Executive who have operational responsibility. Additionally, an almost unseen layer of 
governance exists that feeds directly into these formal arenas, namely the committee structure3.  
 
The members of the Council have three major roles as outlined by the Governance Handbook 
(ICAEW, 2017b). First the representative role, second the holding to account role, and finally the 
approvals role. The representative role reflects the accountability to the membership, the 
holding to account role reflects the managerial accountability through the Board function (this 
is not a focus for this thesis) along with ‘upholding the public interest’. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
the public interest is typically upheld through the Code of Ethics and the related disciplinary 
processes. The process of debate within the Council is the primary mechanism outside of the 
disciplinary process to further the public interest, rather than the external monitoring of the 
Charter terms (Privy Council, 2020).  The third role is the approvals role that requires approval 
of certain proposals, including the operational plan and annual budget. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 2 the accountability to the membership is demonstrated through the 
constitutional structures, including the ratification of certain proposals at the AGM (Table 2.1). 
 
3 For details on the structure of the Council, please refer to Chapter 4. 
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‘Well, council as you say is the ultimate governing body subject to the membership 
who have to decide certain things at the AGM.’ I13 Ex-officio  
The defeat of the Council’s proposals to merge with other professional accountancy bodies has 
drawn researchers to the conclusion that ‘Actions by the rank and file have persistently shown 
that Council’s authority remains seriously diminished’ (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b, p. 38). This 
implies that the role of Council representing members’ interests is not as effective as envisaged. 
In part, this may be a result of the governance structures designed to facilitate representation 
of the membership. 
For many Council members, the dialogue with their constituents is relatively weak, and 
engagement with the election processes is limited leading to unpredictable results from 
membership votes. The public challenges to the Council’s authority may have arguably resulted 
in a reduced willingness to adopt proposals that require ratification by the membership. 
5.3.2. Accountability to the membership 
In common with many social groups, the general membership concentrates power in the subset 
of members who form part of the Council that they formally charge with representing the views 
of membership (Bourdieu, 1986b). As the ICAEW is a membership body governed by and on 
behalf of the members, an examination into how it is governed necessarily involves exploring 
the accountability relationship between the general membership and their representatives on 
the Council. Members join the Council either as elected geographic representatives or co-
optees, creating the potential for differences in accountability mechanisms.  
Accountability to the membership is formally maintained through the Council and the 
Governance Handbook elaborates this facet of the role as follows: ‘Ensuring the views across 
our profession are heard in helping to set the strategy’ (ICAEW, 2017b). Whilst the direct link 
between the membership and the elected Council member is present on a geographic basis, the 
link is weaker for those who are co-opted to represent a specific sector, e.g., public sector, 
business member, as their capacity to represent the sector is variable.  
This section argues that accountability to the membership is established through effective 
processes of representation, which affect the composition of the Council. The important role of 
the District Society network is examined in establishing a structure to facilitate accountability to 
the membership at a local level. It also reflects upon the low engagement of the membership 
with the election process and some recent measures which seek to reengage the membership. 
The elected members are supplemented with those who are co-opted to remedy 
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representational deficits. However, the co-opted members do not have the same accountability 
to their constituency as elected members. 
Representation of the membership 
Of the overall 92 members of Council as at June 2017, 25% were co-opted and 13% were ex-
officio or co-opted by virtue of position, e.g., Chair of a significant committee or officeholder. 
Taken together as co-optees these members form a significant and influential grouping within 
the Council chamber.  
The underlying composition of the Council reflects the belief that elections will secure a 
representative Council who will be accountable to the membership. The electoral constituencies 
are mapped to the District Society network, which plays an important role within the ICAEW 
structure; it also helps to create a forum for dialogue to take place between members and their 
representatives. The relationship between the District Societies and ICAEW has been 
problematic over time (see for example Ramirez (2009) who documents numerous reports over 
an extended period). Historically, District Societies were a useful network to disseminate 
technical advice and training for practitioners (I3 Elected comments) and therefore operated as 
a hub enabling members to network and share practice. 
The District Society network has faced increased pressures in recent years from three long term 
trends. First, in a digital environment, technical guidance can be centrally disseminated and 
consumed on-demand through webinars. Second, the membership is increasingly 
heterogeneous and has differing needs, and finally, as member numbers increase outside of the 
UK, the limits of replication of the District Society structure are becoming apparent. ‘the task of 
representation of the membership has become more complex as differences have grown 
amongst its membership.’ (Ramirez, 2009, p. 403) 
Interviewees often compared the role of an elected Council member to that of a Member of 
Parliament to explain the representational processes. However, a fundamental difference exists 
because Members of Parliament have a political affiliation that is clearly outlined and 
consistently applied, whilst Council members vote on a case-by-case basis and need not reflect 
consistent opinions. Each Council member’s judgement and expertise is shaped by their 
professional experience, e.g., small practice, Big Four, etc., and understanding of the interests 
of members and the public. 
‘I feel that I am entrusted by people who I do not necessarily know to use my judgment 
and expertise for the best interests of members in the public interest.’ I7 Elected 
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There exists a more tenuous relationship between co-optees and the sector they have been co-
opted to represent. They are not appointed by the whole of their sector and may have 
somewhat limited experience outside of their current role. Comments from interviewees 
indicate that co-opted members’ understanding of representation and accountability is 
markedly different from that of the elected members. 
‘Or just to bring a public-sector perspective, […] I do not represent the whole of the public 
sector.’ I12 Co-opted  
‘I’m always kind of trying to look at things through the lens of business, but that’s a very 
wide constituency.’ I23 Ex-officio 
Yet the governance handbook (ICAEW, 2017b) does not make an exception for the more limited 
extent to which co-opted members can undertake a representative role.  
‘It's a bit more difficult for co-opted members I think as individuals to be accountable 
because, you know, if you are, say the co-opted charity member; I'm not sure how you're 
going to get back to the community of charities. So, I think it's a one-way flow then, 
really, you know. You're there in case there are issues coming up which might affect 
charities and I think communicating that back is…is very difficult, really.’ I6 Ex-officio 
This creates a gap between what is formally expected and practice. As such, it would appear that 
a veil of wider representation is created through the co-option process, without co-opted 
members necessarily being able to represent or be held accountable by the sector they have 
been co-opted to represent. 
Composition of the ICAEW’s Governing Council 
To establish accountability to the membership is important that the Council reflects the views 
of the membership; therefore, balancing sector interests, gender, and seniority are all important 
factors to ensure that decisions are reflective of the membership’s interests. 
The large number of members of the Council ensures a degree of geographic diversity through 
District Society constituencies, and representation is weighted by membership numbers. As 
such, the size of Council, whilst large, is not wholly unusual in comparison to similar 
organisations whose Councils vary greatly in size, e.g., the ACCA has 36 Council members (ACCA 
Global, 2018) and approximately 204,000 members (FRC, 2018a), or the AICPA Council that has 
up to 265 members (AICPA, 2006) and in excess of 400,000 members. 
‘In the council, I suppose one of the things that surprised me is the size of the council as 
a sort of a governing body. We’ve had quite lively discussions.’ I12 Co-opted 
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Interviewees did not identify the size of the Council as a barrier to effectiveness at the strategic 
level and many discussed the quality of debate in a positive manner. 
The overall numbers of Council members cannot be increased without alteration to the Bye-
laws and seeking approval of the Privy Council, which is a cumbersome process. It is therefore 
unlikely that the Council will increase in size overall. At present, the wide geographical diversity 
does not match the sectoral weightings, despite the use of co-options to ensure that certain key 
stakeholder groupings are represented at the appropriate level, e.g., Big Four firms, public 
sector, Student Council and academia. 
The composition of Council is not static and over time it has changed as international 
representation has increased. However, this has been at the expense of a measured sector 
representation. 
‘We had one member ring fenced for business in each society at least and one from 
practice. And so, in my constituency, you’d have two members. …. But eventually we 
agreed that we would go down to one per constituency which then created headroom 
so we could then significantly increase the international representation.’ I13 Ex-officio 
The historic influence of the District Society as a means of securing nomination and votes 
remains, whilst the practice sector has contracted as the primary employment sector for 
members. This calls into question the District Society network as a conduit to local members. 
Practice members tend to form more of a homogenous grouping than those in business who 
occupy diverse roles and may have sector specific interests, e.g., retail, manufacturing. It may 
be the case that it would be more relevant to represent the interests of business members by 
significant sectors in which they are employed rather than geographically. 
The data below were extracted from a combination of published election statements and the 
profiles of Council members per the ICAEW website, and has been compared to the FRC data 
published on membership sector groupings. The results (Tables 5.1, 5,2 and 5.3) indicate a clear 
over-representation of practice members; this challenges conclusions in relation to the under-
representation of small practice members (Ramirez, 2009; Ramirez et al., 2015). The under-
representation of business members is consistent with prior research (Noguchi & Edwards, 
2008b; Willmott et al., 1993). 
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Table 5.1: Elected Council members by sector 
*includes those who may have been elected to seats uncontested 
Source: Adapted by author  
Table 5.2: Composition of the ICAEW’s membership (excl. retirees) 
 
Practice Business Other 
ICAEW global member profile 34% 53% 13% 
Source: FRC, 2018a 
Table 5.3: Interview pool by sector 
 Interviewees Interviewee pool Overall Council 
Practice 52% 55% 53% 
Business 28% 25% 24% 
Other 20% 20% 24% 
Source: Adapted by author  
The mix of groupings in the Council was commented on by interviewees, who focused on the 
large number of small practitioners involved in the Council being closely linked to their ability to 
control their time in a way that many business members and those working in mid-tier firms 
cannot. 
‘virtually everyone coming through the district society route outside of London is a small 
firm practitioner. So, we're way over represented with that view on Council.’ I2 Elected 
Whilst the above quote overstates the actual number of smaller practitioners (see Table 5.3), 
they are significantly over-represented within the Council and are often more able to participate 
Composition Practice Business Other 
2015 elections 57% 20% 23% 
2017 elections 48% 39% 13% 
Total 92 49 
(14 Big 4) 
22 21 
Overall Council as at 
June 2017* 
53% 
(38% non-Big 4) 
24% 24% 
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in the affairs of the Institute due to their ability to direct their own time, thereby amplifying the 
voice of this interest grouping.  
Another member noted the polarisation between the Big Four and smaller practitioners, with 
the mid-tier even more significantly under-represented and often omitted from detailed 
compositional analysis. 
‘I don’t think that the mid-tier of the profession is represented strongly, because they are 
too busy earning money than giving back.’ I10 Elected 
On the other hand, few high-profile Council members from the Big Four come through the 
election process, with the majority of those at partner level being co-opted and more junior Big 
Four staff seeking election. 
‘I think if you’re already in a high-profile role, it can be difficult to stand because it’s quite 
a blunt instrument this election process, so you could easily not get elected even though 
you are very well qualified.’ I13 Ex-officio 
One interviewee identified that the higher engagement from practice members reflects their 
interest in ICAEW’s lobbying powers with the regulators:  
‘Probably also because they’re the ones where your regulations and changes have an 
impact. If the FRC wants to do something and wants to regulate something, it does affect 
the practicing member in a way that it doesn’t affect the business member.’ I2 Elected 
The difficulty in standing as a business member was also remarked on by interviewees, with 
some commenting that the lack of flexibility in working practices that often results in business 
can have a negative effect on the capacity of members to devote time to the Council: 
‘I think practice is normally fairly forward-thinking in terms of flexible working but it’s 
much harder to do through in a large corporate.’ I1 Elected 
The weighting towards smaller practitioners in the Council influences the debate in a certain 
manner and can result in other perspectives not being considered, although the Chair does 
actively work to manage the agenda (see Section 5.4.3).  
The role of the District Society Network 
The relevance of the traditional route to election via the District Society network is increasingly 
being questioned by members. They focused on two areas: the engagement of the District 
Society with local members and its relevance to members outside of practice. This is important 
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as most members work outside of practice (Table 5.2) and their interests must be represented 
if the ICAEW is to continue to represent its members. 
Since the inception of the ICAEW, the District Societies have played a role in the governance and 
representation structures. The accepted route to election involved being a member of the 
District Society and often having previously served in the role of President. As the membership 
has become more heterogeneous and technology can connect people in an increasingly flexible 
manner, the structure has continued to come under increasing scrutiny. The quotes below are 
from elected members representing different geographic constituencies. 
‘There isn’t enough engagement with the district society because people don’t see its 
relevance.’ I3 Elected 
‘If XX disappeared, no one would care.’ I1 Elected 
Often, elected members outside of practice queried the relevance of attendance at District 
Society meetings.  
‘I was the only finance director on Council. Certainly, the only finance director of a listed 
company […] why would I want to go to a District Society when all the other people there 
will be sole practitioners or small practitioners?’ I2 Elected 
Other elected members tended to err on the side of caution. This may be linked to the fact that 
they have invested time in this structure to create a relevant network of engaged members who 
will vote for them (i.e., cultivating their social capital (Bourdieu, 1986b)). 
‘I think it is the local representative organisation of the ICAEW, so it acts as the local face 
of the ICAEW but it is that important two-way channel, and I think it…it’s an important 
method of sort of disseminating information about what the ICAEW is doing to members. 
It’s not the only method.’ I6 Ex-officio 
Interviewee 6 has risen through the District Society system to an ex-officio position, yet still 
qualifies their opinion through acknowledging that the District Society is now one of many 
communication channels.  
The current push to strengthen the links between the Council members and the District Societies 
(I6 and I7 below) could be viewed as a protectionist response to instances of non-affiliated 
candidates succeeding in local elections. The following quote illustrates the appearance of 
democracy masking the anxieties over ‘others’ succeeding in the election process. 
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 ‘In principle, nothing wrong with contested election, but when you’ve got a single 
member seat, it’s really important you don’t get the wrong person on council. Otherwise, 
they’ve severed the link and there is no requirement even though you’re an ex officio 
member of the local district society, there’s no requirement for you to turn up. If you 
choose not to, there’s nothing you can do about it.’ I16 Elected 
The comment appears to accord the District Society with the power to decide who the right 
person should be. This implies that there is often an unseen process of selection of candidates 
and anointment of successors who are deemed worthy by the group, thereby excluding others 
from standing against them.  
The apparent institutional weakening of the District Society’s power contrasts with the move to 
reinforce the relationship between elected members and their District Society. This has resulted 
in some members questioning their accountability and modifying their behaviour to prioritise 
attendance. This could be explained as an attempt to discipline the Council members by the 
officeholders to maintain the impression that there is a clear communication channel for 
members through the District Society to the Council.  
‘I think it important that the Council members should sit on the District Society and 
communicate back and raise issues.’ I6 Ex-officio 
‘now I’m going to because Fiona [Wilkinson Deputy President 2018/19] basically looked 
at these societies and said, come on, you guys, you need to be going to your district 
societies if you’re the elected people. So, I’m going to redouble my efforts to get there, 
which is quite right.’ I7 Elected 
Member Engagement with Existing Processes – the Status Quo 
The current representational structure leads to the marginalisation of certain views and many 
members do not engage with the regional structures or the election process. This occurs 
because members are often voted onto the Council either unopposed (Table 5.4 below) or by 
elections, which are characterised by low levels of member turnout. This raises questions about 
the strength of the mandate of those who are voted onto the Council (Noguchi & Edwards, 
2008b).  
‘I mean I have to say how democratic is it when the turnout rates are so, so low.’ I2 
Elected 
In many ways this appears to illustrate the operation of Bourdieu’s concepts of duality as the 
ideal of democracy often masks the power of the District Society to select its preferred 
candidates (Bourdieu, 1998). Frequently it appears that the competition takes place behind the 
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scenes and, as one member remarked, candidates will position themselves in a way to try to 
ensure they stand unopposed to avoid any surprises from the electorate. This is achieved 
through cultivating the appropriate social and cultural capital through the District Society 
structure, and so these members will be viewed by others as master players thereby ensuring 
that they do not even have to contest the seat. 
‘I was unopposed, although to be unopposed, one has to manoeuvre into that position 
to start with.’ I24 Elected 
Table 5.4 below illustrates the extent of the contest for election with an increase in contested 
seats in 2017. However, this may be attributable to the dynamics of those constituencies rather 
than an increased level of engagement.  
Table 5.4: Contested Council seats 
Number of seats 2015 2017 Total 
Uncontested seats 12 7 19 
Contested seats 21 23 44 
Total seats for election 33 30 63 
Source: Adapted by author 
The low level of member engagement with the process appears to reflect a ‘gigantic free-riding 
problem, as less diligent members enforce on the more successful all kinds of demands backed 
by a shared normative structure’ (Portes, 1998, p. 16). This phenomenon is often referred to as 
‘becalming’ and is a recognised by-product of oligarchy (Zald & Ash, 1966). Voss and Sherman 
note that the disengagement is not inevitable as originally envisaged (Michels, 1968) but can be 
reversed in the right circumstances, which are often precipitated by changes in leadership and 
changes in the operating environment (Voss & Sherman, 2000). These findings hold promise that 
there may be a reinvigoration of the membership’s engagement. 
‘It’s a problem of virtually every organisation I think I’ve ever been involved in. From 
public companies downwards, the voting numbers are relatively small. Generally, people 
only get involved, in my experience, if there is something majorly going wrong.’ I5 
Elected 
In an attempt to encourage wider engagement with the election processes, recent rounds of 
elections have been accompanied by centralised marketing campaigns to encourage 
engagement from the wider membership (Appendices 4 and 5).  
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Re-engaging the Membership 
The relevance of a predominantly practice-based geographic structure has come under renewed 
scrutiny in face of the structural problems identified above. Technology is likely to play a major 
role in enabling a wider range of members to participate and curate their interests, as well as 
enabling the ICAEW to reach out to a greater range of members who would not traditionally 
participate in the District Society structure. 
‘For me, you have to find a way of touching people locally. But the big difference now 
compared to when I first got involved is technology. So, 20 years ago, 10 years ago the 
institute couldn’t reach out to an individual member and tailor communications to what 
their interests are. You can do that now.’ I15 Elected 
This seems to be a transition that is in progress. As a result, there is a duality in the messaging 
between those who are part of the District Society, and therefore exposed to the control 
discussed above, and those who are not and respond to the open call for nomination that is 
disseminated centrally to members. The institutional messaging distributes invites through 
social media and direct emails to members rather than relying on personal knowledge of the 
election process (see Appendices 4 and 5). This contrast between the openness of the 
institutional messaging and the closed nature of the constituency threatens the control of the 
District Society.  
However, the institutional messaging is portraying an aspirational image of the Council through 
the use of the profiles in the social media campaign. All three of the Council members featured 
in this campaign are co-opted rather than elected to the Council. It could be argued that these 
are the types of Council members that ICAEW is seeking to create a more diverse and balanced 
Council rather than the existing pool of elected members. 
The comments from the interviewee below indicate that there have been some perceptible 
changes as a result of this type of campaign. 
‘But in the last two or three elections, we’ve seen quite a big shift to encouraging almost 
a disruptive element into the council and I use disruption in a good, healthy way. Because 
there were more open invites to prospective members to say, “Yes, you too can be part 
of council. Stand for it.”’ I3 Elected 
For those who do not form part of these groupings and are not subject to the unwritten rules, 
the fact they succeed as ‘others’ reflects the diminishing power of the existing District Society 
structure. 
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‘What I’m representing is a group of people who don’t engage. I think there’s a lot of us 
that get our qualifications and then don’t have anything to- don’t engage, aren’t in audit, 
not interested in audit.’ I14 Elected 
The findings presented in this section illustrate that there is a problem of representation on the 
Council, which undermines its ability to represent the sectorial interests of the membership as 
some voices are marginalised. This is not fully addressed by the co-option process as there are 
no established accountability links for co-optees to their sector.  
It has outlined the differences in the representative role of the Council members for elected and 
co-opted members, and draws attention to ongoing and largely unresolved struggles within the 
ICAEW to strengthen the links between the membership and its governance body, despite a 
significant period of reform (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a). Whilst many continue to question the 
contemporary relevance of the District Society network within a heterogeneous profession, it 
continues to exercise significant power over the election process through its ability to provide 
members with the requisite social capital to secure nomination and votes. This process favours 
those who can invest significant time and effort to cultivate their position, tending to appeal to 
those who can control their time. There is a sense of gradual change in the processes of elected 
representation as mentioned in the section above. However, this adaptation may not come 
quickly enough to maintain the relevance of the ICAEW in the eyes of its members and the 
stakeholders it serves.  
5.3.3. The accountability of the committee structure to the Council 
This sub-section focuses on the power exercised by the committee structure and the ability of 
those who enter as committee volunteers to convert their external status into positions of 
leadership through co-options to the Council. 
A significant amount of technical and policy work is conducted through the myriad of the ICAEW 
committees, e.g., Learning and Professional Development and task-based working parties (see 
Figure 4.1 for a structure diagram). The committees are classified into three groups: 
- governance committees to which Council members are typically elected e.g. the Board, 
Nominating Committee 
- governance/policy development committees or Boards from which the chair is co-opted as an 
ex-officio Council member and which report to the ICAEW Board (except for the Institute 
Regulatory Board which is semi-detached and reports directly to the Council), and  
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- specialist/operational/advisory committees which report into the Boards including the 
Faculties 
The committees outside of the governance committees, comprise members of Council and 
volunteers who are classified as ‘active’ members who put themselves forward for 
consideration, or who are approached for specific skillsets relevant to the work of the 
committee. The contribution of expertise to committee work is part of expected activities for 
Council members, and the majority contribute to the running of the ICAEW in this manner. 
 ‘there’s an expectation of council members participating in committees.’ I8 Co-opted 
Vacant committee positions are advertised through the Council and externally to members, with 
application by CV and covering letter for consideration by the nominating committee, which 
reports directly to the Council (Figure 4.1). This instrumentalisation of members is part of the 
‘enterprise’ of the professional body (Bourdieu, 1998). It ensures the acquisition of expert labour 
without remuneration, and therefore partially obscures the cost of running the professional 
body. Further, those who become part of the committee structure are susceptible to the ‘illusio’ 
of service to the profession and often take on increasing amounts of work on behalf of the 
ICAEW. As Bourdieu reflects, ‘the exploitation is masked’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 116). 
Whilst from the professional body perspective the appointment process to the committees is 
clear and transparent, this was not always the understanding of the interviewees.  
‘Do you know one of the things you never understand about the Institute is how it 
appoints people to committees? I have never ever had a clue of that.’ I5 Elected 
Whilst Ramirez (2009) argues that the Institute has been instrumentalised by large firms, this 
does not appear to be the case in the formal structure of the Council (see Section 5.3.2) and the 
Board. The unseen nature of committee composition may indeed reflect this 
instrumentalisation. He goes as far as to assert that:  
‘One of the sources of the bigger firm’s power in the profession is that they have 
sufficient technical and human resources to be represented at these institutions’ 
(Ramirez et al., 2015, p. 1355). 
Contributions to technical committee work can be shared across groups of specialists from the 
larger firms, enabling them to shape the agenda outside of the Council forum. These committees 
also function as a means of knowledge exchange as members get to know their counterparts in 
100 
 
other firms. Interviewees widely acknowledged that the committees have an implicit hierarchy 
in the institutional structure. For example: 
‘There is a hierarchy at those committees. There’s definitely a hierarchy with the 
important committees which lead to becoming say, a board member or becoming 
president.’ I3 Elected 
This hierarchical nature of the structure was re-iterated by another interviewee who highlighted 
the importance of serving on the Board as a staging post for those seeking election to office: 
‘At the last minute, somebody said to me, “If you’re serious about standing for office next 
year, it would look pretty odd if you didn’t stand for Board at this election”, so I did.’ I22 
Ex-officio 
As such, the majority of those who wish to progress to officeholder have usually served on the 
ICAEW Board either as an elected Council representative or ex-officio member by virtue of 
chairing another Board, e.g., Members Board.  
This is the route by which many co-opted members from the Big Four succeed in securing 
officeholder positions without running the gauntlet of the general membership, e.g., David 
Matthews, KPMG Partner and Vice President 2018/19, was Chair of the Technical Strategy 
Board. For those who do not have an automatic seat on the Board the result is fierce competition 
to secure a seat and thereby join the pool of suitably qualified candidates seeking election to 
officership. Members self-nominate for the elected Board positions and votes are cast by single 
transferrable vote; therefore it is important to have already created a circle of support within 
Council.  
From the Board, the next step is to stand for election to Vice President, which locks a candidate 
into the path to President. Often there is intense competition to secure the required eight 
unique nominations for officeholder and find favour amongst the members of the Council as the 
elections are also decided on by means of a single transferrable vote.  
The committee structure therefore serves as an important network to secure experts’ input into 
various work areas of the ICAEW, whilst creating a mechanism to identify potential co-optees to 
the Council. These members may eventually become future officeholders without becoming 
involved in the politically charged and emotive issues around the District Society network. 
 ‘certainly, if you look at the Presidential candidates, quite a few of those have been – 
successful ones, have been co-opted onto Council in their time rather than being elected.’ 
I9 Elected 
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Only one of the three officeholders for 18/19 has come through the District Society network. 
The interviewees have alluded to the power of the committees in the ICAEW structure and the 
ability of the Big Four to instrumentalise their work, without necessarily generating a visible 
presence in the Council. This ensures that the democratic appearance of the ICAEW remains 
intact without drawing the attention of external stakeholders. The committees also serve the 
interests of the ICAEW through ensuring a pipeline of potential co-optees who have been trialled 
through the committee structures as loyal servants to the profession. 
The next section asks how the public interest and self-interest of the Council members interact 
in the governance structure. 
5.3.4. Accountability beyond the membership 
The claim to act in the public interest is important in establishing the accountability of the 
profession beyond the membership and retaining its position (symbolic power). The inherent 
tension in answering the four questions of accountability outlined in Chapter 2 (Joannides, 2012) 
led to the argument that the public interest is primarily served through the Code of Ethics and 
the decision making processes of the ICAEW Council.  
Interviews probed members’ understanding of the public interest and compared it to the 
governance handbook discussion of the public interest remit. The continued ambiguity 
surrounding the use of the term ‘public interest’ (Bozeman, 2007b) was identified and 
commented on by a number of interviewees. 
‘But I mean the big debate’s around what do we mean by public interest.’ I13 Ex-officio 
Others offered definitions that could be applied to both the institution and the individual, 
reflecting a moral duty to behave in a certain manner: 
‘if you’re looking for the definition of public interest, it’s to do the right thing when it’s 
hard to do it.’ I16 Elected 
‘The public interest is, it's so simple. If it smells bad and you wouldn't want to see it in 
the Mail on Sunday, there's a problem.’ I19 Elected 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in accounting, the public interest is often linked closely to the 
functioning of the capital markets (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008). One interviewee identified 
the broader conceptualisation of the public interest that may enable it to adapt to the wider 
concerns of society, e.g., sustainability. 
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‘I think as we reflect on the future of our profession and how we remain relevant, we, I 
hope, are always going to have a very important role to play in the capital markets, but 
I don’t believe our only role will be in the capital markets, and that’s why I define the 
public interest more broadly.’ I20 Ex-officio 
This view was further reinforced through interviewees’ explanation of the importance of moving 
beyond the financial reporting sphere as a means of furthering the practice of accountancy and 
addressing public interest concerns: 
‘How do we demonstrate that us existing achieves this public interest remit of putting 
quality accountants out there that can change the world and make the world a better 
place? And I think there has been thought about that. So, moving towards in the direction 
of looking at what else we should be accounting for and the institute’s concern about 
things like the sustainable development goals I think is important towards making us 
more relevant.’ I4 Elected 
The interviews revealed some differences in Council members’ and the ICAEW’s conceptions of 
the public interest. At the institutional level, the role of the Council is elaborated through the 
Governance Handbook, reflecting a narrow conception of setting the standards of behaviour 
and enforcing them through the Regulatory Board. 
‘Upholding the Public Interest and holding the Board to account in support of the 
ICAEW Strategy. 
ICAEW upholds its public interest remit via the ICAEW Regulatory Board. Council holds 
the Board to account through the scrutiny of the Board’s activities through receipt of 
reports and updates from the Chief Executive, the Board minutes, the Elected 
Members of the Board and a quarterly review of the Board Priorities and the 
Operational Plan.’ (ICAEW, 2018b) 
Despite the narrow conceptualisation of the Governance Handbook, the public interest operates 
at a collective level whereby the governance structure of the Royal Charter provides a 
framework to measure the strategic direction of the membership body. In addition, the 
prevailing political and policy environment also serve to drive contemporary understanding of 
the public interest, either by the ICAEW as a response to mounting pressures, e.g., the creation 
of the Institute Regulatory Board (IRB), or by government as a means of compulsion, e.g., 
Apprenticeship Levy.  
Importantly, there is no individual requirement to consider the public interest as long as 
members follow the ethical code as: ‘That is our public interest duty, that is what will preserve 
and enhance all our reputations, and that is what makes chartered accountants special.’ (Izza, 
2017)  
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The representative nature of the Council is important in ensuring that an appropriate Code of 
Ethics is agreed that will apply to the full membership, irrespective of geography or sector.  
 ‘I mean it’s built into an awful lot of what we do and of course, a lot of the public interest 
at this stage is in the disciplinary processes which are now for good or bad effectively 
divorced from Council.’ I5 Elected 
In this view, the Codes by which members must abide create a means of regulating the pursuit 
of the self-interest of members, and the semi-separation of the enforcement processes further 
serve to reinforce the public interest responsibilities of the ICAEW to regulate its members’ 
behaviour. 
The quotes below illustrate that the public interest is not always well specified in briefing papers 
so that it is a guiding principle for decision-making: 
 ‘And I think actually we do rely to an extent to the executive to say, “Yes, but we have a 
public interest duty on occasions”. I think it’s probably not so high up in Council’s mind 
overall.’ I18 Elected 
To some extent this might result from a gap in the induction processes for new Council members 
who may not always have a clear conception of the public interest and how it might be 
considered within the Council. This reflects the continued tension between the self-interest and 
the public interest. The prevailing assumption is that, within the Council, members make 
decisions concerning the ICAEW strategy in the public interest through the debate process and 
in accordance with the Royal Charter terms.  
‘I think some Council members if you actually said to them, remember our duty is to 
speak in the public interest even if that isn’t in our members’ best interest, we’d still be 
quite shocked that, you know, the fact that is the obligation.’ I22 Ex-officio 
The relationship between the Charter and the decision-making process is important in balancing 
the self-interest and preserving the exchange rate of capitals for members. The Charter serves 
to obscure the economic truth of the profession (Bourdieu, 1998). 
‘Because we’ve got a Royal Charter. And the Charter then requires us because of the 
privileges we perhaps give it there to make sure that we’re doing things for the greater 
good. And if we personally benefit either as firms or individuals, that’s okay. But 
ultimately the more important thing is we make sure that the society at large benefits 
from what we are providing collectively.’ I13 Ex-officio 
As such it is the Council is entrusted with pursuing the objectives of the Charter. In this sense, 
the processes of the Council become important in ensuring that representation is balanced, and 
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stakeholder perspectives are considered. This capacity is questionable given the concentration 
of small practitioners within the Council. 
The malleability of the concept of the public interest has distinct benefits as it can endure 
changes in societal expectations (Sorauf, 1957).  
‘that’s why the phrase has been there for so many years and it’s a useful phrase because 
you should understand it innately what the public interest is. You can’t define it because 
it can mean so many different things to different people at different times.’ I3 Elected 
The structures of the ICAEW have changed over time in response to evolving societal 
expectations that are considered in the public interest. This has been manifested by the ability 
of the ICAEW to respond to such challenges through adaptations in its governance without 
fundamentally changing the underlying structures created by the Royal Charter: 
‘But I think the Institute over the years has been very much trying to respond to that with 
things like, and I can’t think of all of them at all of the cuff but just like having open 
sessions as part of the Council meetings. So, we’re trying to make what we’re doing open, 
making the membership of all the regulatory board, all the IRB [Institute Regulatory 
Board] committees at least 50%. So, we have been changing our position as society’s 
expectations have changed about that.’ I13 Ex-officio 
The Council is an approval body with the power to reject proposals. This power was also 
discussed by interviewees in terms of a process-based understanding of the public interest 
(Cochran, 1974). It is this symbolic power to reject proposals that helps to legitimise the entire 
governance structure. 
‘But if the structures in place and the underlying committees on board are right, that’s 
all accounts we should be doing but it’s churning a whole load of stuff back frequently, 
it suggests the underlying structures are wrong.’ I5 Elected 
One interviewee commented on the wider public interest issues and suggested how they may 
be considered in the governance structure by means of a panel type system. This would reflect 
more of an aggregative view of the public interest (Cochran, 1974). However, the process of the 
selection of interests to represent would remain largely subjective (Bozeman, 2007a), which is 
a drawback of this approach: 
‘we don’t focus on public interest issues very clearly or sufficiently. We don’t define them. 
We don’t debate them specifically. […] I think we should have a…we should have a public 
interest panel and a members' panel that advise Council on the impact on the specific 
groups.’ I7 Elected 
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An advisory panel approach would facilitate the consideration of a wider stakeholder group in 
the strategic process within the Council, and the introduction of lay members to a public interest 
panel could ensure that specific consideration was paid to policy impact on a wider range of 
stakeholders beyond the narrow capital markets or members perspectives. As such, the 
understanding of public interest would reach beyond the definition advanced by Dellaportas 
and Davenport (2008). For example, The ICAS has established public interest members of Council 
and who are charged:  
‘To complete, in collaboration with the other Public Interest Members of Council, an 
Annual Report on the Council's conduct of business in the preceding year, commenting 
on the Council's adherence to ICAS' Charters and statutory obligations and functions.’ 
(ICAS, 2018) 
The ICAS rules (section 11) mandate that at least 10% of the Council shall be comprised of Public 
Interest members (ICAS, 2014). Whilst this approach may not take into account the perspectives 
of all interest groupings, it does provide some independent oversight of the Council process and 
the extent to which the self-interest is balanced with the public interest through those processes 
(Cochran, 1974). This challenge may be systematically lacking in the current governance 
structure as the linkage is more implicit. 
‘I think we aren’t good at that piece of self-challenge that says, are we balancing the 
interests of lots of different sets of stakeholders here.’ I20 Ex-officio 
This section has highlighted the instrumentalisation of the public interest by the ICAEW. It 
outlined divergences in the Council members’ understanding of the term and the gap between 
their understanding and that put forward in the Governance Handbook, which suggests a purely 
normative conceptualisation. The findings indicate that governance processes refer to the Royal 
Charter and the processual aspects of the public interest alongside a recognition of external 
pressures arising from an aggregative perspective. The capacity of the processual aspects to 
consider the public interest is called into question as a result of the election process that creates 
a concentration of small practitioners within the Council. The following section answers the 
second sub-question regarding the governance goals of the ICAEW. 
5.4. To what ends is the ICAEW governed? 
This section considers how the current governance structure maintains and reinforces certain 
positions to answer the second part of the first research question – To what ends is the ICAEW 
governed? The governance processes are principally directed to maintaining the symbolic power 
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of the professional body for the benefit of current and future members whilst managing the 
relationship with key stakeholders to retain this status. 
‘The profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity 
which makes them possible. This does not mean that they are consciously pursued as 
such, even in the case of groups like select clubs, which are deliberately organised in 
order to concentrate social capital and so derive full benefit from the multiplier effect 
implied in concentration and to secure the profits of membership – material profits, 
such as those derived from association with a rare, prestigious group.’ (Bourdieu, 1986b, 
p. 249) 
This sub-section considers the symbolic power maintenance aim of the governance and 
accountability process (Section 5.4.1), how the ICAEW governance structures adapt to the 
symbolic violence inflicted up them (Section 5.4.2) and the internal symbolic power and violence 
exercised to further certain agendas (Section 5.4.3). 
5.4.1. Symbolic power maintenance 
Ongoing investment in the maintenance of status and resources is important as ‘professional 
associations, like political bodies, need to cater for the aspirations and needs of their 
membership’ (Ramirez, 2009, p. 403). The status and relevance of the ICAEW were important 
elements of the discussion with interviewees, who often linked status to ideas of exclusivity and 
influence at the highest levels within business and government. In the discussions, the 
membership footprint was closely associated with the maintenance of power (as business is 
international) and representation within policy fora, e.g., IFAC is partially linked to size.  
Interviewees identified that there is a clear requirement for a sustainable business model to 
ensure the continuation of the ICAEW in face of the rapid expansion of alternative qualifications 
and the pace of change in the broader business environment. 
‘So, the biggest challenge I think is around finding a place where we can come around, 
get an effective relationship with all our stakeholders, and from which we can also 
prosecute our strategy which is about getting more people to join.’ I13 Ex-officio 
Some interviewees were clear that scale was important as it creates the power to influence 
policy and practice on an international scale thereby enhancing the accountability to the 
membership as participants within the process rather than as following policies set by others. 
Others identified the risks to relevance that might also result in the demise of accountancy as a 
profession. 
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‘I do see the ICAEW in a leadership role, leading the profession to remain relevant in the 
future, because I think there are lots of things happening, disruptive technological 
change, societal change, slightly closer to home all of the stuff about what should an 
audit do. Anyway all of those things could lead to an outcome where the accountancy 
profession just becomes less and less relevant, less and less valuable to society, and the 
Institute could lead us to our demise or could lead us out of that and make super relevant, 
so for me that’s the biggest challenge.’ I20 Ex-officio  
Others were even more critical in their approach, advocating an appraisal of the social purpose 
of the accountancy profession. 
‘I think as a profession, we should actually be starting from first principles which is do we 
need to exist at all?’ I25 Co-opted 
An examination of the field of professional accountancy bodies provides important insight into 
the environmental pressures that are currently affecting the governance of the ICAEW. ACCA 
has capitalised on its extensive international footprint and overtook the ICAEW’s membership 
base some time ago. The rapid expansion of ACCA has resulted in a significantly younger 
membership profile (Figure 5.1) and so it does not face similar challenges to its income stream 
that the ICAEW does from a mature membership base. 
 
Figure 5.1 Age profile of global membership of the largest UK domiciled professional 
accountancy bodies 
Note: % of members under 25 is 1% or less for each professional body 
Source: FRC, 2018a 
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Members’ impressions of the global standing of the ICAEW reflect a reduction in the symbolic 
status of the qualification in relation to some other professional qualifications; these other 
qualifications are both international and have a significant membership base 
‘as much as we love our qualification, we are slipping behind in the world. The CFA 
(Chartered Financial Analyst) has widely outranked us I would say. ACCA […] when I 
started you know you could sort of look down on that but now it’s definitely a contender.’ 
I8 Co-opted 
If the ICAEW is pursuing meaningful international growth as a means of retaining its power and 
ensuring its sustainability as a leading professional accountancy body, it would appear likely that 
an adjustment to the rate of exchange between academic and economic capital (Bourdieu, 
1986b) may need to be accepted by the membership. However, evidence suggests that the 
membership questions the growth imperative.  
‘I do think growth for growth’s sake is a stronger maxim than quality for long-term 
sustainability’s sake.’ I25 Co-opted 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the historic desire to closely control access to the symbolic capital of 
the ICAEW has resulted in a relatively late entry to the international market. Two factors have 
prompted this change of strategy. First, the aging profile of the membership has prompted the 
interest in accessing growth markets to maintain membership income and second, the migration 
of accounting standard setting to international bodies requires increased membership scale in 
comparison to other professional bodies to secure seats on the IFAC. As such, the habitus of a 
professional accountancy body has evolved. 
‘I think what the institute is trying to be in five years’ time is an international 
organisation, and today it isn’t, it is a UK organisation with some international 
adventures and outposts.’ I10 Elected 
The ability to influence the IFAC’s decision-making process is important for professional bodies 
who have, effectively, ceded power to this body for the standard setting processes in audit, 
education and ethics, and to the IASB for financial reporting. It is arguable that the ICAEW cannot 
effectively fulfil its Charter objectives without accessing growth and the resultant rights of 
representation internationally, leading to a justification on the grounds of public interest rather 
than economic benefit to the members.  
As such, this can be considered a means of protecting and enhancing the capitals of members. 
109 
 
‘I think now you do have to have a global position......you know, in the...in the global 
economy. And I think it's...it's making sure our voice is still heard. So, for example, you 
know, the fact we don't have a full seat at IFAC, in spite of the fact we put a million 
dollars a year into it...’ I6 Ex-officio 
Other members were more sceptical about pursuing a membership growth strategy: 
‘Why do we want to provide capital for […] for growing the business and creating 
300,000 instead of 150,000 accountants?’ I24 Elected 
This small practitioner appears to be focusing on his self-interest as a member rather than the 
wider public interest and the future sustainability of the profession.  
Some members, whilst accepting the global aspirations, questioned the ability of the strategy to 
deliver on its aims. 
‘I’m not convinced that the ICAEW will be an effective global professional body. I don’t 
think its global strategy is […] I don’t think it’s well thought out.’ I25 Co-opted 
Alternative routes to organic growth to achieve significant international scale may include a 
merger or some form of strategic alliance. Whilst the ICAEW appears to be debating its strategic 
approach, the wider field of accountancy is evolving and competitor bodies are merging and 
creating alliances to generate the required scale to compete internationally and secure 
representation within important global accountancy bodies. 
‘I think the challenges are the mergers and the alliances that are taking place between 
other organisations.’ I6 Ex-officio 
Prior failures of merger proposals were linked to the perception that the symbolic capital of the 
ICAEW would be tarnished (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). Given the prior disconnect exposed 
between the leadership and the general membership, it is unlikely a general vote would be a 
favoured course of action. An alliance with other Chartered Accountancy bodies would appear 
to be more likely (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014); this would enable smaller bodies to 
co-ordinate their representation and access financial and political economies of scale. 
‘I’d rather focus on collaboration and network with other accountancy bodies around the 
world to make us a stronger profession together rather than seeking to say its all about 
ICAEW and the number of members we have.’ I20 Ex-officio 
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Other interviewees were clear that ICAEW must be proactive in its change agenda to adapt the 
identity of a Chartered Accountant and provide clear leadership to address the challenges it is 
facing. 
‘And if you look at the fundamentals of trust and integrity, education, embracing the 
future, if we do these things now there is no reason we shouldn’t be around in another 
137 years. But if we become a reactive profession, we won’t be around in 10. If we don’t 
think globally we’ll be part of a bigger organisation. If we don’t embrace and lead on 
digital, we will get left behind by those who do.’ I22 Ex-officio 
The ability of the ICAEW to confront the challenges it faces and have a robust debate was also 
questioned, implying that it continues to be reactive rather than proactive. This calls into 
question the effectiveness of the governance process and the interests that are served by the 
current structures.  
‘So, I think that the international strategy and the relevance of auditing and the future 
relevance of our profession around that are big challenges, but I don’t think the Institute 
is robust enough to have that debate.’ I25 Co-opted 
This section has discussed the directions in which the ICAEW is being steered to survive in the 
changing global accountancy environment, as well as the challenges it faces if it wishes to 
maintain and grow its international influence. Whilst the ICAEW had a historically powerful 
international position, that has long since been overtaken by other professional bodies who 
have grown their memberships rapidly. The focus has moved from a national accounting 
infrastructure (professional bodies, standard setters) to an international infrastructure in which 
scale is an important measure for representation. At the present time, it appears that there is 
no clear consensus on how to balance the competing demands. The next section looks at the 
context in which the ICAEW operates. 
5.4.2. Withstanding symbolic violence 
The ICAEW is accountable to a range of external stakeholders including international bodies, 
government, regulators (including the FRC and HMRC) as well as the Big Four. The social capital 
associated with the ICAEW and its membership has historically enabled it to use its network of 
relationships with such actors to the benefit of the membership.  
This political representation role has been a major feature of the ICAEW’s work since the grant 
of the original Royal Charter (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a). An interviewee highlighted the 
umbilical link between the ICAEW and politics as follows: 
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‘But we are involved in politics and you have to accept that, not because the profession 
wants to be involved in politics but because politics has become involved with the 
profession.’ I5 Elected 
At the same time, the ICAEW is pushing into regulated areas commonly associated with other 
UK professional bodies, e.g., probate, which has been historically undertaken by solicitors. This 
ensures an elevated exchange rate of capital for members (particularly smaller practitioners) 
that may partially counteract the general market trend of decline in this sector of the market.  
The government has adjusted the symbolic capital of the profession periodically through 
legislation, e.g., increases in audit thresholds. This contributed to the number of firms registered 
with the ICAEW for audit reducing by 11% over the period from 2015-2017 (FRC, 2018a, p. 25) 
The relationship between the ICAEW and the government therefore requires ongoing 
maintenance through lobbying and other activities conducted by the Executives and 
Officeholders. 
Recent attempts to expand the jurisdiction of the ICAEW to extend its remit in relation to legal 
services have proved problematic. This is because the incursion into this area normally reserved 
for lawyers has resulted in a rejection by the Lord Chancellor, which has subsequently been 
partially successful on appeal (Sweet, 2019).  
‘I find the legal services position interesting as to why- if we are such good professional 
or chap and chapesses, why should anybody object to us helping with the provision of 
those services, but perhaps they think we’re accountants, why should we mess about 
stuff we don’t understand, but that is clearly- that’s a very stark indicator that there are 
external influences, and it’s difficult to work out whether that’s necessarily just pure you 
know, just things finding their own level or whether there is a degree of self-interest from 
other bodies in that.’ I9 Elected 
In the wake of the recent Carillion collapse, a wave of investigations have been announced or 
undertaken into the audit market in the UK (Brydon, 2019; Competition and Markets Authority, 
2018; Kingman, 2018; Sikka et al., 2018). The power of the ICAEW to make representations to 
various government bodies and contribute to the ongoing debate, continues to steer the debate 
to reflect the interests of its members. In this respect, the ICAEW is in a powerful position to act 
as an intermediary in the policymaking process, representing member views and maintaining a 
dialogue with government. For example, when the Business, Environment and Industrial 
Strategy Report was published, the Chair, Rachel Reeves MP, presented the findings in a keynote 
speech at the ICAEW (Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2019). 
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Whilst the legally protected audit area is no longer the major source of work for members, it 
remains one of the few areas that are reserved for practice members, and is therefore closely 
intertwined with the identity of an ICAEW member and the ICAEW itself. This is at the core of 
the public interest duty as a loss of confidence in the work of accountants, both through external 
reporting and auditing and internally within businesses, would affect the overall functioning of 
the economy with the effects being felt internationally.  
The retention of credibility in the eyes of the public is important and can be employed to justify 
the status quo: 
‘public disaffection with the role that we play […] will result in the government getting 
involved and stopping us doing something or telling us how to do other things. So that’s 
very important.’ I16 Elected 
Many members also recognised that the concentration of power in the hands of the Big Four 
also makes the ICAEW vulnerable, particularly in relation to the pipeline of student members 
(Stringfellow et al., 2015). 
‘The Big Four stop training Chartered Accountants; we haven’t got a business model.’ I16 
Elected 
Whilst there have been measures to facilitate the training of members outside of practice, a 
significant increase would be required to offset the effects of the loss of a Big Four firm as a 
training employer (Duff, 2017). The ability to significantly influence the route to membership 
accords the Big Four the power to instrumentalise ICAEW and the ACA curriculum to satisfy their 
requirements (Stringfellow et al., 2015). 
Politico-economic factors affect the governance of the ICAEW as it is forced to publicly defend 
the protected audit core on behalf of its members and mediate an acceptable solution. Such 
threats have resulted in an increased impetus to expand the boundaries of regulated work in 
certain areas to substitute a diminishing scope in others. As a result, the Executive and the 
Officeholders are engaged in significant political lobbying activities. The next section considers 
how the Executive function influences the governance processes of the ICAEW. 
5.4.3. Symbolic power and violence in furthering agendas 
As the scope and size of the ICAEW has increased, an Executive function has been put in place 
and has expanded to undertake the operational role of running the professional body. A major 
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part of this role is to manage the external stakeholder relationships through representation, 
lobbying and consultation to promote the interests of the ICAEW and its membership.  
‘So, I think part of the Executive’s function is to manage those stakeholder relationships 
rather than Council members doing it, or Council as a body doing it, actually.’ I3 Elected 
Whilst this is a necessary function that is instrumental in maintaining stability and continuity 
within ICAEW, as volunteers rotate both through officeholder positions and through Council, it 
is also important that there is sufficient scrutiny of its activities (managerial accountability). The 
balance of power in the governance structure is maintained through the Board, which comprises 
both members of the Executive, Council and independent members. Managerial accountability 
is not a focus of this thesis, however the role of the Executive in setting agendas and 
orchestrating the Council processes has implications for the governance of the ICAEW and the 
accountability of the Council and is considered in this section. 
The expansion of the executive function reflects the professionalisation of the ICAEW and a need 
for a stable strategic and operational environment: 
‘back and around the time when I came on Council, certainly the late ‘90s, the direction 
of travel could change every year… depending on who was President.’ I9 Elected 
Further, the size of the ICAEW meant that it was no longer practical for volunteer officeholders 
to take on the operational role as the learning process required resulted in a diminished 
effectiveness and significant variability as rotation occurred. 
‘we need a strong executive, a strong staff presence to run the shop, because it’s a big 
shop, but it’s supposed to be run on behalf of its members and so that perhaps needs 
attenuated from time to time.’ I9 Elected 
Interviewees recognised that the Chief Executive is a powerful actor within the ICAEW and has 
the ability to direct the focus of the organisation and expand his role if unchecked. 
‘So, if you've got a Chief Executive, they are…they are bound to accrue power to 
themselves and that indeed is undoubtedly what Council wanted, you know.’ I6 Ex-officio 
Members alluded to the cross-over between strategic and operational decision-making and 
debate, noting that incursions into the operational result in duplication of activity and do not 
make best use of the forum to debate strategic matters. 
‘It’s an evolving role where the role should be in my opinion, it is one of oversight and 
setting strategic direction, they are all volunteers of course, there’s no remuneration, it’s 
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enough being on council, so I think it should restrict itself to strategic direction and 
oversight, it should not be delving down into executive matters. I feel quite strongly that 
the council should not be doing a job that we are paying someone to do, that person 
should do it.’ I10 Elected 
Some members also criticised the quality of the agenda setting that can be difficult to manage 
at the strategic level due to the number of operational items that are reserved in the byelaws 
for decision by the Council, e.g., annual subscription rates. The blurring of the types of decision 
required tends to result in criticism from the Council members. 
‘I think the Council sometimes perhaps struggles to get its agenda in the right space.’ I12 
Co-opted 
Others point to a padding out of the agenda with ‘fillers’, which do not necessarily fit with a 
strategic decision-making remit. This appears to be at the expense of full debate of the major 
strategic challenges highlighted earlier. 
‘I am, yeah I sometimes think it's sort of there’s a bit of filling up with some education 
thoughts […] It's not sort of relevant to the oversight of the running of the Institute.’ I8 
Co-opted 
Some interviewees pointed out that the Council may be unaware of potential bias in the briefing 
packs that they feel can be orchestrated to lead the Council to certain outcomes that are desired 
by the Executive. 
‘I have criticised Council for it as well sometimes, which is a lot of the papers are not—
they are not unbiased. They lead you towards a decision...’ I5 Elected 
In this scenario the Council is heavily dependent on the Board level scrutiny of agenda items. 
However, there is a risk that the Council members on the Board may be caught up in the illusio 
of strategic decision-making without the reflexivity to question the presentation of matters for 
decision-making. 
‘the Council can only scrutinise to the extent that it has been briefed effectively by the 
Executive or the board.’ I12 Co-opted 
Other comments reflect a management of the agenda by the Executive: 
‘In theory, the chairman controls the agenda, but I don't believe that he really does have 
a say as to what's on it and not on it. I think my perception is that comes from the CEO. 
And again, one assumes that the President, in theory, has some say over it, but I would 
think it's much more along the lines that he's able to add to it.’ I4 Elected 
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Some interviewees were critical of the tight control maintained over the Council debates to 
ensure that the agenda is covered and decisions are made. This level of control also has the 
effect of constraining spontaneity and may reduce legitimate questioning from the Council 
members. 
‘There's clearly a lot of attempts to keep everything on script with the intention being to 
get questions submitted in advance. So that people can already know what they are and 
have answers ready for them. Now, there's a good efficiency point there but on the other 
hand, I think it does enable greater scripting of and greater directing, stage management 
of these things.’ I4 Elected 
The scripted nature of Council meetings was also attributed to the role of the Chairman in 
managing the agenda during the meetings, and the Executive function who supports the 
management of the Council meetings. 
‘The chairman takes you back on piste and there’s a controlled message that they need 
to get done by a certain amount of time. And with all these governance police kind of 
people around, they won’t let you go off piste. I think that’s a shame, because it means 
that I almost know what’s going to happen in a meeting before I go to the meeting.’ I3 
Elected 
The interviewee below talks of socialising ideas to ensure that concerns are addressed in 
advance of Council debate. She is an ex-officio member of the Council who has presented 
numerous papers for debate, and has found that the consultative approach is most effective in 
securing a mandate to advance ideas. However, these consultations are often restricted to the 
most influential members of the Council, closing out others who may have valid opinions. 
‘When it works well [...], council is hugely beneficial. And if you share the idea with 
Council at the right time, it gives you the mandate to go on and do look at it further, 
which is excellent. The Executive have all learned their own ways of coping and the thing 
they mustn’t do is take Council for granted or Council gets very touchy. And I think there's 
an awful lot to be done not at Council meetings around talking to people and developing 
ideas and sharing them and dealing with concerns and so on that will then help when we 
get to Council having a more healthy debate.’ I13 Ex-officio 
This approach to ensuring the agenda has a smooth passage through the Council was confirmed 
by another member who termed the socialisation processes as the necessary ‘backwork’. 
‘I said otherwise you're going to get the grumpy old men standing up and rejecting it. 
And it's about communication. If communication is right, you get things done.’ I19 
Elected 
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Other interviewees were more critical of such approaches and talked about the management of 
the agenda through various back channels to socialise ideas and gain support prior to the Council 
meeting, and indeed through planting supporters within the Council debate.  
‘It’s not just the Executive, it’s the Executive in league with the certain you know, 
members of the board and Council who have pre-discussed what’s going to happen in 
this performance. And I feel that I’m going along as a member of that performance, but 
also, a member of the audience really. And I’m going to watch this play out, and nothing 
new is going to happen. […] There’s not the engagement because it’s so well controlled.’ 
I3 Elected 
The interviewee quoted above is an elected representative who, whilst influential in his 
workplace, is conscious that he is not part of the most influential groups within the Council. As 
a result, he feels excluded from the debate as he does not have the social capital within the 
Council to be party to the discussions shaping significant papers for the Council, or to influence 
others through membership of leading committees within the committee hierarchy. Yet he 
continues to participate as he attaches a value to his membership of the Council that outweighs 
his feelings of being manipulated. 
The often symbolic nature of the Council proceedings constrains the Council’s ability to hold the 
Executive to account, and the quotes selected reinforce the view that ‘whilst they are capable 
of reflexivity, those who are successful at playing the game will only engage in a form of 
reflexivity that is permitted within the rules of the game’ (Lupu & Empson, 2015, p. 1333). As 
such, the members are caught up in the illusio of the game that predisposes them to collude 
with (rather than challenge) the actions of those who are dominant in moulding the field, i.e., 
collusio (Gracia & Oats, 2012, p. 307). However, there remain examples of situations in which 
Council has flexed its muscles and rejected a proposal with (I22) citing a case where a direct 
approach had been made to a potential co-optee rather than through the nominating 
committee as outlined in the processes. 
‘with hindsight, I think that the point could have been made without causing the 
embarrassment we then caused.’ I22 Ex-officio 
This section has outlined the symbolic power and violence applied in furthering agendas within 
the Council and thereby influencing the debate and decision making process. Tension was 
revealed in the interviewee process, with a perception that the agenda is stage-managed 
through socialising ideas and the pre-submission of questions prior to the debate. There was 
also evidence of a periodic testing of the relationship that indicates that the Council can still 
exercise its powers where it feels it is necessary. 
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5.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has answered the first research question by using empirical evidence from the 
interviews with Council members to illustrate their perceptions of how the ICAEW is governed 
and to what ends.  
In so doing, the chapter has investigated the accountability of the Council to the membership 
and its broader stakeholders. It has illustrated the dichotomy between the open calls to stand 
for election and the power of the District Societies in attempting to control the processes 
surrounding Council elections. The District Societies continue to wield significant power within 
the Council process, despite critical questioning in relation to their contemporary relevance to 
the membership. It has also been shown that these groups have posed a recurrent problem for 
ICAEW (Ramirez, 2009); however, they retain a privileged role in the governance structure. The 
linkage of elected members to these geographic constituencies, and the attempts to ensure that 
they attend District Society meetings, tends to encourage practitioners to stand, creating an 
imbalance in the sectoral representation on the Council leading to the need for co-options. The 
accountability of co-opted members to the membership is shown to be limited, as they do not 
have a direct link to the relevant sector from which they are co-opted.   
The accountability of the committee structure to the membership is established through the 
Boards and co-options of their Chairs to the Council. This network of committees enables 
potential future co-optees to be identified and some of them are then parachuted into the Board 
through appointment to certain ex-officio positions. This contrasts with the route for elected 
members who must seek election as a Council representative to the Board. Board membership 
is generally accepted by members of the Council as a pre-cursor to standing as an office-holder 
and carries a certain status as a result.  
Accountability beyond the membership is established through the dialogue of the public 
interest, which frees the members to pursue actions in their self-interest subject to compliance 
with the Code of Ethics. The debate within the Council ensures that the public interest is 
considered in the decision making process, however this assumes that the interests of the 
membership are balanced effectively. 
Maintaining the symbolic power of the ICAEW is a major concern for those at the heart of the 
governance process. It has been shown that the governance process is largely defensive and 
reactive rather than ambitious and pro-active. This is primarily due to concerns to maintain the 
118 
 
rate of exchange of symbolic to economic capital for members. This stems from a denial of the 
economic drivers for the ICAEW and reflects a reluctance to change the initiation process to 
ensure survival.  
Historic reluctance to merge or expand internationally has left the ICAEW overly dependent on 
the Big Four to train accountants and it is consequently seeking an organic expansion strategy. 
In this sense, it will be increasingly difficult to fulfil the objectives of the Royal Charter and 
maintain accountability to its membership if the ICAEW is marginalised internationally. The body 
itself will be increasingly prone to instrumentalisation by the Big Four through their control of 
the pipeline of new members.  
Interviewees also identified that, to some extent, the Council process is subject to the powers 
of those who set its agenda referring to the orchestrated nature of proceedings. However, the 
members of the Council are complicit in their own domination by the Executive, with only 
occasional instances of rejection of proposals. 
The next chapter answers the second research question that asks, What are the interests of 
Council members and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW?  
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Chapter 6 
Council members’ appointment, interests, and the implications 
on governance and accountability 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 examined the structure and governance of the ICAEW and its accountability as a 
membership organisation, working to reconcile its accountability to the membership and its 
broader stakeholders. It also reflected on the aims of, and influences on the governance 
processes of the ICAEW. This chapter answers the second research question, which asks; What 
are the interests of Council members and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? The 
main question is further split into two sub-questions to help structure the investigation. These 
sub questions ask the following: What interest groups do Council members represent, and How 
do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW?  
Achieving a greater understanding of the interest groupings within the Council and their 
respective capitals, helps provide insight into the operation of political accountability. Although 
previous work considers the actions of the ICAEW as a whole (Noguchi & Edwards, 2004, 2008a; 
Ramirez, 2009), it has not yet specifically addressed the interests served by those at the heart 
of its governance structure. This chapter seeks to redress this gap. 
Entry to the governing body of the profession conforms to what might be classed as the creation 
of an elite seeming to offer possibilities for entry to all members by means of open elections 
(Williams & Filippakou, 2010), despite the discussion with interviewees revealing a number of 
hidden barriers. To help answer the first sub-question, for elected members an initial analysis is 
performed of the election statements produced by those seeking election investigating the 
common themes. This is the information the general membership can use on which to base their 
voting decision. The election address analysis is supplemented by material from interviews with 
the members of the Council to further understand the interests served. In contrast, co-opted 
members are appointed to represent specific interests within the Council, which are typically 
underrepresented through the election processes and ex-officio are appointed by virtue of other 
positions they hold. 
Findings indicate that the District Society network plays a significant role in the election 
processes through facilitating nomination and providing candidates with the relevant social 
capital to establish credibility through the election statement with the wider membership. It also 
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provides the accountability link to the local membership, as the elected Council members are 
ex-officio members of the District Society Committee. As outlined in Chapter 5 this structure 
tends to privilege those in practice at the expense of members working outside of practice. Co-
options are designed to address some of the representation gaps resulting from the election 
process. However, there is limited accountability to the sector from which co-options are made. 
The second sub-question focuses on the interests of those seeking election or agreeing to co-
option to the Council and how they shape its governance. The findings reveal that elected 
members often seek to strengthen their capital profiles through involvement in the ICAEW 
Council. This is in contrast to those who are co-opted to tend to lend their existing capital profile 
to the ICAEW as a legitimating tool enabling claims to speak on behalf of the membership. Both 
types of Council member are susceptible to being subsumed into the hierarchies of the ICAEW 
and some devote significant amounts of time to participation in committees. This is often easier 
for those who have achieved a certain level of autonomy in their career to undertake, also 
leading to a concentration of interests. 
The underlying risk is that the governance mechanisms of the ICAEW are deeply entrenched in 
an historical structure of the profession and do not reflect the current configuration of members, 
resulting in a failure to effectively address contemporary issues facing the membership. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 helps to answer the question of what interest 
groups the Council members represent, relying on a combination of election statements and 
interview data. It also contrasts the capitals of those appointed through differing routes, i.e., 
election or co-option/ex-officio appointment. Section 6.3 answers the second part of the 
research question regarding how the interests of the Council members shape the governance of 
the ICAEW. Section 6.4 examines the implications for the governance and accountability of the 
professional body. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2. What interest groups do Council members represent? 
The Council represents an elite grouping of members with a major share of authority over a 
larger grouping, in this case the general membership. The existence of an elite charged with 
governance is an accepted product of democratic societies in which a subset of members are 
entrusted with governance duties (Richardson, 1989). As such, it appears appropriate to 
associate the Council with the elite of the ICAEW (Lee, 1999).  
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The election process takes place every two years with approximately half the seats coming up 
for election in each period. In theory, this should ensure a healthy turnover of Council members 
whilst retaining institutional stability. In practice, however, many members have sought multiple 
re-elections and have held seats for long periods; this contrasts with current Board best practice 
recommendations that call for maximum tenures of nine years (FRC, 2018c). The number of 
consecutive terms is limited for co-opted members, thereby ensuring a more frequent rotation 
of composition and the ability to address short-term diversity deficits in this manner. 
The recurrent election of members has also contributed to the Council composition lagging that 
of the membership, despite significant evidence of the benefits associated with diversity within 
decision-making bodies. 
‘you can’t move on diversity if people block the positions.’ I10 Elected 
The interview process seeks to provide insight into what capitals are valued by the members 
who join the Council. It uncovers some of the struggles that take place in the process of 
becoming a Council member, and the apparent differences between elected and co-opted 
members.  
‘Although those struggles might appear meaningless for agents external to the field, 
they are crucial for its members’ (Golsorkhi et al., 2009, p. 784). 
Interviewees’ comments help to illustrate types of struggles they face in becoming members of 
the Council and managing the accountability to their constituents. This helps to further our 
understanding of the political accountability of Council members. This section is organised as 
follows. The next sub-section considers the role of the election processes in establishing political 
accountability and section 6.2.2 outlines the interests of co-opted members. 
6.2.1. Election processes: establishing political accountability 
Elections establish political accountability and typically encourage a range of candidates to stand 
and enable the electorate to exercise their judgement in the choice of who to vote for. This is 
done by comparing challengers’ track records against the incumbent, and thereby enabling a 
democratic choice of representative for the geographic area. The findings indicate that whilst 
this process appears open, the election process actually serves to constrain diversity and 
privileges certain interest groupings, reinforcing the dominance of small practitioners within the 
Council. The capacity to connect with local issues and effectively represent more than a narrow 
group of members is called into question by the interviewees and threatens the political 
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accountability ideas that underpin the current governance structure. Some of the comments 
were surprising given elected members have been successful under the existing structures. 
Evidencing social capital: meeting candidate requirements 
For those who are considering putting themselves forward for election, the first point of 
reference is the election briefing, which explains the nomination process and provides guidance 
in relation to the election statement that each candidate is required to produce (Figure 6.1). This 
process may be considered a form of symbolic violence designed to ensure that those who do 
not conform are excluded (Gracia & Oats, 2012). This appears to be objective but, in reality, 
serves to exclude certain types of members who, in the eyes of the existing elite who control 
what is considered to constitute merit, do not possess the requisite cultural capital to govern 
(Fogarty & Zimmerman, 2019). In this regard, whilst the strict guidelines are prima facie helpful, 
they are likely to result in various combinations of the four forms of exclusion: self-elimination, 
over-selection, relegation, and direct selection (Lamont & Lareau, 1988).  
It is probable that the election briefing itself results in some members exercising self-elimination 
prior to commencing the process. For those who wish to stand, one of the first barriers that a 
potential candidate must overcome is securing nomination by the requisite number of members 
registered in the appropriate constituency. There are three main ways of securing the requisite 
nominations from other members: 1) working in practice with other members; 2) by cultivating 
a network of members through the District Society, and 3) through broader social networks. The 
ability to generate sufficient nominations represents a first step to evidencing suitability to 
represent members. If a member does not have a local network, their ability to represent those 
members would appear to be questionable. 
What should I include in my candidate statement?  
• Make a personal introduction – tell your story so voters have insight into what you 
can offer  
• Say why you want to be elected to Council  
• In what ways have you been involved with ICAEW?  
 
• This could be as a member of a working group or committee or perhaps Council itself. 
You may be involved in local society activities or meet with ICAEW members and 
other professionals in wider groupings or at work. Or you might have qualified not 
too long ago and could bring that perspective and involvement.  
 
• What experiences would you bring to the role of a member of Council?  
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Figure 6.1 Extract from candidate statement guidance  
Source: ICAEW (2018a) 
It seems to be easier for those in practice to secure the appropriate number of nominations 
from constituents, as they are more likely to work with other members. Those working in 
business, the public sector, or in another capacity may not routinely interact with other 
members. This has the effect of resulting in the over-selection of practice members.  
Importantly, prior involvement in the ICAEW infrastructure is useful to secure the social capital 
required to achieve nomination (Figure 6.1). For example, 67% of successful members in the 
2015 election mentioned involvement with the District Society, and 70% of successful 
candidates (excluding international constituencies) in the 2017 election. 
‘I think personally I would like to see a much different nomination system or ideally no 
nominations at all to be able to stand for council. […] In reality, it’s usually just asking 
you, “Do you know five other chartered accountants?” I18 Elected 
The nominations system reinforces the interests of those who operate within certain social 
groupings whilst resulting in self-elimination of those who do not form part of such groupings. 
The whole nominations process can be viewed as part of a currency of obligations and often 
creates an expectation of reciprocity; this may be immediate or deferred and may not even need 
to be repaid in the same form (Portes, 1998).  
‘I think my perception, the fact that from a lot of the other statements, candidates that 
I’ve seen previously and lists of who nominated them indicated that was a lot of sort of 
cross-nomination by existing Councillors, had always made me think it was a bit of a 
closed shop.’ I4 Elected 
• Your experiences will include the roles you have held, the sector(s) and sizes of 
organisation where you have worked, the stage of your career, your own background 
and where you are based.  
• Identify the key issues affecting Chartered Accountants and how you hope to help 
resolve these  
 
• In what ways do you think you would be able to contribute to the strategic 
development of ICAEW?  
 
• Describe how you would use your knowledge, skills and experiences to help your 
Institute move forward?  
 
• Be concise  
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The District Society often facilitates the practice of cross-nomination of candidates, with 
committee members endorsing their favoured candidates through nomination. It is also a means 
of controlling the actions of those who rely on such endorsement and may create a deferred 
obligation, which can be called in at a future date.  
This quasi-gift of the candidature by the District Society was also highlighted by another 
interviewee. 
‘So the guy who was the practicing Council member decided to retire and I was asked if 
I would take it on because I just stepped down as District Society President. So it made a 
lot of sense because it only came up once in a blue moon, it was either, well do it or you 
might lose your chance to do it.’ I16 Elected 
It may be the case that to those outside of practice (without extensive social networks) who 
need to garner support outside of their workplace, that the District Society can provide a means 
to connect with members and generate support. This process requires a sustained commitment 
to the District Society and its committees. 
‘what it can provide is a way to get these signatures if you’re already involved.’ I18 
Elected 
District Societies mirror the Council constituencies and are local groupings of members that 
organise training and networking events. It would also appear that the incentives for practice-
based candidates to be involved in the District Societies and their activities are greater than for 
business members who often network on a pan-professional or industry focused basis rather 
than in a role specific way. The District Society network is therefore a contributor to the 
concentration of small practitioners on the Council. A reform of this established link could 
encourage a more representative group to become involved in the workings of the professional 
body. However, throughout its troubled history, reform of the District Society structure has been 
minimal as the status quo has been vociferously defended by interested parties (Willmott et al., 
1993). 
As outlined by I4 below, to be successful outside of the District Society route requires candidates 
to have alternative means to access similar sized networks of members. In this case the 
candidate in question, whilst not a typical profile, accessed a substantial network of practitioners 
through her personal network. 
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‘I think it’s to do with being known. So, in the group I was elected for instance, a public 
sector employee got elected. That’s very unusual. However, she is someone who through 
her home relationship is connected with practice.’ I4 Elected 
Challenging the status quo: contesting elections 
A contested election provides a positive choice for members and encourages them to consider 
who their preferred candidate may be and what they are offering to bring to the role. In some 
circumstances (over-selection), less qualified candidates offer themselves against those who are 
deemed well qualified by the District Society or the central infrastructure. This is a likely by-
product of the open call for candidates (see Appendices 4 and 5). However,  
‘the problem I think in a sense is it’s not a level playing field because the institute put out 
a series of announcements saying there is a vacancy on Council. That…when I read that, 
I might chuck my hat into the ring and have a go at it. And so, it’s encouraging…contested 
elections. In principle, nothing wrong with contested election, but when you got a single 
member seat, it’s really important you don’t get the wrong person on council.’ I16 
Elected 
It appears that whilst the power of the District Society to control candidacy for the Council is 
subject to challenge, there are members who remain keen to perpetuate the control of the 
District Society. This is because it continues to offer the primary route for accountability to the 
membership who elect Council members. 
Others are happier to contest the control of candidature by the District Society rather than 
conforming. 
‘So, it was essentially that the seats felt like they were in the gift of the District Society 
management committee.’ I21 Elected 
The interviewee above later disclosed that he had been encouraged to stand for election in his 
district by the Executive who were perhaps trying to provide a wider field of candidates for 
election. This may indicate that those who are sympathetic to the central agenda are being 
encouraged to stand. It is notable that this candidate later conformed to the discipline of the 
District Society and attended meetings in his capacity as the local elected Council member. 
Relegation can serve to result in less qualified candidates ‘making up the field’ rather than 
mounting a strong campaign. This appears to be a factor that differentiates those who are active 
locally within the District Society network from those who are not. However, it seems that these 
active members often represent the small but powerful grouping of District Society members 
rather than members more generally: 
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‘I think if you've just been the local president, you've got better profile. So, the other 
person that stood wasn't particularly known in the society. So, I think I got about twice 
as many votes as he did. So, but not enormously different but even as a president, you 
don't necessarily get to know that many people even though you try very hard.’13 
To operate as an effective democratic process, members should be able to exercise their rights 
to select their preferred candidate. Whilst the number of uncontested seats (an example of 
direct selection) has fallen slightly over the period, it remains significant overall at over 30%. 
Taken in isolation, the number of uncontested seats is an indicator of disinterest from the 
membership (Parker, 2007). As such, the interests of the disaffected are not represented within 
the Council, and therefore the overall strategic direction of the ICAEW, as there are limited 
alternative outlets for such voices to be taken into account. 
Reasons for the number of uncontested seats may include the reputation or symbolic capital of 
the candidate, which acts as a deterrent to others to compete alongside general apathy. Some 
interviewees alluded to adopting specific tactics to ensure that they did not need to run the risk 
of the election process to secure their Council seat. 
‘I was unopposed, although to be unopposed, one has to manoeuvre into that position 
to start with.’ I24 Elected 
The political act of closing down potential opponents and securing full support of the District 
Society to ensure that others do not stand in contest is not often transparent to outsiders but 
had been adopted by some of the elected interviewees. 
‘There was an incumbent and I talked to him about wanting to stand and he decided not 
to stand against me.’ I7 Elected 
Table 6.1 below shows the numbers of uncontested and contested seats in the last two major 
rounds of elections incorporated into this study. A widespread social media campaign and direct 
encouragement to stand from members of the ICAEW staff resulted in a larger number of 
contested seats in 2017. 
Election processes: shaping the narrative through election statements 
In contested elections, the election statement can provide insight into the candidate’s suitability 
and their intentions. The statement is combined with candidates having extensive local 
networks, which they have cultivated either through the District Society network or through 
their workplace. Interviewees considered the election statement as a means of garnering 
additional votes from those outside their range of contacts. Securing additional votes is 
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important given the low overall member engagement with the voting process, therefore 
candidates need to have a broad appeal in their election statement to ensure that they can pick 
up any additional votes. 
‘So, I think the people who aren’t actively involved and don’t know any of the individuals 
but have an interest in voting will read what someone's written.’ I15 Elected 
The number of candidates contesting seats increased (Table 6.1), in part in response to changes 
in the nominations process with each candidate requiring just five nominations in 2017, in 
contrast to 2015 where up to ten nominations were required depending on the seat. Further, a 
concerted email and social media campaign was undertaken by the ICAEW to encourage 
members to stand for election. Despite this, the most heavily contested constituency was the 
newly introduced Europe and Eurasia constituency, with ten candidates contesting two seats. It 
also generated a greater percentage of members voting than other smaller geographic 
constituencies (15.4% (Electoral Reform Services, 2017)). This goes some way to indicating that 
the linkage between very local operations and member engagement can be overcome through 
modern communication channels. 
Table 6.1: Contested seats in recent ICAEW elections 
Percentage of seats 2015 2017 Overall 
Uncontested  37% 23% 30% 
Contested  63% 77% 70% 
Source: Adapted by author 
This section seeks to develop insight into the likelihood of being successful in Council elections 
based on evidence from the 46 candidate election statements for the 2017 election. Prior 
investigations indicate that success may depend on a variety of factors including the following: 
‘Technical expertise, contribution to the work of the ICAEW, political influence in the 
outside world, a wide range of knowledge and experience, social contacts, fame, 
popularity, seniority and various other factors probably play a part in the election of a 
member to the Council.’(Noguchi & Edwards, 2008a, p. 141) 
Voting turnouts are typically low in the Council elections (2017 5.8% (Electoral Reform Services, 
2017)). Those who vote can be divided into two groups: those who know the candidate and vote 
without necessarily reading the election statement, and those who do not know the candidate 
but who use the election address as a means of guiding their decision. Therefore, it is important 
that all candidates establish their credentials with the full range of members rather than relying 
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on a subset to support them. Whilst some candidates focused on certain segments, e.g., 
business Candidate 45, practice Candidate 29, family Candidate 30, none of these candidates 
were successful against others who sought to establish credibility with the full range of members 
in their constituency. Because voting turnouts are low, it is hard to quantify the potential 
number of voters falling into the target grouping within the constituency and the extent to which 
any target group might actually vote. 
For example, one member standing on a business-focused mandate voices the underlying 
symbolic violence felt by business members in their candidate statement: 
‘Do you ever feel that ICAEW does nothing for members like you? 
More than 40% of members work in business. Yet the Institute Council is dominated by 
members in practice – even though they comprise less than a third of membership.’  
Candidate 45 
This candidate was not successful in their bid for election. Disaffected members are likely to be 
precisely those who do not engage with the election process. Further, the adoption of a 
business-based mandate means that this member was also likely to push away practice-based 
voters who may represent the more active group of voters in these elections. 
Successful candidates tended to focus on common themes, perhaps as a result of the guidance 
on election statement structure issued to all candidates (Figure 6.1). Quotes are illustrative of 
the three key themes from the 2017 statements (Appendix 6); they include candidate number 
plus S denotes successful candidates, number denotes unsuccessful candidates. 
The themes were extracted, from both a manual reading of the statements followed by 
developing a coding structure for the candidate statements based on the election guidelines, in 
NVivo. The four main themes were linked to the candidate’s accountability and participation in 
the ICAEW governance as shown in Table 6.2: 
Table 6.2: Themes extracted from 2017 election statements 
Theme Candidate statement 
guidance (Table 6.1) 
Linkage to accountability and 
governance 
Enthusiasm Say why you want to be 
elected to Council  
Establishing credibility  
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Representation Say why you want to be 
elected to Council  
Representation of the membership 
– accountability 
Two way 
communication 
In what ways have you been 
involved with ICAEW?  
Accountability to the membership 
Changes to the 
professional 
environment 
Identify the key issues 
affecting Chartered 
Accountants and how you 
hope to help resolve these  
Proactive governance 
 Source: Adapted by author  
Theme 1: Enthusiasm 
The enthusiasm of the candidate for the role and the ICAEW as a body was mentioned by many 
successful candidates, and relates to the election statement guidance (Table 6.1), which asks 
candidates to establish motivation for standing and therefore credibility with the membership. 
Candidates articulated this enthusiasm in two different ways: at the organisational level of the 
ICAEW with candidates expressing their belief in the professional body and secondly at the level 
of the individual members within the constituency. 
Some candidates used the word ‘passionate’ to denote their affinity for ICAEW. 
‘I am as passionate now as I was then about the future of our Institute.’ Candidate 14S 
Others directed their enthusiasm to the individual members and their concerns through 
establishing their appeal with the full spectrum of members and their concerns. 
‘I am passionate about helping our members wherever they work, in business or practice, 
small or large, in X, including working with professional standards to simplify our ethical 
code, to make our disciplinary procedures more human.’ Candidate 17S 
The establishment of a credible motivation to be involved is important in creating a rapport with 
the electorate who will seek to place their votes with candidates who establish their passion for 
the role and so appear to be likely to undertake it in a responsible manner. 
Theme 2: Representation 
A substantial number of successful candidates mentioned representation of the membership, 
or diversity. The ability to appeal across the range of members is important for candidates who 
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seek election. This is because the voting turnouts are low (Electoral Reform Services, 2017) and 
it is important not to alienate any potential voters. 
 ‘I wish to continue representing the interests of members of ICAEW in a constructive 
manner, and to serve on Council on behalf of both the [constituency] members and 
members in general.’ Candidate 10S 
The candidate below appeals to younger members and the stereotype of a Council member as 
typically older and more established in their careers. This candidate established their credentials 
as an active member who has had extensive involvement within the student society and as chair 
of the local Younger Members grouping within a large constituency. Their existing network of 
younger members within the constituency, combined with multiple seats up for election at the 
same time, may have contributed to their success. 
‘to continue to represent the needs and views of all ICAEW members, especially the 
younger members.’ Candidate 9S 
Representation is an important aspect of the election process as voters seek candidates who 
they can relate to either by sectorial interests, gender or age. 
‘I am passionate about helping our members wherever they work in business or practice, 
small and large.’ Candidate 17S 
However, as identified appealing to a narrow group of members is not typically a successful 
strategy as it can alienate other member groupings. As a result most successful candidates 
frame representation in a broad and inclusive manner rather than a sector specific manner. 
Theme 3: Two way communication 
This theme establishes the accountability link as a two way process with the District Society 
network providing the means of reporting back to the constituency. 
For example, one candidate established their credentials in the following manner: 
‘I attend Committee meetings and member events giving detailed feedback from Council 
and receiving input from members’ Candidate 20S 
The reinforcement of the accountability of candidates differentiates those who are already 
part of the ICAEW structures e.g. the District Society and those Candidates who were not. This 
displays a more nuanced understanding of the role of a Council member, which is not apparent 
from the general guidance, which asks candidates to establish their credibility through prior 
involvement with the ICAEW.  
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‘In what ways have you been involved with ICAEW?’ Table 6.1  
Those who cannot establish prior involvement with the ICAEW were typically unsuccessful e.g. 
Candidate 30, Candidate 19. 
Theme 4: Changes to the professional environment 
The final major theme discussed highlights the environmental pressures under which the 
profession is operating, e.g., technological change, Brexit.  
‘The profession is currently under pressure from many directions.’ Candidate 10S 
These themes help to establish candidate credibility with the electorate by identifying them as 
candidates who understand the operating landscape and have the ability to provide an active 
contribution to steer ICAEW through the strategic challenges that it faces. 
‘in a world of seemingly accelerating change, I believe that the ICAEW needs to 
continually adapt itself to become truly agile, in deed as well as in word.’ Candidate 1S 
In the 34 candidate statements from the 2015 elections (Appendix 6) fewer candidates 
mentioned their passion or motivation for standing and regulation was a frequently cited theme 
in the statements, together with globalisation and the protection of the Chartered Accountants’ 
qualification. Again, it was noticeable that those who stood on a specific mandate were 
unsuccessful in comparison to candidates who appealed to the full membership in their election 
statements. 
This section has evaluated the election processes as a means of representation and reflected on 
the barriers that prevent a more matched composition between the Council and the general 
membership. For elected candidates, a seat on the ICAEW Council is worth the investment in 
building their campaign and profile to secure election. They go about this in a variety of ways, 
the most reliable of which is involvement in the District Society, which helps to build a circle of 
potential supporters who are already engaged with the ICAEW and therefore likely to vote. This 
need for a network of contacts is combined with the requirement to appeal broadly to other 
constituents who are not active within the District Society network. The election statement 
process, and the careful selection of themes to emphasise, can help to appeal to those outside 
the candidate’s immediate network. Overall, the process has been shown to encourage certain 
groups to participate. The next section compares elected and co-opted members of the Council. 
 
132 
 
Election processes: reinforcing the interests of the dominant 
In both elections, a significant number of successful candidates were from practice (2015 57%; 
2017 48%). This results in an over-representation of practice members on the Council (53% at 
June 2017 v FRC reported 34% (FRC, 2018a)) and affects the overall representation of other 
segments of the membership as a result. Whist significantly more business and other members 
were successful in 2017, this did not serve to redress the balance (24% at June 2017 v 53% FRC 
reported (FRC, 2018a). Of the practice-based members elected in 2015, only two worked for the 
Big Four; there was only one in 2017. As such, the Big Four are also significantly under-
represented within the elected members of the Council. The resultant mix of members within 
the strategic Council is likely to significantly affect the concerns debated within the forum and 
the manner in which decisions are made. 
The interviewee below suggests that it may be the case that voting strategies of members vary 
depending on the constituency profile. 
‘But there do seem to be particular profiles that get elected. I think it has more impact 
when you've got very big constituencies. If you've just got one person standing for one 
place, then I think it's more judged on the individual. But I think if you've got eight places 
up for grabs and people are looking at a whole range of potential people, they’ll probably 
try and pick a branded mix of candidates.’ I13 Ex-officio 
Following generally accepted research on corporate boards that finds that female 
representation is a matter of social justice, it follows that gender balance within the Council 
would also appear to be an important factor contributing to the ongoing legitimacy of the 
profession (Lehman, 2019; Tremblay et al., 2016). The gender split of candidates in contested 
seats broadly reflects the composition of the membership, which was 28% female as at 31 
December 2017 (FRC, 2018a) and Council 27% female as at June 2017. In terms of analysis, the 
high-level numbers do not tell a representative story as each constituency differs in terms 
candidate profile as mentioned above by I13.  
Most candidates tend to defend their seats successfully; however, there remains a real 
possibility that candidates will not be elected, as reflected in Table 6.3. It would appear that 
women are generally more likely to defend a seat with no defending candidates failing to be 
elected in the last two rounds of elections. It also seems that males are more likely to stand 
speculatively with many newcomers failing to be elected. Gender mix is only one contributor to 
the dynamics of the election process as sectoral differences, age and the statement themes are 
likely to have a significant impact.  
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Table 6.3: ICAEW Council election success by gender 
Source: Adapted by author  
 
6.2.2. The interests co-opted members 
The co-option process offers an opportunity to address the imbalance in interests in the Council 
generated through the election process. For example, it ensures representation of senior 
partners from the Big Four, leading business members and younger members. If the election 
processes were effective in securing full representation of the membership base, co-options 
would not appear to be a necessary feature of the governance process. 
‘I think the co-options give an excellent opportunity to help improve the diversity of 
council.’ I17 Co-opted 
Co-options ensure that the interests of the dominant firms are represented within the Council 
thereby adding legitimacy to the Council processes. The preoccupation with relevance outlined 
in Chapter 5 underlies the strategic importance of involvement of the Big Four within the 
workings of Council. A lack of presence within the Council would heighten the dissociation 
between the dominant firms and the remainder of the profession (Sellers et al., 2015), 
potentially resulting in a diminished symbolic status for the ACA qualification or even 
replacement by an in-house or competitor qualification. 
‘I think if you're already in a high-profile role, it can be difficult to stand because it's quite 
a blunt instrument this election process, so you could easily not get elected even though 
you are very well qualified. And it's the output of all that which results in us having co-
options.’ I13 Ex-officio 
 Elected and 
defending 
Elected, not 
defending 
Not elected, 
not 
defending 
Not elected, 
defending 
Total 
candidates 
2015 
Females 
5 3 0 0 8 
2015 Males 8 5 10 3 26 
Total 2015 13 8 10 3 34 
2017 
Females 
4 2 7 0 13 
2017 Males 10  7 12 4 33 
Total 2017 14 9 19 4 46 
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Another member outlined a different view of the need for the co-option of high-profile partners 
from leading firms. 
‘Our co-options tend to be to bring Big Four or top 12 firms in where they’re under-
represented because they can’t be bothered standing for election because they think 
they’re too busy.’ I16 Elected 
One Big Four partner outlined his recollection of his co-option as an approach from the Head of 
Audit within his firm: 
‘He asked me would I take one of our places on Council.’I8 Co-opted 
This partner had been involved in a number of the ICAEW committees prior to his co-option to 
the Council; this may have identified his commitment to the ICAEW within his firm and likely 
willingness to undertake the role. He went on to highlight that the Big Four have many routes to 
interact with the ICAEW and Council membership, whilst visible, is predominantly symbolic. 
‘being on the Council is only a part of the firm’s engagement with the Institute.’ I8 Co-
opted 
Another Big Four co-optee outlined the implicit expectation from the firm in relation to their 
participation as the firm’s representative on the Council: 
‘I think also [the firm] then places an expectation on me that this is a bit unsaid, but I 
definitely think this is true, that given their support may extend however long I do at the 
ICAEW [..] then they expect me to make sure that our view and opinions are properly 
represented in the ICAEW, and everybody I work with is grown up enough to realise that 
doesn’t always translate into [the firm], always gets their own way.’ I20 Ex-officio 
A co-opted academic member, discussed his route to co-option in the following terms: 
‘One of co-options at Council is for AA member, and the person before me, XX, had 
finished their co-option period, and YY, who’s the BB manager of the ICAEW contacted 
me and said that they’d been discussing who would be a suitable person to put up for 
nomination instead of XX, and asked if I’d be willing to do it because they felt I was a sort 
of a suitable person.’  
The general perception of interviewees was that the nominating committee has been actively 
managing the co-options’ processes to improve the mix of members. 
‘I think the nominations committee has been very proactive in trying to get a much better 
mix of people.’ I2 Elected 
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Table 6.3 reveals an emerging route to the Council as members of the ICAEW Student Council 
(ISC) are co-opted to the Council for a year and then a follow-on period of three years to bring 
their term to four years, in line with elected Council members. 
‘the fact that the ISC [ICAEW Student Council] chair shouldn’t just be a year’s 
appointment that it should receive an appointment equivalent to a full council member. 
So, the idea will be they have a year as chair and then three years afterwards so a four-
year term as a method of increasing diversity.’ I1 Elected 
The creation of this route is also likely to help increase gender diversity amongst the co-opted 
members as student members are 43% female (FRC, 2018a). In addition, the members of this 
grouping are likely to form a pool of master players who are deeply entrenched in the workings 
of the ICAEW so that they continue their commitment beyond their term of co-option and strive 
for officership roles, becoming the new heirs. In fact, the use of Jessica Bernardez and Vincenzo 
Leporiere in the 2019 Council election campaign (Appendix 5) indicates that the ICAEW is striving 
to portray itself as young and vibrant. 
The majority of co-opted members tend to be significantly higher profile than the elected 
members and are generally approached to join the group. In contrast, members who have been 
elected have frequently invested significant time and effort to position themselves for success 
with the electorate. For co-opted members, rich social capital is important in generating 
extensive networks within the sub-field (Gracia & Oats, 2012) resulting in a strong reputational 
capital (Duff, 2017). They are frequently contributors to committee work prior to co-option. The 
initial investment in committee work through exchanging the institutional capital of their 
employer for the symbolic capital of policymaking helps to ensure that they come into focus for 
the nominating committee when considering co-options and conferment of the title of a 
member of the Council. This co-option process reflects the group sanction of the symbolic capital 
of the member, whilst at the same time granting additional rights to the holder of the position 
(Bourdieu, 1989). Their advancement through the sub-field may also be linked to their 
professional habitus as they have an instinctive and ‘a serious understanding of the field’ (Carter 
& Spence, 2014, p. 958). 
Table 6.4 below outlines the members who are co-opted and those who are ex-officio. The 
officeholders are ex-officio appointees, together with those who are chairs of the major 
committees. It shows the various reasons for co-options and therefore the sector or 
constituency to which the member represents in the Council. Beyond the ex-officio co-options 
there are a number of specific co-options to ensure representation from senior partners of the 
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Big Four as well as Group A firms. Senior representation from these firms is essential to support 
the ICAEW’s claims to represent the profession. Other co-options result from gaps identified in 
the distribution of the membership of the Council by the nominating committee e.g. public 
sector, younger member, academic.  
Table 6.4: Ex-officio/Co-opted members of the ICAEW Council as at June 2017 
Name Ex-officio/Co-
opted 
Reason for Ex-Officio Position/Co-Option 
Nick Parker Ex Officio President 
Paul Aplin Ex Officio Deputy President 
Fiona Wilkinson Ex Officio Vice President 
Jan Babiak Co-opted Senior member in Business, technology and 
sustainability 
Jessica Bernardez Co-opted ICAEW Student Council 
Jeremy Boss Ex Officio Chair IT Faculty 
Ben Cairns Co-opted Senior Insolvency Partner 
David Canning-
Jones 
Co-opted Large Firm Partner 
David Carr Ex Officio Chair Business & Management Faculty Committee 
Kathryn Cearns Co-opted Member working with Public Sector 
Noel Clehane Co-opted Member in the EU 
Paul Etherington Co-opted Large Firm Partner 
Mark Fong Co-opted HKICPA Representative 
Dato' Gan Co-opted ASEAN Representative 
Oliver Grundy Co-opted Large Firm Partner 
San Gunapala Co-opted Large Firm Partner 
Stephanie 
Henshaw 
Ex Officio Chair Financial Reporting Faculty Board 
Neeraj Kapur Ex Officio Chair Financial Services Faculty Board 
Pam Kaur Co-opted Member in the Banking Sector 
David Lim Co-opted Member in SE Asia 
Hilary Lindsay Ex Officio Immediate Past President 
Gilly Lord Ex Officio Chair Audit & Assurance Faculty Committee 
Rob Mann Co-opted Younger member 
Kate Mathers Co-opted Public sector 
David Matthews Co-opted Senior Large Firm Partner 
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David Mellor Co-opted Group A firm senior Partner 
Martin Muirhead Co-opted Group A firm senior Partner 
Richard Nunn Co-opted Member in Canada/Caribbean 
Eddie Ouko Co-opted Member in Africa 
Mark Pacitti Ex Officio Chair Corporate Finance Faculty Board 
Andrew Ratciffe Ex Officio Past President 
Anis Sadek Co-opted Member in the Middle East 
Rob Thompson Ex Officio Chair ICAEW Business Committee 
Jeffrey Unerman Co-opted Academic 
Juan Watterson Co-opted Younger member working in the public sector 
Source: https://www.icaew.com/about-icaew/who-we-are/governance/council 
From the table above, it can be seen that this elite grouping is predominantly male (74%) and 
similar to the gender mix of elected members (72% male). The mix increases to 77% male when 
the ICAEW officeholders are excluded. Most notably, all of those co-opted by virtue of their 
position as Partners, representing either the large or Group A firms, are male. This is likely to be 
a result of the limitations of the pool of available candidates, and is consistent with 80% of Big 
Four partners reported as male (Marriage, 2018). It may also reflect a gendered internal process 
of nomination by those firms. 
Those who are co-opted often talk of the accepted groupings within the Council and reflect what 
might be classified, in Bourdieusian terms, as the class struggle between various types of elected 
members, particularly the small practitioner groupings (Bourdieu, 1989). This can create a 
barrier to engagement with the real issues as a biased view pervades the discussion. 
‘I think the very small practitioners, and I’m in danger of generalising and I don’t mean 
to generalise, but there are- I think there is a group of small practitioners who, I say this 
slightly flippantly, but I think it’s actually sort of true, who are united by their hatred for 
the big firms.’ I20 Ex-officio 
Co-opted members therefore access elevated positions to which the elected members must 
work to occupy. However, they cannot do so without the consecration of the existing group as 
the nominating committee reports directly to the Council (Bourdieu, 1986b). It is arguable that 
those most successful at playing the game (in this case developing a high profile career) are also 
those who become most susceptible to be captured by it (Lupu & Empson, 2015). However, 
many co-opted members also often contribute widely to professional groupings across the 
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sector and therefore possess a degree of reflexivity, which those who focus solely on the ICAEW 
may not. 
This grouping of interviewees appeared to view their presence on the Council in a more strategic 
manner and often referred to how they could capitalise on their involvement though developing 
their social network. 
‘They’re fascinating, really useful contacts, hopefully in a two-directional way as well.’ 
I12 Co-opted 
Or being exposed to new areas that are commensurate with the status accorded to a Council 
member and the resultant organisational legitimacy with different fields, e.g., journalism and 
politics. 
‘I have just loved being involved in the politics and I’ve loved doing the work with the 
press. If it hadn’t been for ICAEW I wouldn’t have done any of that stuff.’ I22 Ex-officio 
One member who was co-opted into a specific role felt that their expertise was not drawn upon, 
which resulted in a lack of certainty around their purpose as a co-opted member. These 
comments reflect the adoption of his symbolic capital to provide legitimacy without drawing on 
his expertise. 
‘well, it frustrates me because I wanted to be an active contributor and I thought Brexit 
was probably the biggest topic ever for a Council member and the EU to be active on.’ 
I25 Co-opted 
The conduct of members of the Council within the chamber may also differ between elected 
and co-opted members. This was commented on by interviewees, who drew attention to the 
embodied cultural capital in the form of knowing when to speak and how to behave in this 
forum. It appears that a group of Council members will talk on any topic rather than allowing 
others who have particular expertise to contribute. This means that those in officeholder 
positions, or other positions of power, tend to weight the attention they pay to members 
accordingly. 
‘I’m not thinking about them as individuals but as representing a particular section of 
the membership or a particular kind of expertise who we would particularly listen to. […] 
And there are some who are, you know, just wise-heads who you know are going to come 
up with a view that the debate will eventually end up […]. And also, people like X who 
won’t speak at every council meeting but when he does, you know what you’re getting, 
it’s absolutely 100% something you should take on board. And others perhaps I wince a 
bit when they stand up because I know I’m going to get a rant, but I try not to discount 
it even if it’s a rant.’ I22 Ex-officio  
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The interviewee above is describing the variation in habitus of members and appears to describe 
co-opted members as having adapted better to the field than those elected to it. The existing 
profile and reason for the co-option of these members may mean that they have developed a 
higher level of linguistic capital through their work, which forms an advantage within the ICAEW 
Council forum. This accords with the implicit privileging of certain types of linguistic competence 
within the Council, excluding or discounting the views of some members who feel they are 
contributing to the debate (Topper, 2001).  
The interviewee below also considered that some of those who might be crowded out in the 
Council may be actively contributing through the committee work and influencing the policies 
and practices of the profession in that manner. 
‘They’ll speak on almost everything and it crowds out other people. Now it doesn’t 
necessarily crowd it out in terms of those people aren’t chosen to ask questions, but 
people just don’t speak, and there are some people who you hardly ever hear from on 
council.’ I17 Co-opted 
However, this is not a universal inequality of capital distribution within the Council, and 
members who speak on matters where they can offer insight or challenge display a more 
nuanced understanding of the habitus of the Council. 
The interviews demonstrate that the capital mix is different for co-opted members who are 
often courted because their existing profile adds legitimacy or specific skills to the composition 
of the Council, e.g., Big Four Partners, academics, public sector. They lend their status to the 
overall Council who appropriates it in its discourse on the profession, thereby adding to its own 
legitimacy. 
The following section explores the interests of Council members and how they shape the 
governance of the ICAEW. 
6.3. How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the 
ICAEW? 
This section seeks to answer the second research sub-question: How do the interests of Council 
member shape the governance of the ICAEW? In so doing, an understanding is developed of the 
agenda that these members bring to the Council and the extent of the accountability felt to the 
membership.  
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The ICAEW has provided all members with a form of symbolic capital through the ACA 
qualification (Poullaos, 2016). This form of symbolic capital is officially sanctioned through the 
ICAEW’s Royal Charter, enabling all those who meet the conditions for its grant to command an 
elevated price in the market (Matthews, 2017). As Bourdieu explains, it is the official 
legitimisation that enables the ACA to have a ‘universal value’ for holders (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 
22). For a certain minority, this creates a ‘bounded solidarity’ or identification through the 
community, which can create a deep seated motivation to participate (Portes, 1998).  
‘the ultimate thing is I think most people are just quite content to, just to pay the 
membership subs and know that they don’t know what the ICAEW does and they don’t 
really care what the ICAEW does.’ I1 Elected 
An elected member highlighted a differential cultural capital across the membership, with those 
in senior positions judged by their performance rather than whether they are a member of the 
ICAEW. In this sense, the ACA acts as a facilitating mechanism to enable members to access 
various career opportunities, but which diminishes in importance as a reputation and track 
record are established. 
‘If you’re a CFO, people will know that you’re CFO. They’ll judge you by the success of 
your organisation when you want to move. So, it’s really for people like myself, my wife, 
who are still making it in their career where they, you know, people are looking for that 
accreditation still.’ I1 Elected 
It appears that many members view their membership in an instrumental manner and often 
have little association with the ICAEW beyond maintaining their annual subscription renewal 
and continuing professional development attestation. In this circumstance the member’s 
affiliation to their employer’s values, culture and infrastructure is stronger, which may help to 
explain why the largest firms come under repeated criticism for their practices. 
‘So, there are a lot of people for whom the membership to the Institute is a ticket to a 
good job and whatever. And an awful lot of people never pay for the membership 
because it’s a big accountancy firm or a big bank that pays for the membership.’ I11 
Elected 
This may explain why those who do engage with the election processes often cite a range of 
reasons for doing so. For some there was a degree of instrumentality underlying their 
involvement with the ICAEW. 
‘I found myself on my own, I needed clients, so I needed a network, so I joined [the District 
Society], and I’ve been there ever since.’ I9 Elected 
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This is typically tempered by the fact that for most elected members there are multiple 
motivators for engagement that include the altruistic.  
‘I used to think everybody on Council was completely there to make a difference and be 
altruistic. […] it certainly dawned on me that everybody that was on Council was on 
Council for several reasons and that one of them is being altruistic, but others could well 
be to do with, well I’ll meet people or I’ll get knowledge that would be helpful, or I’ll 
understand what the issues are. So, I think that it varies across people.’ I13 Ex-officio 
Often members, who are already engaged with ICAEW or known in some way, are receptive to 
gentle encouragement to stand for election as a Council member.  
‘What we need to do is just focus on the part of the continuum and people who are on 
that continuum where they don’t quite want to engage, do things that will help them 
realise that actually its good for them to engage.’ I17 Co-opted 
There appears to be a strategy within the ICAEW to operate behind the scenes to encourage 
possible candidates to stand as a means of increasing the number of contested elections and 
contributing to a more diverse field of election candidates. An increase in seats contested by 
credible candidates serves to reinforce the democratic process of election and makes the 
process appear worthwhile to those who are successful. 
‘I think if I hadn’t known a member of ICAEW staff who was encouraging me that I don’t 
think I would, the fact that I thought it was a good thing to do would not by itself 
necessarily given me the courage to do it.’ I4 Elected 
One of the ex-officio members described her role in reinvigorating the Council through 
encouraging newcomers to challenge incumbents in the election process. This has also resulted 
in a reduced feeling of entitlement for incumbents, as they are required to prove themselves 
during their tenure. 
‘So, I’m quite proud of the fact that I very much have been trying to encourage people to 
challenge existing Council members, which means that as an existing Council member, 
you should be then very conscious of the fact that it isn’t an entitlement to stay on the 
Council.’ I13 Ex-officio 
Others hinted at a lengthy courtship period and one co-opted member who is a member of 
another professional accountancy body even joined the ICAEW, via the provisions for mutual 
recognition of qualifications gained with other professional accountancy bodies, to become 
eligible for co-option. 
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‘I think there was a process of wooing going on even though I didn’t know it at the time.’ 
I21 Elected 
For others, the encouragement to stand for the Council from ICAEW staff was more explicit, 
prompting them to put themselves forward for election to help to break the cycle of re-election 
of members to Council. 
‘So that coupled with the fact that a member of ICAEW staff that I knew at the time said 
to me, “We need new faces on council. We keep getting the same people,”’ I4 Elected 
As discussed in Section 6.2, career advancement is often more of a by-product rather than a 
primary motivating factor for employees standing for the Council. In many cases, the 
advancement is deferred and is linked to the habitus and social capital of a Council member 
rather than a direct conversion into economic capital. 
‘I don’t think people should do it as a career enhancement. I think it would be nice if it 
was recognised as being more important because I do believe it is important. But I mean, 
I think it is, it’s given me a different view of the profession. It enabled me to meet 
different types of people who I wouldn’t have met otherwise. It enabled me to know 
more about the profession, but it’s also enabled me to be a voice and a vote.’ I15 Elected 
An ex-officio member reflected that prior to her involvement, her needs were a fulfilled by her 
firm. As a result, she had not sought external engagement prior to involvement with the ICAEW 
related to her role. 
‘So, before I became involved with ICAEW because of my role at XX, I never felt- first of 
all I never felt like there was any gap left to be filled in my professional life.’ I20 Ex-officio 
This helps to explain the higher levels of engagement with the election processes from small 
practitioners who mobilise their membership as a critical part of the identity of their firm in 
seeking new business. For them it is a critical differentiating factor in a competitive market. 
Continued incentives to stand for election were frequently linked to the social capital developed 
within the Council. In the past, seniority was a marker of position within the Council chamber. 
This physical domination resulted in members seeking continual re-election in a race to the best 
seat and to remain within friendship groups developed within the Chamber. However, in recent 
times, the rigid seating structure has been broken down and although seating plans are fixed, 
positions within the Chamber are varied each meeting. This enables the Council members to 
build social capital with the whole group. 
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‘You know, my first meeting I sat right at the back with two other guys who happened to 
be their first meeting as well… and it was quite clear… and I suppose this was deliberate, 
I don’t think anyone tried to hide it… that you gradually moved forward as, you know, 
people at the front started to fall away.’ I23 Ex-officio 
As a result, there might now be a reduced incentive for members to seek continual re-election 
and for the Council to slip into familiarity and operate akin to a cosy club. This should open up 
seats for elections and increase the turnover within the Council. 
‘We had this system which gravitated toward the front row depending on how many 
years you’d been on Council. I heard one former President actually use the word club.’ 
I22 Ex-officio 
This section has outlined some of the interests that drive interviewees to join the Council and to 
remain on the Council. The majority of the members interviewed appear to cite multiple 
motivations that co-exist including economic building economic and social capital. Often the 
ICAEW executive function has been revealed to be instrumental in encouraging newcomers to 
stand for election. This process has helped to establish increased accountability of elected 
Council members who have contested an election and received a mandate to represent their 
constituency.  
6.3.1. Elected members: capital accretion through Council membership 
The capital mix of elected members appears to be homogeneous in many respects due to sector 
concentration and level of involvement with the District Societies. The interviews revealed that 
it is often ‘illusio’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 76) that drives the elected members who often talked in 
terms of ‘giving back’ and reflecting the belief that the process of election is worthwhile 
(Stringfellow at al., 2015). For them, seeking election to the ICAEW Council is worth the 
investment that can often be considerable both in time and effort. 
Accessing new networks – social capital 
It is the case that members who seek election to the Council typically cultivate their social capital 
through participation in the District Society structure, which can be seen as a means of creating 
the required capital (Bourdieu, 1985; Portes, 1998). ‘The acquisition of social capital requires 
deliberate investment of both economic and cultural resources’ (Portes, 1998, p. 4). This may 
be in the form of time invested cultivating contacts, or in the form of benefits from affiliation to 
and status within the District Society. 
144 
 
For some there was a substitution of organisational social capital by professional organisational 
interaction following a move to set up their own practice. This was a common theme for 
interviewees who had moved out of the Big Four into smaller organisations, either practice-
based or in industry. 
‘I mean if you’re used to being in a large firm, you’re used to talking to lots and lots of 
chartered accountants and then leaving that and going down to being the only chartered 
accountant in an organisation or having trainees or having a staff of seven or eight is a 
massive, massive difference.’ I16 Elected 
Membership of the Council is also constitutive of social capital to which members attribute a 
value (Bourdieu, 1986b).  
‘you learn a tremendous amount by being on Council. In the first year, you realise how 
much you learn which you wouldn’t pick up form general stuff.’ I19 Elected 
For others, Council membership has exposed them to experiences that might not otherwise 
have been available in their roles. The interaction with senior members of the profession 
through committee work would not have been possible in this Council member’s employment. 
‘So, Council is being really useful in terms of giving me exposure to chair really important 
committees, giving me access to a great network of individuals where, you know, I can 
just observe their behaviours. I think this has been immense.’ I1 Elected 
The types of opportunities discussed by these elected members of the Council above are not 
likely to have been on offer through their employment. Many recognise the chance to build their 
reputation and networks through involvement in the committee work of the ICAEW as valuable. 
The discourse of giving back – cultural capital 
The cultural capital associated with the role of a Council member is not just a means of career 
advancement for junior employees but can facilitate the next stage of career development for 
those at the top of their firms. It provides external interaction with those who are shaping the 
policy and practice of accountancy. The elected member below also uses his membership of 
Council to further the aims of his firm. 
‘it’s part of giving back to the profession but also part of my own succession plan as 
managing partner of a firm […] they gave me the time to take a wider public interest 
professional role and my firm found that useful because we can feedback and put them 
in contact with people.’ I10 Elected 
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The discourse that surrounds giving back to the profession appears to have become an 
embodied cultural good for many members and therefore part of the habitus of Council 
members as a whole (Neu et al., 2003). This may also go some way to explaining the increased 
awareness of the public interest for these members in contrast to the that of the general 
membership (Neu et al., 2003). 
An enhanced status or standing in the community? Symbolic capital 
The symbolic capital associated with Council membership appeared to differ across the group 
of interviewees with some referencing status and credibility. For these members, it is important 
to maintain what they consider appropriate company (Wacquant, 1993a).  
‘Certainly, some people are very keen to say they’re a member of Council because it adds 
to their standing and their reputation in their role and therefore, presumably they feel 
they can do their role better. […] So, I’ve heard several people saying that this is a way 
of hearing what’s happening, keeping up to date, keeping up to speed.’ I13 Ex-officio 
It also emerged from the interviews that the symbolic power of membership of the ICAEW 
Council depends on the interactions of members and the awareness of their counterparts of the 
workings of the profession. For example, the interviewee below interacts regularly with 
politicians who he feels treat him differently due to his status as an elected Council member. 
‘And people find it, especially when you’re meeting with politicians. They treat you with 
much more respect than if you were just a simple accountant. It really makes a big 
difference I think to your status.’ I19 Elected 
This point was echoed by other interviewees as a means of generating increased credibility in 
front of clients.  
‘the by-product part of how I have benefited from that is by status. There’s no doubt that 
when I’m doing a pitch or I’m talking to somebody new and networking, or even if they’re 
just an accountant…just an accountant, I can say that yeah, I’m on Council and I’m 
involved in various committees, so that gives you some status.’ I3 Elected 
The members who referred to status and credibility were predominantly those from mid-size or 
smaller practices where the firm name many not be sufficient on its own to establish this type 
of authority.  
For some, there is an element of instrumentalisation of their membership of the Council and its 
ability to enhance their CV. One interviewee outlined the effect that membership of the Council 
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has on their career prospects and the ability to access what they consider to be networks of 
people who may facilitate their next position. 
‘I think it’s quite- it’s useful on my CV. So, when you’re talking, when- at the level that 
I’m now getting jobs, there will be somebody from our Council or on the finance 
committee who is there. And for them, that’s quite interesting.’ I14 Elected 
The experience of becoming a Council member often adds to the members’ skillset and can help 
Council members secure other complementary roles, some of which may be remunerated. One 
member explained their involvement as a means of obtaining the type of experience that they 
could then use to secure further non-executive roles: 
‘this seemed as easy a thing to do as anything else in terms of getting some non-exec-
type experience.’ I7 Elected 
As such, it can play a facilitating role, enabling Council members to develop their skills further 
outside of the ICAEW. 
 ‘so, it’s all pitched, it should all be pitched at a high level and focused around risk, 
reputation and governance. […] I’ve found that it is complementary to the charity trustee 
position I took on a year later.’ I4 Elected 
One former board member highlighted the fact that he had managed to translate his experience 
as an elected board member of the ICAEW into a non-executive directorship. Such roles are 
highly sought after by senior executives, and for those who work in practice the experience of 
board membership is not typically part of their range of experiences.  
‘by being an elected member of the board, that gave me my first non-executive 
directorship.’ I16 Elected 
The symbolic capital associated with membership of the Council is valuable to elected members 
who may not have the exposure to a broad range of experiences within their work. This is 
particularly useful for those in small practice or those who are looking to develop their profile 
to secure non-executive positions. Membership of the Council can help members to secure 
credibility with various stakeholders and translate the symbolic capital into financial capital 
through accessing new opportunities. 
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6.3.2. Council members: the investment required and its influence on the 
interests served 
This section outlines the findings in relation to the actual commitment made by members to the 
ICAEW. The interviewees mentioned a significant time and physical commitment, which, for 
some, does not appear to generate the status and recognition they feel they are due from their 
employer, whilst for others it is part of their work identity. 
The commitment to serve as a Council member is significant and requires a physical 
commitment to attend the meetings in London with dinners the night before, resulting in travel 
the prior afternoon for those outside London. 
‘So, if you did the minimum it’s six days, probably, which is not a lot and probably most 
organisations will free people up for that. But then there is an expectation, and I think to 
get the most out of it, that you will join another committee and give your expertise 
somewhere else and then all that starts to … to grow if you let it.’ I5 Elected 
The social interaction and informal networking that takes place in this informal setting is 
important for those who later seek nomination to the Board or as an Officeholder. Support is 
generated, and agendas are socialised at these dinners, which take place outside of the formal 
proceedings of Council. Whilst optional, the strong directive to attend often leaves the Council 
members feeling that they are quasi-compulsory. 
Members may dial into meetings; however, it is not encouraged on a systematic basis and 
repeated missed attendance can result in expulsion from Council.  
‘The office of a member of the Council shall be vacated: 
I if he has been absent from three or more consecutive meetings of the Council 
without the consent of the Council.’ (ICAEW, 2018c, sec. 37) 
If a member is to continue in office a vote on the matter must be conducted by the Council. 
The physical commitment is combined with the requirement to catch up on the day-to-day 
demands of the Council member’s primary role. For many this is significant and is often 
accommodated through reduced leisure time: 
‘So, I accept that my involvement in…my involvement with the institute doesn’t do me 
any good from a professional perspective, from a firm perspective. I think it is 
acknowledged and with a number of people they think it is valuable what I do. But from 
a performance appraisal, from a how am I spending my time, is not value added and the 
day job doesn’t reduce. So, I know that if I’m here for a couple of days I’m going to have 
to do the work another time. And I think that’s part of what puts people off from getting 
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involved along with the committee structures and committees that are there for the […] 
sake of a committee.‘ I15 Elected 
For elected candidates, therefore, immediate economic capital is not increased. However, it may 
be the case that the social and cultural capital garnered whilst on Council will subsequently reap 
rewards in terms of status or opportunity. 
‘So, when you’re building up your career it’s not appreciated by the employer that you 
leave early for a meeting.’ I11 Elected 
Many echoed the sentiment that for those building their career it is difficult to commit time to 
participate on the Council. The elected member below disclosed that they must cover some of 
the commitment to Council as holiday. This member later comments that membership of the 
Council is useful on their CV to help move to their next role. As such, the financial and physical 
investment of the present is deferred until the individual is successful in converting it to 
increased economic capital and status. 
‘They are fine with it, not particularly interested, recognise that it takes some time out 
and I take some of it as holiday. So, for the- when it’s the Council Away Day I normally 
take that as holiday.’ I14 Elected 
One interviewee voiced a more sceptical view of the career benefits of involvement with the 
ICAEW. They have devoted significant time and effort to their involvement with the ICAEW and 
have been a committed volunteer since the early 1980s, having served on student Councils prior 
to that point. He has been a member of the Council for three full terms, having first been elected 
in 2005 and at the time of interview had started his fourth term. 
‘I would never say this to a general member, but I actually think it can damage your 
career and it probably did damage my career from the amount of time that I have taken 
out of work to do these sorts of things.’ I5 Elected 
A possible explanation is that he is so caught up in the ‘illusio’ of the ICAEW that he lacks the 
instrumentality or reflexivity present in the comments from other interviewees who remain 
primarily focused on their careers (Lupu & Empson, 2015). 
Whilst details of members’ age are not published, the date of admittance to the ICAEW provides 
a guide to their age as the majority of current members have followed a standard route from 
university to the profession and qualified within a three to four-year period. The elected 
members typically qualified in the 70s, 80s and 90s. The majority are therefore experienced 
members who can direct their own time (Nesbit & Gazley, 2012), as evidenced by the number 
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of successful candidates who are owners of the firm or business, including partners (17/21 in 
2015 and 16/23 in 2017). For these members, involvement as members of the Council has the 
capacity to generate benefits to their firms by adding credibility to their standing with clients. 
For other members, the benefit varies depending on their position of power within their 
employing organisation, and the value the employer places on the symbolic capital of an ICAEW 
Council member.  
‘Oh, fortunately my employer is very supportive. But that might be because when I go to 
a new job, I tell them I need an extra number of days a year to do it, and … well, they 
employ me on that basis.’ I18 Elected  
This interviewee, a technical specialist, has an allowance of 21 days for ICAEW business and has 
embedded themselves as a master player within the infrastructure of Council. The interviewee 
below, a partner in a small local practice, tells a similar story and is also a leading member of 
Council. 
‘they’d always agreed 30 days a year on Institute stuff, anything over that I’ve had to 
find from my own time.’ I22 Ex-officio 
Developing and maintaining the capitals of a high-profile Council member involves a significant 
investment of time that many cannot afford, either because their employer attaches a different 
order of value to involvement in the ICAEW Council or because they need to run their own 
business. As such, there can be a mismatch in the valuation of this symbolic capital. 
‘For symbolic capital exchange to function, the two parties must have identical 
categories of perception and appreciation.’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 100) 
The weighting towards mid-career Council members is due to two factors. First, less experienced 
members do not value the incentives (Knoke & Prensky, 1984) on offer through participation in 
the governance processes and second, employers are not sufficiently incentivised by the 
benefits derived from relatively junior staff participating in the governance of the ICAEW (Wilson 
& Musick, 1997). 
‘I think they are people who are partners or directors in their firms or businesses so … 
and typically they’re older, because their time is their own and they can manage it as 
they wish. I think it is harder for, you know, some of our younger members.’ I5 Elected 
For example, one of the co-opted Big Four partners identified that their seniority within their 
firm was likely to ensure that their commitment to the ICAEW was not questioned. This 
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interviewee is a Council member as well as a member of three of the major committees of the 
ICAEW and, as such, their time commitment is rather significant. 
‘Nobody ever questions that. That’s probably because I don't know, there are certain 
stage of my career where people wouldn't question that anyway.’ I8 Co-opted 
In contrast, an elected member pointed out the hidden financial implications of the trade-off of 
time that disproportionately affects those who work for themselves (Nesbit & Gazley, 2012). 
‘You could argue that Council is very elitist because although expenses are paid, there is 
no stipend for it because it’s so…it tends to be people that are able to give their time 
rather than necessarily be paid for it.’ I1 Elected 
Taken together, the factors discussed above demonstrate that the commitment (physical, time 
and financial) required from individuals to devote their time to becoming a Council member and 
serve on various committees is significant. This means that those who are able to fully engage 
are typically in a position of power within their work environment and able to articulate any 
benefits to their employer. As a result, a barrier to entry exists for much of the wider 
membership and results in a lack of diversity within the Council. 
6.4. Implications – the dysfunctional consequences on the governance 
and accountability of the ICAEW  
The Council members are accountable to the constituency or sector that they represent, as well 
as to the ICAEW that prescribes the conditions under which they undertake their role. However, 
the lines are often blurred between the constituency and the sector for those who are elected. 
As a membership body, the ICAEW claims to represent its membership and to do so effectively 
it must reflect their concerns through its governance structures. The Council is formally 
representative of the membership and accountable to them. However, the current electoral 
system based on geographical constituencies, which are often de facto controlled by the District 
Society, and networks of small practitioners has resulted in a composition that does not reflect 
the general profile of the membership. This is problematic, as the debate around the ICAEW 
strategy in the Council may not reflect the concerns of its membership, thereby undermining 
the processual concept of the public interest (Cochran, 1974) that relies on robust democratic 
representation. In turn, this is likely to lead to a greater degree of apathy amongst the general 
membership and drive even lower levels of engagement.  
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The power of the District Society structure in providing nominations and facilitating candidature 
is disproportionate to its general reach and appeal to the heterogeneous contemporary 
membership base (Ramirez, 2009). Without this structure, however, it is unclear how elected 
members have an outlet to represent their constituency, feeding views up and down. Despite 
efforts to increase the range of candidates and contested elections, there remains an over-
representation of small practitioners within the Council. This entrenchment of physical location 
within the governance structure contrasts with the location agnostic environment in which 
contemporary business is conducted and that has been facilitated by the Internet. In many ways 
it should be easier to bring those with shared interests together where there is a clear value 
attached to the interaction. 
The co-opted members of the Council are approached due to their seniority and status within 
the profession. This status means that they represent certain views. Co-options are an important 
means of engaging with groupings who would not otherwise involve themselves in the 
governance of the ICAEW. They are critical to involving leading partners from the Big Four and 
thereby increasing the legitimacy of the ICAEW’s governance. Further, they are also being used 
to style the Council as more dynamic and younger in its composition, e.g., through co-opting 
younger members and using them in election campaigns. 
Co-opted members do not have an identified constituency forum to represent views or feedback 
to, so may reflect their individual or firm’s agenda. Due to the entrenched interests of members 
of the Council, balance is not achieved unless a robust process of debate ensures that the 
interests of the wider membership are indeed taken into account. Comments from interviewees 
indicate that the debate process is often captured by those seeking to promote their own self-
interest within the Council rather than defer to those who have significant contributions to the 
debate based on their level of expertise. This creates a disconnect between the form and 
substance of the governance process. 
6.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has answered the second research question through an examination of the 
establishment of political accountability of Council members through the election process and 
co-option process. This has revealed that elected members invest significant effort in obtaining 
the relevant capital profile for election and appealing to a broad range of members within their 
constituency. They are often captured by their involvement with the ICAEW, devoting large 
amounts of time and energy to the activities of the ICAEW. Yet many revert to representing the 
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narrow sector from which they come once voted onto the Council, with many classified as ‘small 
practitioner’. 
This contrasts with co-opted members who are typically rich in social and cultural capital and 
have been approached for co-option because of this. The nominating committee has significant 
power over these decisions and recommends new co-options for ratification. Co-opted 
members feel less responsibility to the wider membership in many ways and are not always 
appreciative of the concentration of small practitioners within the elected section of Council.  
The struggles between the two types of Council member become visible in the elections for Vice 
President, which is the start of the route to the ultimate position of President. In this case, the 
co-opted members often have a privileged position on the Board, which is an accepted pre-
cursor to candidature, whilst those elected to the Board have had to build support amongst their 
peers to secure this important first step on the ladder.  
The interests that help secure appointment to the Council may have dysfunctional 
consequences on the governance and public accountability of the ICAEW as a whole. 
The next chapter provides a critical discussion and analysis of the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 in 
light of the Bourdieusian concepts outlined in Chapter 3, and the literature review presented in 
Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and analysis of findings 
7.1. Introduction 
The thesis elaborates on concepts of governance and accountability of the ICAEW Council. It has 
addressed questions related to the structure of the ICAEW Council and the role of Council 
members’ interests in shaping the governance of the ICAEW. The interviews revealed a number 
of ongoing tensions related to governance and accountability which are increasingly important 
to address as the membership continues to grow in heterogeneity (Ramirez et al., 2015)  and 
the membership footprint is also increasingly international (FRC, 2018a). 
This chapter discusses and analyses the empirical findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 in 
relation to the literature presented in Chapter 2, and the Bourdieusian theoretical lens 
presented in Chapter 3. The literature review presented in Chapter 2 provided context to this 
study and identified what prior studies examining governance and accountability of professional 
accountancy bodies have found, to make this study’s contributions to knowledge and 
understanding explicit. Chapter 3 drew on some of Bourdieu’s concepts to help develop an 
improved understanding of the sub-field of the ICAEW and the role of agency (i.e., Council 
members) in structuring the accounting profession. Whilst the case study focuses on one UK 
professional accountancy body, the ICAEW, the basic governance structure is replicated across 
many other professional bodies holding Chartered designations in the UK; It has also been 
transposed to other jurisdictions, primarily as a result of the UK’s colonial influence (see, for 
example, Chua & Poullaos (1993)). As such, the findings have an interest beyond the 
accountancy profession as well as beyond the UK context. 
The thesis seeks to contribute to domain theory in the field of the accounting profession (Lukka 
& Vinnari, 2014). It does so by drawing on Bourdieu’s analytical framework to help explain the 
contemporary issues affecting the governance and accountability of the ICAEW Council. 
Questions of governance and accountability are relevant in face of the increasing heterogeneity 
of members (Ramirez et al., 2015), internationalisation of the structures of the profession 
(Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014), polarisation of practice work between the Big Four and 
small practitioners (Ramirez, 2009), and renewed challenges to UK regulation and public 
confidence following a recent series of corporate collapses. 
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Chapter 5 answered the first research question in relation to the structure and governance of 
the ICAEW. In so doing, the public accountability (Sinclair, 1995) of the ICAEW Council to the 
membership was examined through the structures of representation and the hierarchical 
committee structures. The public accountability of the ICAEW beyond the membership was also 
examined by evaluating the Council member’s concepts of the public interest. The interviews 
helped to illustrate symbolic power maintenance strategies operating within the ICAEW 
structures along with the adoption of symbolic power and violence in furthering agendas.  
The interests of serving Council members of the ICAEW and how they shape the governance of 
the ICAEW were outlined through the interview responses in Chapter 6 to answer the second 
research question. The political accountability (Sinclair, 1995) of the Council members was 
examined by analysing election statements and the processes of election. Empirical evidence 
highlighted that the District Society continues to play an important role in the process of building 
social and cultural capital within the sub-field for those who later seek election to the Council. 
However, this path privileges the interests of small practitioners for whom a local network is 
beneficial. The interviews also uncovered the apparent hostility to those not deemed worthy of 
election. Differences in the capital profile of elected and co-opted members were revealed, 
leading to an internal division within the Council itself. This division has been shown to favour 
co-opted members in the passage to Officeholder as they are often able to ascend to leading 
positions through instrumentalising the symbolic and social capitals that form the basis of their 
co-option. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section critically discusses the structure and 
governance of the ICAEW in relation to the literature. Section 7.3 evaluates Council members’ 
appointment interests and the implications for the accountability and governance of the ICAEW 
in relation to the literature. Finally, Section 7.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2. How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? (RQ1)  
The empirical work in Chapter 5 helped to shed light on the operation of governance and 
accountability with the ICAEW through the interviews conducted with those embedded within 
the structures of the ICAEW, i.e., the Council members. Governance can be expressed as the 
‘rules of the game’ (UNESCO, 2017) or Bourdieu’s ‘illusio’ (Bourdieu, 1998), and extends to both 
formal and informal aspects. The ICAEW is a membership body created by means of the grant 
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of a Royal Charter (ICAEW, 1880) that established a market for the services of its members and, 
at the same time, generated obligations on behalf of the ICAEW. The understanding that 
accountancy serves the public interest underpins the exchange with the state to secure the 
extension of the ICAEW’s jurisdiction (ICAEW, 1948) and is designed to foster the trust of the 
public it serves (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008). 
Following the grant of the original Royal Charter (ICAEW, 1880), the market for public accounting 
services later became increasingly competitive as Royal Charters were granted to competitor 
organisations, e.g., ACCA and CIMA. However, the ICAEW continued to dominate the UK market 
(Cooper & Robson, 2006). This led to competitors seeking membership growth through targeting 
different markets for accounting services, e.g., business (CIMA) and internationally (ACCA and 
CIMA). Over time this has led to an erosion in the ICAEW’s leading position, as membership of 
ACCA has surpassed that of the ICAEW (FRC, 2018a) and CIMA has merged with AICPA to access 
an extended global scale (AICPA, 2016). 
The findings caution that the ICAEW is facing challenges to adapt its governance and 
accountability structures to better serve its current membership composition without alienating 
the powerful interests that form the current Council. Of paramount importance to the ICAEW 
and its members is the maintenance of its symbolic power in the field of professional 
accountancy bodies.  
The following sections discuss and analyse the main findings from Chapter 5 in relation to the 
literature and the first research question which asks How is the ICAEW governed and to what 
ends.  
7.2.1. How is the ICAEW governed? 
The first part of the research question relates to the structures of governance within the ICAEW.  
The empirical findings in Chapter 5 focused on the public accountability of the Council to the 
membership and to stakeholders beyond the membership. The findings indicate that the current 
governance structures result in an imbalance of representation within the Council and an 
amplification of voice of small practitioners. This is primarily due to the established 
accountability links via the District Society network, which is populated by small practitioners 
and no longer reflects the interests of the local membership. 
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Accountability to the membership 
The ICAEW Council is comprised of elected and co-opted members (including ex-officio 
members co-opted by virtue of their position). It is this structure, which creates accountability 
to the membership for the Council as a whole. The election process forms part of the technical 
core of the ICAEW in Bourdieu’s vocabulary and it continues unchallenged (Oakes et al., 1998). 
Typically, elected representatives have previously been involved with the District Society 
structure, which mirrors the Council constituencies. This local network often provides a source 
of supporters for those seeking election to the Council in addition to its role facilitating local 
networking and the dissemination of technical knowledge to members. 
The accountability of elected members differs from that of co-opted members who did not feel 
accountable to a particular constituency. The sectorial balancing undertaken through co-options 
seeks to mitigate the limits of the geographical election processes thereby increasing the 
balance of representation. However, this leads to a differential structure of accountability. 
The increasing disconnect between the District Society constituencies and the membership 
reflects the heterogeneity of the overall membership, with approximately 66% of members 
working outside of practice (excluding retirees) (FRC, 2018a). Members are no longer 
predominantly practice-based and the resulting over-representation of smaller practitioners 
within the Council results in a concentration of interests within the policymaking process. As 
such the claim to represent the membership as a whole is increasingly problematic as the 
spectrum of differences has grown ever larger (Ramirez et al., 2015). For example, elected 
Council members, whilst charged with representing their constituency, often have limited links 
with the range of members within their area, outside of the network created through 
involvement in the District Society; this results in limited opportunities to create a localised 
dialogue. The general disconnect with the membership is reflected in voting rates in elections 
to Council (Electoral Reform Services, 2017) which have suffered over time despite a number of 
reforms of the election process (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). As such, the current governance 
structure amplifies the voice of the minority, i.e., the small practitioner rather than effectively 
representing the wider interests of the membership. 
Despite the continued changes experienced in the operating environment for District Societies, 
there remains a renewed attempt by the ICAEW to impose attendance of the Council members 
to District Society meetings. This symbolic violence could be construed as a means of continuing 
to privilege the path that has resulted in success for the incumbents rather than looking to meet 
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the demands of the future membership. Few interviewees contested this imposition, and many 
viewed it as an appropriate means of establishing a dialogue with interested members. 
However, without a genuine link to the local membership, the accountability of elected Council 
members remains problematic. As the membership becomes increasingly international, 
geographic linkages are likely to continue to be scrutinised and further questions regarding 
accountability to members raised. In the 2017 elections, for example, the Europe and Eurasia 
constituency had members based in a variety of countries, including Greece, Malta, Switzerland, 
and Belgium, amongst others. The capacity to maintain close local ties in a constituency that 
covers multiple countries is questionable.  
The reality of the closely controlled route to Council membership for elected members is in stark 
contrast to the messages disseminated by ICAEW through its email and social media campaigns 
prior to the elections (Appendices 4 and 5). These imply that the process is open and 
transparent, and use images of younger and more diverse members of the Council. The rigidity 
of the nomination and election statement process is likely to contribute to potential new 
candidates eliminating themselves (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). The public portrayal of the Council 
has been carefully curated in recent times and the 2018 campaign, run in advance of the 2019 
elections, used images of co-opted members rather than elected members (Appendix 4). This 
appears to be an attempt to encourage those with similar profiles to stand for election, thereby 
broadening the diversity of the Council.  
The interviews also demonstrated that not all elected members come through the District 
Society route. Those interviewees who did not come this route included a business member, 
public sector member, and a practice member. The critical factor common in these members’ 
success was their wide network of contacts or social capital, which could substitute for the 
District Society network to facilitate their election. Deploying personal networks in this manner 
can secure election, but does not address the issues of accountability to the local membership. 
Whilst co-opted members tend to be co-opted to represent a specific sector, they do not feel a 
similar responsibility to that sector in the way elected members typically feel responsible to their 
constituents. For these members, the communication process is one way and they do not have 
a channel to communicate back to the sector, which they ostensibly represent. However, the 
governance handbook (ICAEW, 2017b) does not differentiate between the duties of these 
different types of Council member. They formally share the same degree of accountability, 
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although, in practical terms, co-opted members cannot and do not represent the sector from 
which they are co-opted. 
Members are often co-opted following service on a technical committee or by becoming known 
to the ICAEW in other ways. In this way, the power such members wield is often hidden by the 
ostensible knowledge that they contribute (Farjaudon & Morales, 2013). Co-opted members 
often command an elevated status and respect within the Council and can be catapulted to (ex-
officio) Board positions, entering the running for officeholder positions on an accelerated 
timetable in comparison to elected members who work hard to cultivate their positions amongst 
their peers within the Council, seek election to the Board, then run for officeholder. The ex-
officio nature of some of the Board positions enable claims of neutrality, e.g. participation by 
virtue of the position as Chair of certain Committees, to mask their dominance (Everett, 2003). 
These powerful actors appear to secure their power without questioning by the other members 
of the Council (Farjaudon & Morales, 2013). 
A new route is emerging for ‘younger members’ co-opted to the Council from the Student 
Council, which may lead to an accelerated path to the officeholder positions. In common with 
career MPs, a large amount of cultural capital has been accumulated by those members within 
the boundaries of the institution and its practices (Davis, 2010). As such, the ICAEW Council 
appears to be in transition regarding the cultural capital required for progression through its 
hierarchies from those who have progressed through the traditional District Society route, i.e., 
former Presidents, to those who are entering Council early in their careers. This revaluation of 
capitals within the Council (Oakes et al., 1998) may lead to some actors being marginalised in 
the process (Neu, 2006). The emergence of a new form of symbolic capital invites parallels to 
Davis’ findings that those with senior party ambitions are less reliant on the local party and 
accumulate their social capital through existing leaders, senior figures and the media (Davis, 
2010). This route allows ‘younger members’ the opportunity to build up field specific capital 
through their experiences in the Student Council. It also ensures that they are fully caught up in 
the illusio, encouraging them to work their way through the hierarchical committee system to 
claim the officeholder roles. The profile of such members is exploited through marketing and 
other routes, portraying ICAEW as young and dynamic, e.g., Jessica Bernardez (Appendix 4). 
However, the power of the ICAEW to retain younger members within the governance structures 
for an extended period remains to be seen and ongoing involvement with the ICAEW must be 
weighed against other opportunities that may present themselves to this group of members 
(Wacquant, 1993a). 
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The accountability of the committee structure to the Council 
The committee structure is hierarchical and complex (Figure 4.1) as outlined in Chapter 5. The 
committees are classed into three groupings, with varying membership compositions balanced 
between: 1) committees to which Council members must be elected e.g. nominating committee; 
2) those which comprise Council and other members and from which the Chairs are appointed 
co-opted, by reason of their position; and, 3) those that feed into the Boards and Faculties which 
comprise a broader membership. 
The committees are an important way for the ICAEW to secure expert input (Ramirez, 2015) and 
identify future co-optees and committee Chairs, who will be co-opted ex-officio to Council and 
also potentially to the Board. As outlined in Chapter 5, membership of the Board is a common 
pre-cursor to standing as an office holder. The result is an established route to office holder, 
which by passes the election process but which relies heavily on the final assent of the Council 
members who vote for the officeholders. In this case the Council is a proxy for the membership 
and should therefore reflect the membership and its interests so that it can effectively hold its 
elected leaders to account. 
Accountability beyond the membership 
The claim to act in the public interest is important in establishing accountability beyond the 
membership. The public interest was discussed in Chapter 2 with reference to the accountability 
questions posed by Joannides (2012) and led to the argument that within the ICAEW the public 
interest is primarily served through the Code of Ethics and the Council’s decision making 
processes. 
The interview evidence reflects the ambiguity of the term (Sorauf, 1957) despite its widespread 
use within the Council. In common with other ICAEW members, interviewees have been 
subjected to a process of inculcation through the training processes attendant with becoming a 
member of the professional body and the induction to the Council (Hamilton & Ó hÓgartaigh, 
2009), but they continue to articulate the public interest in a variety of ways. 
For many, the notion of acting in the public interest is an indicator of a profession rather than a 
trade grouping (Abbott, 1988). However, as Bourdieu suggests, such an analysis may be 
simplistic and mask the underlying function of the concept of the public interest (Bourdieu, 
1998). Within the field of accountancy this is to facilitate the pursuit of individual self-interest 
(Bourdieu, 1998; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). The term creates a kind of mystique for the 
profession and the interests it serves in a similar manner to the widespread use of the phrase 
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‘true and fair view’ (Hamilton & Ó hÓgartaigh, 2009; Willmott, 1986). As a result it is argued that 
the public interest represents part of the technical core or unchallenged cultural capital of the 
ICAEW sub field (Oakes et al., 1998). 
This study’s findings suggest that the public interest can be framed a cultural good in a similar 
manner to ethical notions, providing access to ‘symbolic capital’ for the profession (see also, 
Neu et al. (2003)). Enforceability is deemed to be necessary only at an individual level, i.e., by 
means of the group norms or Code of Ethics (Portes, 1998). The social and economic capital 
associated with membership far outweighs the cost to members of non-compliance and the risk 
of expulsion from the group. Whilst the occurrence of expulsion is relatively remote, with many 
calling for greater and more frequent sanction (Mitchell, Puxty, Sikka & Willmott, 1994), it has 
major consequences across all areas of a members’ life beyond the simple financial to 
questioning the individual’s standing and impacting the member’s ability to secure future 
employment. 
The ICAEW as a whole can engage with the public interest as an antidote to the pursuit of 
individual self-interest that underlies its existence but which has also become its primary threat 
(Spence, Voulgaris & Maclean, 2017). The mismatch between the individual and the institutional 
is also reflected in the governance handbook that focuses on the role of the Institute Regulatory 
Board in upholding the public interest (ICAEW, 2018b).  
Institutionally, the processes of representative democracy are assumed to ensure consideration 
of the public interest. The findings suggest that the electoral system is not as effective as one 
might expect in generating a representative Council. In an attempt to remedy this deficit in 
representation, members are co-opted to the Council by virtue of their existing position, e.g., 
Big Four partners, and academics. It is expected that this disconnect, between the elected 
representatives and the membership they are accountable to, will grow as the membership 
continues to fragment in terms of sector, international membership growth continues, and the 
relevance of location is further diminished by electronic communication. The processes of 
securing a representative governing body and engaging the membership have been shown to 
be under increasing pressure and are in urgent need of reform to achieve their aims. 
One approach would be to harness the existing structures of sector groupings that exist within 
the ICAEW to expand sectorial representation whilst reducing the reliance on geographic 
representation. One suggested approach is to conduct a review to adjust the geographic 
constituency members to elected Council member ratio and redistribute the seats released as a 
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result to sectorial groupings applying a similar representation ratio e.g. the Faculties. Such a 
move would lead to a reduction in the reliance on co-options for certain sectors e.g. public 
sector. 
7.2.2. To what ends is the ICAEW governed? 
The findings indicate that the governance of the ICAEW is oriented to maintain the symbolic 
power of the ACA credential. This is the common thread for all members. It is the acquisition of 
the ACA, which enables members to convert its symbolic capital into economic capital during 
their careers. 
To maintain the enduring power of the ACA, the ICAEW must respond to changes in its operating 
environment including the reduction of its scope of influence due to the internationalisation of 
standard setting. For the ICAEW to remain influential and maintain its symbolic power it must 
secure representation and influence in these new settings. To do so requires it to establish 
international scale. 
Symbolic power maintenance 
As Neu et al. (2003) pointed out the justification of the benefits of membership of the 
professional body essential for promoting cohesion amongst the membership in face of the 
broadening geographic reach, changing membership composition and flux the boundaries of 
professional work therefore the findings of this thesis provide insight in to the governance of 
the ICAEW and its accountability to its members. The findings reveal that the sub-field of the 
ICAEW is bound together through the credential of the ACA, which is both a weapon and a stake 
in the symbolic struggle of classification (Wacquant, 1993a). The ACA is the unifying thread 
across the membership, and the ability to retain its prestige is critical for both existing and future 
members of the group. It is highly valued by the membership as a rigorous and high quality 
qualification where the prestige is linked to the ‘ordeal of preparing for it’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 
21) and notions that holders have joined a ‘nobility’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 21). The ongoing 
perceived relevance of the ACA by members is evidenced by the high levels of membership 
subscription renewals. 
Maintaining the symbolic power of the ICAEW is pertinent in light of the differences already 
discussed in the membership base (Ramirez, 2009) and mounting external political pressures 
likely to affect the scope of operations and increase public scrutiny of the ICAEW. Ongoing 
challenges to the field affecting the accountability of the ICAEW to its membership were outlined 
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in Chapter 5. These included the ability to, maintain the symbolic power of the ACA qualification, 
and operate in an international environment (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009).  
Against the backdrop of perceived and real threats to the ICAEW’s power, the requirement to 
grow membership to remain a significant global player was raised by many interviewees. Few 
acknowledged that the primary concern is one of status (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b); however, 
it underlies the discussion and concerns raised by interviewees.  
Oakes et al. (1998) who emphasised the important relationship between a field’s legitimacy and 
maintenance of its unique capital profile as the lack of legitimacy leads to an inability to control 
the exchange of its capitals. Findings confirm that the members are concerned over any dilution 
of or consequent reduction in the status of the ACA qualification. Concerns over dilution of 
status across the general membership (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b) appear to preclude merger 
with other professional accountancy bodies in the UK. This adjustment in the rate of exchange 
of capital (Bourdieu, 1998) is something that other professional accountancy bodies have  
overcome in recent times through the execution of mergers to access the scale required for a 
global professional membership body, e.g., AICPA and CIMA (AICPA, 2016), or the merger of a 
number of Canadian accountancy bodies (Richardson, 2017). This leads to agreement with 
Willmott (1986) that the ICAEW’s primary purpose is political and is to further the interests of 
its dominant and high-profile members. 
It would appear more likely that, at least in the first instance, the ICAEW will invest its resources 
in affinity groupings of similar bodies, e.g., Chartered Accountants Worldwide (Samsonova-
Taddei & Humphrey, 2014). This may be a precursor to future merger and reflects the likely need 
to access the benefits of economies of scale for the Executive function to provide a competitive 
offering to members. 
The relationship management process required to maintain the symbolic power of the ICAEW 
within the policy and political arena is typically undertaken by the Executive on behalf of the 
membership rather than directly by members of the Council outside the officeholder grouping. 
This representation or lobbying role has always been important for the ICAEW as a professional 
body (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b), however, in times of crisis it becomes more apparent (Carter 
et al., 2015). 
In the UK, and to some extent internationally, the ICAEW has produced a type of nobility in the 
field of business (Wacquant, 1993a) who set themselves apart from members of other 
professional bodies and are able to convert their symbolic goods (i.e. the ACA credential) into 
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enhanced economic rewards. It is this protection of status of the ACA that underpins the 
continued reluctance to merge with other professional accountancy bodies.  
Withstanding symbolic violence 
The ICAEW is accountable to a range of stakeholders beyond the membership, including 
international bodies, government, regulators and the Big Four. The public accountability often 
brings incursions into ICAEW’s jurisdiction in the form of restrictions on its scope of operations 
or that of its members e.g. changes to the audit thresholds, which have led to reduced work for 
auditors. 
The ICAEW Council delegates the management of the political discourse to the Executive, who 
undertake a process of continual boundary maintenance. The Executive is accountable to the 
Council via the Board for this activity  (Friedman & Mason, 2006). 
At the same time, the Big Four continue to exert significant power over the ICAEW as it relies on 
those firms to train substantial numbers of members and thereby refresh and grow the stream 
of subscriptions. Whilst the reliance is reducing through international expansion of the 
membership and increasing numbers of members training outside of practice, the ability of the 
Big Four to shape the syllabus and education of members is significant and affords them 
significant power over the ICAEW, although this is mainly exercised outside of the Council forum. 
Symbolic power and violence in furthering agendas 
The interviewees suggested that, to some extent, the Executive function imposes symbolic 
violence on the Council. The Council is complicit in its own domination by the Executive through 
its acceptance of a role, which is strategic in form but can be operational in substance. At times, 
this is facilitated by the size of the Council. This tendency enables the Executive to present its 
plans in a manner to manage towards consensus and choreograph the Council’s debate. The 
control of the Executive over what will be documented and presented through the Council’s 
agenda reflects the symbolic violence imposed on the Council without it realising (Hamilton & Ó 
hÓgartaigh, 2009; Oakes et al., 1998).  
At the same time, the Executive also has a hand in controlling the agenda of Committees by 
providing a secretarial function, which typically directs the contributory work. At a board level, 
the dominance of the Executive members may be facilitated through the capture of the Council 
members who often subsequently seek to progress to the officeholder roles. This ‘collusio’ 
(Stringfellow et al., 2015) results in the Council members socialising the agenda and ensuring 
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support on behalf of the executive. At the same time, the Council periodically reasserts its 
authority to readjust the balance when it feels that the Executive function has overstepped its 
remit (Osterman, 2006), e.g., one interviewee mentioned a co-option that had been announced 
prior to Council approval that was subsequently rejected. 
7.3. What are the interests of Council members and how do they shape the 
governance of the ICAEW? (RQ2) 
Elections and co-options are viewed as the legitimate means of entry to the elite of the 
profession (Lee, 1999) as they reproduce the established structures of the ICAEW (Wacquant, 
1993a), with the District Society network maintaining its privileged position. The democratic 
election processes can serve to underpin this reproduction through the perceived linkage to 
‘merit’ (Wacquant, 1993a). The interviews also identified those who could be classified as 
exceptions and were elected despite not being part of the dominant sector group or being part 
of the District Society network. The findings highlighted a two-way exchange of capitals 
depending on whether members were elected or co-opted. Elected members typically accrue 
capital from their position, whilst co-opted members lend their capitals to the Council as a 
means of legitimating the governance structure. This legitimisation of the ICAEW governance 
structure by means of co-option is important as failure to engage prominent members has 
previously been shown to result in a reduction in power in a similar professional accountancy 
body, e.g., the AIPCA (Sellers et al., 2015). 
The findings from the work undertaken in Chapter 6 are discussed in the following sections 
which seek to answer the second research question What are the interests of Council members 
and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? Section 7.3.1 answers the sub-question, 
which asks: What interest groups do Council members represent? Section 7.3.2 addresses the 
sub- question which asks: How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of 
the ICAEW? Finally, section 7.3.3 outlines the implications for the governance and accountability 
of the ICAEW. 
7.3.1. What interest groups do Council members represent? 
The structures of the Council are predicated upon establishing political accountability of the 
Council members to their constituency. For elected members, accountability is established 
through the geographic constituency and the District Society structures. The accountability of 
co-opted members to their sector has been shown to be limited. 
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The findings illustrate the election processes contribute to the concentration of interests within 
the Council by controlling the capitals that are valued and the manner in which candidates 
evidence them. This tends to result in certain profiles putting themselves forward for election 
or uncontested elections. There was evidence of some non-standard profiles succeeding by 
substituting personal networks for local involvement through the District Society. 
Co-opted members are found to lend their established capitals to the Council facilitating an 
external credibility and representative composition. The interviews established that they often 
seek to increase their capitals, using positions within the Council as a means to access other 
roles either within the ICAEW or externally. 
Election processes: Establishing political accountability 
The cultivation of the appropriate mix of capitals is an important factor in successfully seeking 
election by one’s peers. The findings indicated that existing election processes, which are tied 
to notions of geographic representation, privilege those who conform to conceptions of 
candidate legitimacy (Lamont & Lareau, 1988) and result in practice members being over-
represented in the Council. Continued effort to rebalance the composition of the Council 
through the creation of new routes, e.g., via the co-option of members from the Student Council 
have had some initial effect on composition and may create a pipeline of master players; 
however, this has been a result of the co-option process rather than election. 
The ICAEW seeks to control the process of election through the requirement for nominations 
and for candidates to prepare an election address including certain specified themes; this 
establishes the members’ capitals in the manner thought to be desirable for Council 
membership. Both steps can serve to exclude members who do not fit the characteristics 
outlined in the briefing documents (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). 
Despite the transparency of the election process, during the interview process, some members 
disclosed their manoeuvring to ensure that they were not opposed in the election. The 
forethought required in this process reveals the significant investment made by elected 
members in securing their position. However, this approach to securing a seat on the Council 
can only succeed if the membership understands the unwritten rules of the game and 
newcomers do not respond to the open calls to stand for election made by the ICAEW. As 
engagement with District Societies continues to come under pressure such tactics are likely to 
become less successful. 
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Successful nomination requires a local network of members to support the nominee’s proposed 
candidature; for many, the primary route to nomination is through the District Society rather 
than through personal contacts. As the profession is increasingly heterogeneous (Ramirez, 
2009), fewer members are likely to work in environments with large numbers of other members, 
thereby resulting in a reduction in the pool of potential candidates who can easily secure 
nomination outside of the District Society.  
Members who work in practice continue to dominate the process, forming a significant grouping 
of successful candidates in both rounds of elections (2015 57%; 2017 48%) in contrast to the 
34% of the overall membership working in this area (FRC, 2018a). This may be attributable to 
the fact that practice-based members are more likely to be part of the District Society, which 
offers a means to build the requisite social and symbolic capital within the constituency and is 
the dominant route to election. The combination of a requirement for physical presence and the 
expected assumption of committee duties, in addition to Council meetings and pre-dinners, 
results in a significant commitment for members, with some reporting up to 30 days spent on 
Council related business each year. As a result, the ability to manage one’s own time was also 
identified as an enabling factor involved in standing for Council due to the time commitment 
involved (Nesbit & Gazley, 2012). This tends to favour older, more experienced members and 
has resulted in co-options being used to retain ‘younger members’ who have previously served 
as members of the ICAEW Student Council. For these members, the perceived value of this 
activity by the employer is important as they are required to release relatively junior staff for 
this purpose.  
Thus, for most elected members, a significant investment is made to secure election, both 
through the cultivation of social and cultural capital as well as through the election statements. 
Key factors include participation in the activities of a District Society combined with the ability 
to control one’s time.  
The interests of co-opted members 
The imbalance created through the election process results in the requirement for co-options 
to add legitimacy to the ICAEW’s governance structures. These members lend their capitals to 
the Council, including linguistic capital, symbolic capital and cultural capital, thereby supporting 
its claim to represent the membership. This capital exchange works both ways, with co-opted 
members often benefitting from increased professional credibility and deferred economic 
capital. This study’s findings also suggest that whilst all members of the Council commit physical 
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presence and time, their expertise is often weighted according to their perceived capital 
strength. 
The interview process revealed differences in the capitals of the elected and co-opted members. 
In part, this is because the co-opted members have reached a degree of notoriety within their 
own organisations or sector prior to co-option; they therefore have a different perspective from 
those who have worked their way through the District Society and fought contested elections 
to secure a seat on the Council. It is natural that those who have entered the Council through 
the election route seek to defend the process and protect the District Society structure. At the 
same time, the relative lack of reflexivity (Lupu & Empson, 2015) is creating an increasing 
distance between the ICAEW and its membership, thereby increasing the threat to its relevance. 
Members who work outside of practice are less likely to be part of the District Society or have a 
local network of members who can support their candidature. It is in this area that ICAEW should 
be looking to innovate through embracing this shift in its membership and engaging more with 
interest groups and sector groupings of members to ensure that they are represented on the 
Council and their interests are not marginalised. 
The symbolic capital of a Council member is often a powerful tool used to enable members to 
command a greater level of respect and potentially convert it to economic capital at some future 
point in time. Many interviewees mentioned accessing further opportunities subsequent to 
becoming a Council member. This elevation in status for those who volunteer in this manner is 
an important factor in the discourse. The exploitation of their expert knowledge by the ICAEW, 
its Council and committees, is masked through ‘the logic of volunteerism’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 
116) enabling the ICAEW to function whilst hiding the true cost of doing so from the general 
membership. 
7.3.2. How do the interests of Council members shape the governance of the 
ICAEW? 
The interests of the Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW as imbalances can 
lead to the amplification of certain voices, which do not necessarily reflect the concerns of the 
membership. The ambition of certain members to rise to office holder positions by seeking 
favour amongst the Council’s electoral college may also results in the dominance of perspectives 
which are adopted for that purpose. 
Elected members: capital accretion through Council membership 
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Elected members possess a relatively homogenous capital mix due to the tightly controlled 
election processes, which lead to sector concentration and self-elimination of those who cannot 
evidence their prior involvement in the manner required by the election statement. As a result 
the capital benefits of membership of the ICAEW cCuncil might be thought to be uniform. This 
was not the case and a range of different opportunities were cited by interviewees as a by-
product of membership of the Council. 
Many benefitted from accessing new networks through the Council, elevating their status with 
prospective clients, accessing improved roles and developing their skillsets. Most of these capital 
accretion opportunities enable the elected members to eventually turn the experience into 
increased economic capital. Whilst there was consensus that Council members’ symbolic capital 
was enhanced through membership of the Council this was most beneficial in groupings who 
were aware of the iCAEW and its governance e.g. politicians were mentioned. 
Elected members also engaged with an altruistic discourse of giving back to the profession. 
However, it was the case that multiple motivations were mentioned. To some extent altruistic 
thread has been mirrored in the discourse of the ICAEW around the public interest. 
Council members: the investment required and its influence on the interests served 
All members of the ICAEW Council, both elected and co-opted make a significant investment of 
time and energy to its work. This tends to favour members who can control their time, which 
helps to explain the high numbers of small practitioners (Nesbit & Gazley, 2012) and the 
weighting to more senior members. For those in business or more junior members, findings 
indicated that their employers need to share the value placed on the position of Council member 
with the employee (Bourdieu, 1998). Some members in these groups mentioned that they did 
not feel that membership of the Council was sufficiently recognised by their employers. This 
could be because the employer was not in a position to derive an increase in its own capital 
profile as a result. 
Whilst many of the Council members talked about the compromises they had made to serve on 
the Council e.g. taking holiday for the Council Away Day or having reduced leisure time as they 
caught up on work, they were confident of a deferred increase in economic capital. The findings 
also demonstrated that some of the Council members were caught up in the ‘illusio’ of the 
Council devoting large amounts of time to committee work and using it as a step to leading 
positions within the Council. These members did not appear to seek external status or economic 
gain as a product of their involvement with the ICAEW. Instead they appear fully focused on 
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building their capitals within the ICAEW governance structures. This strategy favours certain 
profiles where such a commitment is possible. 
For the ICAEW to broaden the composition of the Council to represent the membership more 
closely the ICAEW needs to start to work with employers to find mutual benefit deriving from 
an employee’s membership of the ICAEW Council. In so doing it contribute to a reduction in the 
barriers to fuller participation and encourage a broader range of existing Council members to 
seek leadership roles. It would also contribute to improving diversity amongst the general 
membership of the Council and help to reduce the sector concentrations currently found within 
the Council. 
7.3.3. Implications: the dysfunctional consequences on the governance and 
accountability of the ICAEW 
This study has shed light on the ‘black box’ (Willmott et al., 1993) of the ICAEW’s governance 
and accountability from a contemporary perspective. It has yielded an assembly of viewpoints 
from the different members of the Council which serve to highlight aspects of transformation 
which the ICAEW must address to augment accountability to the membership. In so doing it is 
expected that the Council composition would increase in inclusivity as a result of a more 
effective representation of the membership profile. 
At the same time the majority of the membership remain content with the symbolic capital that 
membership offers. Many of these members do not engage with the ICAEW, either for 
networking or for CPD purposes. Their technical CPD needs are either sector specific or are 
identified and provision created in-house by their employer. As such, they are content to let 
others work at the maintenance of the symbolic capital that they share (Portes, 1998) but have 
a strong and vocal opinion when this is deemed under threat, e.g., the high voting turnouts to 
block merger with other bodies (Noguchi & Edwards, 2008b). 
The current electoral system based on geographic constituencies is weakening as the mandate 
for elected Council members is often weak with low voting turnouts and many uncontested 
elections. As the membership continues to fragment across multiple sectors and at the same 
time becomes increasingly international, electoral constituencies tied to the District Society 
network are likely to come under increasing pressure. The imbalances created by the election 
processes lead to a disconnect between the membership and its representatives within the 
governance structure. As a result, the debate may not reflect the concerns of the membership 
and undermine the public interest.  
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Co-options serve as a means of supplementing the Council composition through engaging 
groupings who would not otherwise serve on the ICAEW’s governance body. The co-opted 
members offer their credibility and existing professional status to the ICAEW Council and help 
to create a balance in the structure. This helps to add to the public accountability of the ICAEW 
to its wider membership and augments its capacity to speak on behalf of the membership with 
external stakeholders. At an individual level, co-opted Council members are not accountable to 
the sector from which they are co-opted in the same way as elected members.  
Careful consideration is required to transform aspects of governance and accountability of the 
ICAEW to address the challenges that have been uncovered in this thesis. This is likely to be a 
gradual but critical process to secure the longevity of the ICAEW and safeguard its symbolic 
capital. 
7.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed and analysed the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 in relation 
to the literature presented in Chapter 2, and the theoretical concepts presented in Chapter 3 to 
help answer the research questions that are central to this thesis. The discussion and analysis 
undertaken in this chapter drew on elements of Bourdieu’s relational framework to understand 
the governance of the ICAEW, both at the structural level within the Council and at the level of 
the individual Council members. Bourdieu’s framework gives us insight into the governance 
mechanisms of the ICAEW and how control works within the professional body (Oakes et al., 
1998) serving to illuminate the issues identified from the empirical work and deepening the 
analysis 
The election processes have been found to privilege the historic structures and therefore the 
composition of the elected members of the Council does not fully reflect the range of interests 
of the current membership. It is likely that the geographic ties will continue to be challenged as 
the membership continues to become increasingly heterogeneous and international. In the 
immediate term, the vested interests that have benefitted from those structures display inertia 
and are likely to seek to protect the status quo. The continued reliance on co-options to engage 
high profile members with the process of governance is an important legitimating tool for 
maintaining the ICAEW’s symbolic capital, but it also serves to mask the underlying 
representational deficits resulting from the democratic process. The ICAEW faces the challenge 
of evolving its processes of representation and accountability without losing the legitimacy that 
the high-profile co-opted members lend to it. The loss of the external legitimacy these members 
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provide may lead to a reduction in status and relevance for the ICAEW as a whole (Sellers et al., 
2015). 
The ICAEW Council is simultaneously subject to inherent structural constraints, which serve to 
restrict its composition, whilst portraying a vibrant and open election process to the wider 
membership who are not always aware of the substructures that seek to control membership 
of the Council (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  
It is the belief in the legitimacy of the processes that contribute to the overall power of the 
ICAEW as a professional membership body. However, the maintenance processes that secure 
political accountability are under threat as the geographical power of the District Society 
continues to erode, the membership fragments, and the scale of operations is increasingly 
important in exerting influence on the international accountancy infrastructure. These factors 
endanger the public accountability of the ICAEW with the membership and stakeholders. As a 
result, the capacity of the ICAEW to undertake its public interest role is under pressure unless it 
can effectively address these threats. 
The final chapter concludes this thesis, discusses implications for policy, and offers some 
directions for future research. It also identifies some of the limitations inherent in this research. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary, conclusions and implications of the research 
8.1. Introduction 
This PhD thesis has examined the governance of the ICAEW, a UK professional accountancy 
body, by focusing on the governing Council, its structure and the composition of its membership. 
In so doing, it engaged with the following research questions:  
1. How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends?  
2. What are the interests of Council members and how do they shape the governance of the 
ICAEW? 
The research sought to better understand the role of the Council within the governance and 
accountability structures of the ICAEW by drawing Bourdieusian concepts. The adoption of 
Bourdieu’s analytical tools has helped to examine the relationship between the public 
accountability (Sinclair, 1995) of the ICAEW to both its membership and those beyond. The study 
also addressed the political accountability (Sinclair, 1995) of the ICAEW Council members to 
their constituencies.  
Primary and secondary data collection techniques were adopted to generate the empirical 
evidence for the study. Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews 
conducted with members of the ICAEW Council. Secondary data were collected from a range of 
publicly available documents and web-based sources. 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the main points in the preceding chapters, 
outlining the main findings and contributions, reflecting on some limitations of the study and 
possible directions for future research, together with a consideration of the implications arising 
from the findings. 
8.2. Summary of the thesis chapters 
Chapter 1 introduced the thesis, explained the motivation for the study, and outlined the origin 
of the research questions. It also outlined the contributions to the literature, theory and 
practice. Whilst prior studies have examined the governance of professional accountancy bodies 
in an historical context, this study offers a contemporary framing through interviewing members 
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of the Council of the ICAEW. The perspectives generated by those involved in the governance 
processes add to our understanding of the tensions that exist and the control mechanisms 
deployed; these are often obscured in the official narratives, accounting records, minutes of 
meetings and other public data. The adoption of Bourdieusian concepts to organise the analysis 
helped to provide insight into the various layers, which exist within the governance structure 
and how they interact, as well as the workings of agency within a governance and accountability 
structure that is aimed at shaping accounting practice locally and globally. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature to assist the development of the research questions in relation 
to prior studies. It outlined what the governance of professional membership bodies means and 
how their governance structures differ from other organising structures, e.g., corporates, 
charities. Forms of accountability identified in the literature were reviewed prior to focusing the 
study on two forms of accountability (Sinclair, 1995). Joannides’ accountability questions were 
used to help focus the study (Joannides, 2012) on two aspects: public accountability of the 
ICAEW, to the members and beyond; and political accountability of the Council members to their 
constituencies.  
Chapter 3 outlined elements of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework and the existing accounting 
literature, which draws on those aspects to shed light on the contribution of theory to 
illuminating broader tensions within accounting structures. Theory helps to deepen the analysis 
of the research questions by offering established structures and vocabularies to articulate 
research findings. 
Chapter 4 outlined the research methodology and methods adopted in this thesis. A discussion 
of research paradigms within accounting research was presented as part of the methodological 
backdrop to justify the rationale for the selection of a critical paradigm for this thesis. The 
research methods adopted were outlined together with the selection of the case study 
approach. The process of data collection adopted for the study was also presented, together 
with an overview of how the interview data were analysed. 
Chapter 5 presented the empirical results that answered the first research question: How is the 
ICAEW governed and to what ends? The chapter addressed the public accountability of the 
ICAEW to the membership and beyond. The findings identified a differential accountability to 
the membership between elected and co-opted members of the Council. Further, the 
democratic election processes were shown to result in an imbalance in sectoral representation 
within the Council directly leading to the amplification of certain voices within the governance 
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processes.  Accountability beyond the membership to the public interest is achieved in two 
ways: through the Code of Ethics; and through the debates within the Council (Cochran, 1974). 
The effectiveness of the debate process was questioned in light of the imbalances in 
representation. 
Chapter 6 focused on aspects of political accountability (Sinclair, 1995) of the individual Council 
members by examining the appointment processes and their capital profiles. In so doing, the 
chapter answered the second research question: What are the interests of Council members 
and how do they shape the governance of the ICAEW? Findings reflect the implicit controls 
imposed throughout the election process from establishing nomination and candidature to 
developing a network of peers to vote for candidates. Differences between the capital profiles 
of elected and co-opted members were revealed with elected members using their position to 
extend their capital profiles and co-opted members being instrumentalised by the ICAEW to lend 
their already established capitals to the Council to secure legitimacy and representation from 
certain groupings e.g. Big Four partners. 
Chapter 7 discussed the findings using Bourdieu’s analytical structure as an organising tool, 
which helped to deepen the analysis. The research questions addressed structure and agency 
within the ICAEW, and findings centred on the public accountability of the ICAEW to the 
membership and beyond and the political accountability of the ICAEW Council members to their 
constituencies. 
8.3. Summary of the main findings 
The focus of this thesis was to examine questions of governance and accountability of 
professional membership bodies through a case study of the ICAEW. The ICAEW is a professional 
membership body for accountants that grants the designation of ACA following a period of 
training combined with the successful completion of a set of professional exams. Members also 
commit to abide by a Code of Ethics and maintain their competence through annual CPD 
attestations. Whilst the ICAEW is based in the UK, it has an international footprint with its 
international membership increasing at a faster pace than the domestic membership growth: 
25% of student members are now based internationally (FRC, 2018a). This has created new 
challenges for the governance structures of the ICAEW and the historic mechanisms designed to 
establish accountability to the membership. Specifically, the case study focused on the Council 
and its members as this is the strategic decision-making forum within the ICAEW. The main 
175 
 
findings arising from research questions that the thesis sought to answer are outlined in Section 
8.3.1 and section 8.3.2.  
8.3.1. How is the ICAEW governed and to what ends? 
This research question was answered by examining the public accountability of the ICAEW to its 
membership and beyond. Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic power and violence help to deepen 
the analysis of the structures of accountability. 
The findings are that the political accountability to the membership is constrained by the historic 
structures of the ICAEW, which rely on geographic elections and the District Society network as 
a conduit to the membership. In contrast to elected members, co-opted members do not have 
a mechanism of accountability to the sector from which they are co-opted creating a differential 
accountability. 
Public accountability beyond the membership is established through the Code of Ethics and its 
enforcement by means of the Institute Regulatory Board. Compliance with the Code of Ethics 
facilitates the ability of individual members to pursue their own self-interest (Izza, 2017). The 
debate process within the Council is understood to serve the public interest, however the 
findings show that the debate is likely to amplify certain interests. This is a direct result of the 
imbalances created through the election processes. 
The capacity of the ICAEW to address the structural imbalances will directly affect its ability to 
maintain its symbolic power both externally and with its membership. It is increasingly 
important that the weaknesses in the governance and accountability structures area addressed 
as the membership continues to fragment across sectors and internationally (Ramirez, 2009). In 
addition, the capacity of the ICAEW to access international policy making fora is closely linked 
to its ability to extend its footprint and maintain its symbolic capital. 
8.3.2. What are the interests of the Council members and how do they shape 
the ICAEW’s governance? 
Research question two was addressed through an analysis of the processes of appointment to 
the ICAEW Council and the capital distribution of its members. 
The findings indicate that there is a distinction between the routes to the Council membership, 
elected or co-opted, which results in differential capital profiles of members following each 
route. The elected members reflected on the importance of the District Society within their 
constituencies to steer candidature and election success. Typically, those who seek election 
176 
 
establish their nomination through the District Society, building cultural and symbolic capital in 
this forum. This route serves to perpetuate the status quo and tends to result in an over-
representation of small practitioners who often are more active within the District Society 
structure.  
Engagement of the wider membership with the ICAEW governance processes is low, with the 
majority of members remaining content to let others maintain the symbolic capital of the ICAEW 
and the ACA. However, when this has come under threat of perceived dilution via mergers, there 
has been a significant engagement resulting in the defeat of proposals to consolidate the UK 
accountancy profession (Willmott, 1986). This outcome is directly linked to the problematic 
representation processes outlined above. 
The imbalances created by the electoral system are addressed to some extent by co-options to 
Council, which helps strengthen the legitimacy of the ICAEW’s governance structures (Sellers et 
al., 2015). However, this perpetuates the lack of engagement with the democratic processes by 
high profile members and reinforces the historic structural weaknesses. 
The ICAEW must act to address the deficits in the political accountability of its membership 
without alienating those powerful members who lend it legitimacy through co-options to the 
Council. 
8.4. Overview of the main contributions of this study 
Contributions are offered to theory, the literature on the professions, and to policy and practice 
in the following areas. 
8.4.1. Theory 
This thesis applies an established method theory drawn from sociology to the field of 
accountancy within the UK by treating the ICAEW as a sub-field (Ejiogu, A., Ambituuni & Ejiogu, 
C., 2018). In so doing, the thesis explores questions of structure and agency and their inter-
relationship using concepts of symbolic power and violence and capitals. Drawing on elements 
of Bourdieusian theory to organise and deepen the analysis of the governance and 
accountability of the professional body helps to contribute to domain theory (Lukka & Vinnari, 
2014).  
The work extends the existing work related to the public and political accountability (Sinclair, 
1995) of professional accountancy bodies highlighting the importance of the representation 
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processes within the governance and accountability structures along with the use of co-options 
to address weaknesses and strengthen external credibility. Joannides (2012) accountability 
questions helped frame the empirical work and add to the to the public interest literature on 
the accountancy profession e.g. Lee (1995), Parker (1994) and Sikka et al. (1989). 
8.4.2. Literature 
Contributions are made to the literature on the governance of democratic membership 
organisations (Spear, 2004) through examining the ICAEW as a case study and reflecting the 
inherent tensions and imbalances that have been internalised within the objectively democratic 
structure of such bodies. In so doing, the thesis adds to the literature on symbolic power and its 
‘covert’ operation (Tremblay et al., 2016). This thesis expands the extant literature on the 
ICAEW, which primarily adopts an historical critical perspective through adopting an interview 
method to capture contemporary perspectives and experiences of those participants within the 
Council. 
The research also contributes to furthering the understanding of the governance and 
accountability of the ICAEW. It explored two types of accountability (Sinclair, 1995): public 
accountability to the membership and beyond; and the political accountability of the members 
of the ICAEW Council to their constituencies. In so doing, it contributes to a greater 
understanding of the concept of the public interest and its rhetorical adoption by the ICAEW as 
part of its technical core (Oakes et al., 1998). The interview process revealed the absorption of 
the term into the governance structures of the ICAEW. 
8.4.3. Policy and practice 
Policy and practice findings identify that the geographical election structure has led to a sectoral 
concentration of elected members within the Council, resulting in imbalances in composition. 
The increasing heterogeneity of the membership (Ramirez, 2009) has led to challenges to the 
role of the District Society network in establishing and maintaining political accountability by 
interviewees; past reforms have not effectively addressed these concerns (Ramirez, 2009). The 
empirical evidence identifies that this has led to an amplification of concerns related to those 
members rather than those of the wider membership.  
The inherent deficiencies of the democratic processes of representation (Knoke & Prensky, 
1984) result in the co-option of members to create a more balanced Council (Friedman & 
Phillips, 2004) and secure the input from high profile members of the profession. These attempts 
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to generate a governance body that is more reflective of the membership are shown to create 
a division in the membership of the Council. Co-opted members tend to have a different capital 
profile from elected members and are often able to parachute to officeholder positions as a 
result. This assumes that when the Council acts as an electoral college for office holders it acts 
as a proxy for the membership however, this is not the case and may result in increased success 
for those displaying certain capital profiles. 
Reform must be balanced to retain the legitimacy that high profile co-optees bring to the ICAEW. 
Prior research into the AICPA indicates that the loss of this capital within the Council could lead 
to a diminished role for the professional body as a whole (Sellers et al., 2015). The maintenance 
of the symbolic power of the ICAEW is one of the primary aims of the governance process as it 
enables the ICAEW to attract new members and increase its ability to represent its members in 
the political and policymaking fora. 
The pressure on the ICAEW to address the fundamental challenge around the processes of 
representation and accountability of individuals to a constituency and of the Council to the 
whole membership is likely to continue increase as the membership is increasingly 
internationalised. Unless these matters are adequately addressed, the capacity of the Council’s 
debate processes to adequately reflect the public interest is likely to come under scrutiny.  
8.5. Limitations of the research 
Three primary types of limitation to the research have been identified and will be expanded on 
below; namely theoretical approach, scope of the study, and the focus on a case study. 
The first limitation results from the selection of the theoretical lens to apply to the study, which 
is a personal choice for the researcher following an evaluation of alternatives (Broadbent, 2002). 
In this case a Bourdieusian method theory was adopted to help organise the research and 
provide a framework to develop an understanding of the interplay between the ICAEW 
structures and the agency of the Council members who govern the ICAEW. Other governance 
theories might have been adopted, e.g., Foucault’s governmentality framework (Foucault, 
1991), Latour’s actor network theory (Latour, 2007), or institutional logics (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Suddaby & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008), amongst others. In common with other method theories, 
these alternative theoretical frameworks have been imported from other domains and have 
their merits for shedding light on related research questions from different structure and/or 
agency perspectives (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). A Bourdieusian lens was selected to frame the 
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study as it offers an organising tool to help explain the interplay between agency and structure 
within the ICAEW Council. Therefore, an understanding can start to be constructed of how the 
interests of the Council members shape the governance of the ICAEW and how the structures 
perpetuate the dominance of certain interests. 
The identification of the ICAEW as a sub-field within the field of UK professional accountancy 
bodies may also constitute a limitation as the solution to a particular problem may differ 
depending on which field perspective is adopted (Shenkin & Coulson, 2007). Other ways of 
viewing the field of study might have been to analyse the field of professional accountancy 
bodies either at a UK level or internationally. The study of the ICAEW as a sub-field helps the 
case study to remain focused on the ICAEW and its governance processes and structures.  
The second limitation arises from the scope of the study. The research was limited to a case 
study of one professional body’s governance structure through the governing Council. The 
interview pool was limited to those who were at least part-way through their second term as 
elected members as at June 2017, or were co-opted for the first time prior to that date, to ensure 
that members had some experience of the Council process. Elected members are partially 
refreshed every two years; therefore, conducting the research in a longitudinal manner may 
yield different results as the profile of members changes over time. Other interviewees might 
have included the Executive Board members to focus on the interaction between the 
operational Board and the Council, or the wider membership, to understand the low levels of 
engagement and participation in the election processes. 
A third limitation relates to the case study context. The thesis was limited to a case study of one 
UK professional accountancy body’s governance structure, which differs in some respects from 
the structure of other UK professional accountancy bodies as well as that of international 
professional accountancy bodies. For example, other UK professional accountancy bodies, whilst 
also constituted by means of Royal Charter, are subject to bespoke Charters and bye-laws. 
Internationally, the constitutional structures vary and, as such, caution should be applied to 
generalisation of all aspects of the study. This limitation is mitigated by the rich insight that can 
be derived from a focused case study (Humphrey, 2014). A relevant case study has the potential 
to shed light on complex structures and organisations that cannot easily be realised through 
alternative research methods (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995). 
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8.6. Suggestions for future research 
The limitations outlined above can be applied as a guide to stimulate future research into the 
governance of professional membership bodies. This section offers some suggestions to help 
germinate further research ideas rather than as a comprehensive list. They focus on the 
theoretical approach adopted, the delineation of the field of the study, and alternative research 
methods and questions. 
First, a different theoretical framing may generate complementary insights into the governance 
of the ICAEW (Llewelyn, 2003). This is a decision for the researcher based on their paradigmatic 
beliefs and is likely to lead to different research questions and methods (Lukka, 2010). The 
critical paradigm adopted in this study draws on a broad range of theories to inform research 
studies (Gendron, 2018b). For example, Foucault’s conceptions of governmentality (Foucault, 
1991) could be applied to the Council drawing on the notion of the panopticon as a framework 
for analysis of the power relationships at play between the membership, the Council, and the 
Executive function within the professional body. A constructivist paradigm might draw on actor 
network theory (Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011). Actor network theory has often been used to 
explain change through the application of the concept of ‘translation’ (Latour, 2007). This theory 
is defined by the assertion that both humans and non-humans possess agency (Justesen & 
Mouritsen, 2011). In accounting research, reliance is often placed on the works of Latour and 
draw heavily on one work, Science in Action (Latour, 1988), possibly as a means of overcoming 
the complexity of the theoretical contributions to actor network theory (Justesen & Mouritsen, 
2011). This therefore offers an opportunity to add to domain theory (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014) 
through either an holistic application or a focus on different writings or writers in the application 
of the theory to the field of accounting. 
Alternatively, a different delineation of the field of study within a Bourdieusian analysis may 
offer new insights into the governance of professional accountancy bodies (Shenkin & Coulson, 
2007). Replication studies with Council members of other UK-based professional accountancy 
bodies could provide additional insight into the governance of the field of accounting and the 
different interests that these bodies serve. This research could also be undertaken across other 
professional membership bodies constituted by Royal Charter, e.g., the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors. 
Similar studies could be undertaken with Council members of CAWW membership bodies or the 
GAA membership bodies to further our understanding of the influence of the enabling 
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constitutional structure and national context on the governance of professional accountancy 
bodies. Research may also be extended to focus the membership and governance processes for 
such international groupings.  
A differing research paradigm may also result in the adoption of different research methods to 
answer the research question. For example, an historic comparator between the official minutes 
and the perceptions of the Council members might reveal differences in the domination of the 
Council debates. Other potential areas of interest would include a longitudinal study of the 
Council membership to investigate questions related to sectoral representation and 
composition by gender, age or ethnicity. This quantitative approach might be adopted by those 
adopting a positivist paradigm or as part of a broader mixed methods study. 
8.7. Implications of the research findings 
The research has implications for theory, the literature, and policy and practice. These are 
outlined below. 
8.7.1. Theory 
The theory of the public interest continues to evolve outside of its original political science 
origins where the public is generally accepted as the electorate. When adopted by professional 
membership bodies, the concept of public becomes increasingly problematic (Willmott et al., 
1993). This is balanced against the purpose of enabling members to pursue financial 
maximisation strategies (Matthews, 2017) and the self-interest of the professional bodies in 
creating a sustainable membership base. The research findings indicate that there is significant 
scope for further work in this area. 
8.7.2. Literature 
The research has implications for the literature on the professions beyond accountancy as it has 
adopted a qualitative interview-based approach to research the governance of a professional 
membership body. It has addressed the internal governance structures of the ICAEW, which are 
often taken for granted, and contributed to opening the black box for others to extend the 
research to the other key governance bodies within the ICAEW, i.e., the Board and the Executive 
function and their inter-relationship, and in other professional membership bodies. 
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8.7.3. Policy and practice 
The implications of the findings for policy and practice can be summarised as follows. First, the 
existing structures of democratic representation within the ICAEW have been shown to be 
imbalanced with differential accountability between elected and co-opted members. Further, 
as the profession has evolved the local accountability ties to the District Society network have 
perpetuated, despite the lack of engagement with this structure by members outside of practice. 
The result is that the composition of the Council no longer reflects the membership and amplifies 
certain interests. Section 7.2.1 outlines an approach to rebalancing the Council composition and 
involves reducing the reliance on geographic representation through the introduction of specific 
sectoral representation. 
Second, the public interest will only be served consistently if the Council is representative and 
its deliberations are robust. A more systematic approach to the explicit consideration of the 
public interest must be introduced to Council deliberations, for example, through consistent 
reference to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the papers presented to the Council. 
Steps to include public interest representatives within the Council are unlikely to be effective as 
those individuals bring their own personal experience and interests to the debate (Bozeman, 
2007a). 
Third, the paramount priority for the ICAEW is to maintain its symbolic power; this will ensure 
its sustainability in a competitive field of professional accountancy bodies seeking growth in 
membership and the resultant influence that scale can provide e.g., in the international standard 
setting bodies. ICAEW must continue to seek to safeguard and expand its ability to represent 
the interests of its membership in these important fora. The most likely route is through alliances 
with other Chartered Accountancy bodies, e.g. through the Chartered Accountants Worldwide 
grouping.  
Reform of the election processes to secure a more representative Council is critical to 
maintaining the ICAEW’s capacity to speak on behalf of its members and represent their 
interests. 
8.8. Conclusions 
This thesis has engaged with the research questions posed related to the governance and 
accountability of the ICAEW, a professional accountancy body. It is the first detailed study of the 
ICAEW Council’s governance and accountability and draws on an assembly of viewpoints from 
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interviews with the Council members. In so doing it starts to open the ‘black box’ (Willmott et 
al., 1993) of the ICAEW’s governance processes. The findings could be applied to a range of 
professional membership organisations and reflect the challenges involved in the 
synchronisation of individual personal and professional interests. The main findings of the 
research are briefly summarised as follows.  
First, the ICAEW is accountable to is members and beyond. However, its accountability to the 
membership is constrained by the composition of the Council and the differential accountability 
between elected and co-opted members. These structures result in the amplification of certain 
interests. This imbalance leads to the capacity of the debate processes within the Council to 
reflect the public interest to be questioned. 
Second, the processes of representation and accountability of elected members result in a 
Council, which does not reflect the interests of the membership. Those who engage with the 
election processes cultivate a field specific capital profile to secure election, whilst co-optees 
provide a legitimacy to the Council through lending their capitals to it. In particular, the interests 
of business members are marginalised through the current composition of the Council. This 
might be addressed through a reduction in geographic constituencies, releasing seats for sector 
based elections. 
Finally, the findings indicate that the existing governance and accountability structures must 
evolve to effectively address the changes in membership composition. The membership is 
expected to continue to fragment in terms of sector and location as the work of accountants 
becomes increasingly specialised. Failure to adapt will undermine the symbolic power of the 
ICAEW and constrain its claims to represent the interests of its members. 
  
184 
 
Bibliography 
Abbott, A.D. (1988). The System of professions: an essay on the division of expert labor. Chicago, 
Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 
ACCA Global (2018, June 17). Council and elections. Retrieved 17 June 2018 from 
http://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/member/council-elections.html 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S.-W. (2002). Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. Academy of 
Management Review, 27(1), 17-40. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2002.5922314. 
Ahrens, T., & Chapman, C. S. (2006). Doing qualitative field research in management accounting: 
Positioning data to contribute to theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(8), 819-
841. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.03.007. 
AICPA (2006, September 17). AICPA Governing Council. Retrieved 17 June 2018 
https://www.aicpa.org/about/governance/aicpacouncil/aicpa-council.html. 
AICPA (2016, June 18). AICPA and CIMA Members Overwhelmingly Approve Ballots to Position 
Profession for the Future. Retrieved 26 February 2017 from 
https://www.aicpa.org/Press/PressReleases/2016/Pages/AICPA-CIMA-Members-Approve-
Ballots-Profession-Future.aspx. 
Alvesson, M., & Skoldburg, K. (2009). Reflexive Methodology. London: Sage. 
Annisette, M. (2000). Imperialism and the professions: The education and certification of 
accountants in Trinidad and Tobago. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 25(7), 631-659. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(99)00061-6. 
Annisette, M. (2003). The colour of accountancy: Examining the salience of race in a 
professionalisation project. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28(7-8), 639-674. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(02)00030-2. 
Annisette, M., & Cooper, C. (2017). Critical Studies in Accounting. Researching the exercise of 
power. In Hoque, Z., Parker, L.D., Covaleski, M.A. and Haynes, K. (Eds) The Routledge 
Companion to Qualitative Accounting Research Methods (pp. 79-94). Taylor & Francis. 
Annisette, M., & Kirkham, L. M. (2007). The advantages of separateness explaining the unusual 
profession-university link in English Chartered Accountancy. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 18(1), 1-30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2006.03.005. 
Ashley, L., & Empson, L. (2016). Understanding social exclusion in elite professional service firms: 
Field level dynamics and the ‘professional project’. Work, employment & society, 31(2), 211-
229. https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017015621480.  
Bakre, O. M. (2014). Imperialism and the integration of accountancy in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 25(7), 558-575. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2013.08.008. 
Baxter, J., & Chua, W. F. (2008). The field researcher as author‐writer. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management, 5(2), 101-121. https://doi.org/10.1108/11766090810888917. 
Berry, A. J., & Otley, D. T. (2004). Case-Based Research in Accounting. In Humphrey, C., & Lee, B. 
H. (Eds). The Real Life Guide to Accounting Research: A Behind-the-scenes View of Using 
Qualitative Research Methods (pp. 231–255). Elsevier. 
Bourdieu, P. (1962). The Algerians. Beacon Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1985). The social space and the genesis of groups. Theory and Society, 14(6), 723–
744. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/657373. 
185 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1986a). The force of law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field. Hastings Law 
Journal, 38, 805. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986b). The Forms of Capital. In Richardson, J. G. (Ed.). Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (pp. 241-258). Westport, CT: Greenwood.  
Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. Sociological Theory, 7(1), 14-25. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/202060. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (2010). Distinction (1st edition). London: Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). An invitation to reflexive sociology. Retrieved from 
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~carlos/607/readings/bourdieu2.pdf. 
Bozeman, B. (2007a). Public Interest Theory and Its Problems. In Bozeman, B. (Ed.). Public Values 
and Public Interest (pp. 83-99). Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2tt37c.9. 
Bozeman, B. (2007b). The Privatization of Public Value. In Bozeman, B. (Ed.). Public Values and 
Public Interest (pp. 1-21). Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2tt37c.5. 
Brennan, N., & Solomon, J. (2008). Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of 
accountability: An overview. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21(7), 885-906. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570810907401. 
Briston, R. J., & Kedslie, M. J. M. (1997). The internationalization of British professional 
accounting: The role of the examination exporting bodies. Accounting, Business & Financial 
History, 7(2), 175-194. https://doi.org/10.1080/095852097330702. 
Broadbent, J. (2002). Critical Accounting Research: A View from England. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 13(4), 433-449. https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.2002.0543. 
Brydon, D. (2019). The quality and effectiveness of audit: Independent review. Retrieved 18 April 
2019, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-quality-and-effectiveness-
of-audit-independent-review. 
Bryman, A. (1984). The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: a question of 
method or epistemology? The British Journal of Sociology, 35(1), 75-92. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/590553. 
Burawoy, M. (1998). The extended case method. Sociological Theory, 16(1), 4-33. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00040. 
Burawoy, M. (2012). The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci. Sociology, 46(2), 
187-206. 
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The roles of accounting in 
organizations and society. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(1), 5-27. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(80)90017-3. 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2019). The Future of Audit (No. 19 of 
Session 2017-19). Retrieved from 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/1718/1718.pdf. 
Canning, M., & O’Dwyer, B. (2001). Professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary procedures: 
Accountable, transparent and in the public interest? European Accounting Review, 10(4), 
725-749. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180127398. 
186 
 
Carter, C., & Spence, C. (2014). Being a Successful Professional: An Exploration of Who Makes 
Partner in the Big 4. Contemporary Accounting Research, 31(4), 949-981. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12059. 
Carter, C., Spence, C., & Muzio, D. (2015). Scoping an agenda for future research into the 
professions. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 28(8), 1198-1216. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-09-2015-2235. 
Chiapello, E., & Baker, C. R. (2011). The introduction of French theory into English language 
accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24(2), 140-160. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513571111100663. 
Chiapello, E., & Medjad, K. (2009). An unprecedented privatisation of mandatory standard-
setting: The case of European accounting policy. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20(4), 
448-468. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2008.09.002. 
Christopher, J. (2010). Corporate governance—A multi-theoretical approach to recognizing the 
wider influencing forces impacting on organizations. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
21(8), 683-695. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2010.05.002. 
Chua, W. F., & Poullaos, C. (1993). Rethinking the profession-state dynamic: The case of the 
Victorian charter attempt, 1885–1906. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18(7-8), 691-
728. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(93)90049-C. 
Chua, W. F., & Poullaos, C. (2002). The Empire Strikes Back? An exploration of centre–periphery 
interaction between the ICAEW and accounting associations in the self-governing colonies 
of Australia, Canada and South Africa, 1880–1907. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
27(4-5), 409-445. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(01)00020-4. 
Chua, W. F. (1986). Radical developments in accounting thought. Accounting review, 61(4), 601-
632. 
Cochran, C. E. (1974). Political Science and ‘The Public Interest’. The Journal of Politics, 36(2), 
327-355. https://doi.org/10.2307/2129473. 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of 
Sociology, 94, S95-S120. https://doi.org/10.1086/228943. 
Competition and Markets Authority (2018, November). Statutory audit market study. Retrieved 
1 December 2018, from https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/statutory-audit-market-study. 
Cooper, C., & Coulson, A. B. (2014). Accounting activism and Bourdieu’s ‘collective intellectual’ 
– Reflections on the ICL Case. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 25(3), 237-254. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2013.01.002. 
Cooper, D. J., & Robson, K. (2006). Accounting, professions and regulation: Locating the sites of 
professionalization. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(4-5), 415-444. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.03.003. 
Cornforth, C. (2003). The Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations. Routledge. 
Cornforth, C. (2004). The Governance of cooperatives and mutual associations: A paradox 
perspective. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 75(1), 11-32. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00241.x. 
Cunliffe, A. L. (2011). Crafting Qualitative Research: Morgan and Smircich 30 Years On. 
Organizational Research Methods, 14(4), 647-673. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428110373658. 
187 
 
Davis, A. (2010). Forms of capital and mobility in the political field: Applying Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework to UK party politics. British Politics; Basingstoke, 5(2), 202-223. 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1057/bp.2010.2. 
Dellaportas, S., & Davenport, L. (2008). Reflections on the public interest in accounting. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 19(7), 1080-1098. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2007.06.002. 
Detzen, D. (2018). A “New Deal” for the profession: Regulatory initiatives, changing knowledge 
conceptions and the Committee on Accounting Procedure. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 31(3), 970-992. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-06-2016-2584. 
Duff, A. (2017). Social mobility and Fair Access to the accountancy profession in the UK: Evidence 
from Big Four and mid-tier firms. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 30(5), 1082-
1110. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-10-2012-1133. 
Dunne, M., Pryor, J., & Yates, P. (2005). Becoming A Researcher: A Research Companion For The 
Social Sciences: A Companion to the Research Process. McGraw-Hill Education (UK). 
Ejiogu, A., Ambituuni, A., & Ejiogu, C. (2018). Accounting for accounting’s role in the 
neoliberalization processes of social housing in England: A Bourdieusian perspective. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.07.002. 
Electoral Reform Services (2017). The Institute of Chartered Accountants England and Wales 
Council Elections 2017. Retrieved from: http://www.icaew.com/-
/media/corporate/files/about-icaew/who-we-are/icaew-governance/icaew-council-
elections-results-2017.ashx. 
English, P. (2016). Mapping the sports journalism field: Bourdieu and broadsheet newsrooms. 
Journalism, 17(8), 1001–1017. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884915576728 
Everett, J. (2003). The politics of comprehensive auditing in fields of high outcome and cause 
uncertainty. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14(1-2), 77-104. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.2001.0517. 
Farjaudon, A.-L., & Morales, J. (2013). In search of consensus: The role of accounting in the 
definition and reproduction of dominant interests. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
24(2), 154-171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2012.09.010. 
Finlay, L. (2008). Reflecting on ‘Reflective practice’. PBPL paper, 52, 1-27. Retrieved from 
http://www.open.ac.uk/opencetl/resources/pbpl-resources/finlay-l-2008-reflecting-
reflective-practice-pbpl-paper-52. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 
12(2), 219-245. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363. 
Fogarty, T. J., Radcliffe, V. S., & Campbell, D. R. (2006). Accountancy before the fall: The AICPA 
vision project and related professional enterprises. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
31(1), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2004.07.004. 
Fogarty, T. J., & Zimmerman, A. (2019). Few are called, fewer are chosen: Elite reproduction in 
U.S. academic accounting. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 60, 1-17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.09.001. 
Foucault, M. (1991). The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. University of Chicago Press. 
FRC (2018a). Key Facts and Trends in the Accountancy Profession (p. 63). Retrieved 12 August 
2018, from https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/27725654-8bd9-4623-a410-
ef1661a69649/Key-Facts-and-Trends-2018.pdf. 
188 
 
FRC (2018b). Particulars of Fact and Acts of Misconduct in the matter of: The Executive Council 
to the Financial Reporting Council and 1) Stephen John Denison 2) Pricewaterhousecoopers 
LLP (p. 39). Retrieved from FRC website: https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/433f3df8-
d0ef-456b-8a26-aeb55f65489b/BHS-Particulars-of-Fact-and-Acts-of-Misconduct.pdf.   
FRC (2018c). UK Corporate governance code. Retrieved 12 August 2018, from UK Corporate 
Governance Code website: https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-
stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code. 
Friedman, A., & Mason, J. (2006). Governance of Professional Associations: Theory & Practice. 
Retrieved from https://www.parnglobal.com/publications/governance/governance-of-
professional-associations-theory-and-practice. 
Friedman, A., & Phillips, M. (2004). Balancing strategy and accountability: A model for the 
governance of professional associations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 15(2), 
187-204. https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.61. 
Friedson, E. (2001). Professionalism. The third logic. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Gallhofer, S., & Haslam, J. (1997). Beyond Accounting: The possibilities of accounting and 
‘critical’ accounting research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 8(1-2), 71-95. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.1996.0087. 
Gallhofer, S., & Haslam, J. (2007). Exploring social, political and economic dimensions of 
accounting in the global context: The International Accounting Standards Board and 
accounting disaggregation. Socio-Economic Review, 5(4), 633-664. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwm012. 
Gendron, Y. (2018a). Beyond conventional boundaries: Corporate governance as inspiration for 
critical accounting research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 55, 1-11. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.11.004. 
Gendron, Y. (2018b). On the elusive nature of critical (accounting) research. Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, 50, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.11.001. 
Golsorkhi, D., Leca, B., Lounsbury, M., & Ramirez, C. (2009). Analysing, Accounting for and 
Unmasking Domination: On Our Role as Scholars of Practice, Practitioners of Social Science 
and Public Intellectuals. Organization, 16(6), 779-797. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508409343400. 
Gracia, L., & Oats, L. (2012). Boundary work and tax regulation: A Bourdieusian view. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 37(5), 304-321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.03.004. 
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Suddaby, R., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2008). The SAGE Handbook of 
Organizational Institutionalism. SAGE. 
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. R. (2002). Theorizing Change: The Role of Professional 
Associations in the Transformation of Institutionalized Fields. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(1), 58-80. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069285. 
Guba, N., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In Denzin, N. K., & 
Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds): Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (1st Edn, pp. 105-117). Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Guba, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005a). Paradigmatic controversies, contadictions and emerging 
confluences. In Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds): The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (3rd Edn, pp. 191-215). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
189 
 
Guba, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005b). Paradigms and Perspectives in Contention. In Denzin, N. K., & 
Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds): The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd Edn, pp. 183-190). 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Guo, K. H. (2018). The odyssey of becoming: Professional identity and insecurity in the Canadian 
accounting field. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 56, 20-45. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.10.008. 
Halliday, T. C. (1985). Knowledge Mandates: Collective Influence by Scientific, Normative and 
Syncretic Professions. The British Journal of Sociology, 36(3), 421–447. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/590459. 
Hamilton, G., & Ó hÓgartaigh, C. (2009). The Third Policeman: ‘The true and fair view’, language 
and the habitus of accounting. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20(8), 910-920. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2009.02.003. 
Hanlon, G. (1998). Professionalism as Enterprise: Service Class Politics and the Redefinition of 
Professionalism. Sociology, 32(1), 43-63. 
Haynes, K. (2010). Other lives in accounting: Critical reflections on oral history methodology in 
action. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21(3), 221-231. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2009.11.002. 
Haynes, K. (2017). Reflexivity in accounting research. In Hoque, Z., Parker, L. D., Covaleski, M. A., 
& Haynes, K. (Eds): The Routledge Companion to Qualitative Accounting Research Methods 
(pp. 284-297). Taylor & Francis. 
High Fliers Research (2019). The Graduate Market in 2019 (p. 34). Retrieved from 
https://www.highfliers.co.uk/download/2019/graduate_market/GMReport19.pdf. 
Hines, R. D. (1988). Financial accounting: In communicating reality, we construct reality. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 13(3), 251-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-
3682(88)90003-7 
Hopper, T. (2013). Making accounting degrees fit for a university. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 24(2), 127-135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2012.07.001. 
Humphrey, C. (2014). Qualitative research—Mixed emotions. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting and Management, 11(1), 51-70. 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1108/QRAM-03-2014-0024. 
Hyndman, N., & McDonnell, P. (2009). Governance and Charities: An Exploration of Key Themes 
and the Development of a Research Agenda. Financial Accountability & Management, 25(1), 
5-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0408.2008.00463.x. 
ICAEW (1880). Royal Charter of the 11th of May 1880 (ICAEW). Retrieved 6 November 2016, 
from http://www.icaew.com/en/about-icaew/who-we-are/charter-and-bye-laws. 
ICAEW (1948, December 21). Supplemental Charter of 21st December 1948 [ICAEW]. Retrieved 
17 March 2017, from https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/about-icaew/who-
we-are/charters-bye-laws/supplemental-charter-of-the-21st-december-1948.ashx?la=en. 
ICAEW (2011). Code of Ethics. Retrieved from 
https://www.icaew.com/en/technical/ethics/icaew-code-of-ethics/icaew-code-of-ethics. 
ICAEW (2012). Acting in the Public Interest. A Framework for Analysis (p. 81) [Market 
Foundations Initiative]. Retrieved from http://www.icaew.com/-
/media/corporate/files/technical/ethics/public-int-rep-web.ashx?la=en. 
190 
 
ICAEW (2017a). ICAEW Council members. Retrieved 1 July 2017, from 
http://www.icaew.com/en/about-icaew/who-we-are/governance/council. 
ICAEW (2017b). ICAEW Governance Handbook: Chapter 1. Retrieved 14 October 2017, from 
https://www.icaew.com/en/about-icaew/who-we-are/governance/governance-handbook. 
ICAEW (2018a). Candidate information pack (Council By-Election 2018). Retrieved from 
https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/about-icaew/who-we-are/icaew-
governance/2015-council-elections/can-i-stand-for-election.ashx?la=en. 
ICAEW (2018b). ICAEW Governance Handbook Chapter 2: Delegations. Retrieved 24 March 
2018, from https://www.icaew.com/about-icaew/who-we-are/governance/governance-
handbook/chapter-2-delegations. 
ICAEW (2018c, October 10). Principal Bye-laws. Retrieved 21 July 2019, from 
https://www.icaew.com/membership/regulations-standards-and-guidance/bye-
laws/principal-bye-laws. 
ICAS (2014). ICAS Rules. Retrieved from 
https://www.icas.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/271734/Rules-22.09.14.pdf. 
ICAS (2018). Governance of ICAS. Retrieved 20 May 2018, from https://www.icas.com/about-
icas/governance-of-icas. 
IFAC. (2012). A Definition of the public interest (No. IFAC Policy Position 5; p. 9). Retrieved from 
www.ifac.org/. 
IFAC (2015). IES 5, Initial Professional Development—Practical Experience (Revised) | IFAC. 
Retrieved from //www.ifac.org/publications-resources/ies-5-initial-professional-
development-practical-experience-revised. 
IFAC (2018a). IES 7, Continuing Professional Development (Revised) | IFAC. Retrieved from 
//www.ifac.org/publications-resources/ies-7-continuing-professional-development-
revised. 
IFAC (2018b). IESBA Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. Retrieved 20 July 2019, from 
https://www.iesbaecode.org/. 
Inanga, E. L., & Schneider, W. B. (2005). The failure of accounting research to improve accounting 
practice: A problem of theory and lack of communication. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 16(3), 227-248. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1045-2354(03)00073-X. 
Izza, M. (2017, April 24). What is our individual duty to the public interest? Retrieved 19 May 
2017, from https://ion.icaew.com/moorgateplace/b/weblog/posts/what-is-our-individual-
duty-to-the-public-interest. 
Joannides, V. (2012). Accounterability and the problematics of accountability. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 23(3), 244-257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2011.12.008. 
Johnson, T. J., & Caygill, M. (1971). The Development of Accountancy Links in the 
Commonwealth. Accounting and Business Research, 1(2), 155-173. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1971.9728562. 
Justesen, L., & Mouritsen, J. (2011). Effects of actor‐network theory in accounting research. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24(2), 161-193. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513571111100672. 
Kamla, R., & Komori, N. (2018). Diagnosing the translation gap: The politics of translation and 
the hidden contradiction in interdisciplinary accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 31(7), 1874-1903. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-08-2017-3067. 
191 
 
Killian, S. (2015). “For lack of accountability”: The logic of the price in Ireland’s Magdalen 
Laundries. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 43, 17-32. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2015.03.006. 
King, A. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A ‘Practical’ Critique of the Habitus. 
Sociological Theory, 18(3), 417-433. https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00109. 
Kingman, J. (2018). Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council (p. 95).  Retrieved 
from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/767387/frc-independent-review-final-report.pdf. 
Kirkham, L. M., & Loft, A. (1993). Gender and the construction of the professional accountant. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18(6), 507-558. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-
3682(93)90002-N. 
Knoke, D., & Prensky, D. (1984). What Relevance Do Organization Theories Have for Voluntary 
Associations? Social Science Quarterly, 65(1), 3-20. 
Lamont, M., & Lareau, A. (1988). Cultural Capital: Allusions, Gaps and Glissandos in Recent 
Theoretical Developments. Sociological Theory, 6(2), 153-168. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/202113. 
Larson, M. S. (1977). The rise of professionalism: A sociological analysis. Berkley: University of 
California Press.  
Latour, B. (1988). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (New 
Ed edition). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Latour, B. (2007). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Latour, B. (2018). Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime (Translation edition). 
Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA: Polity Press. 
Laughlin, R. (1995). Empirical research in accounting: Alternative approaches and a case for 
“middle‐range” thinking. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 8(1), 63-87. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579510146707. 
Laughlin, R. (1999). Critical accounting: Nature, progress and prognosis. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 12(1), 73-78. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579910259942. 
Lee, B., & Humphrey, C. (2006). More than a numbers game: Qualitative research in accounting. 
Management Decision, 44(2), 180-197. https://doi.org/10.1108/00251740610650184. 
Lee, T. (1995). The professionalization of accountancy: A history of protecting the public interest 
in a self‐interested way. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 8(4), 48-69. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579510100725. 
Lee, T. A. (1999). Anatomy of a Professional Élite: The Executive Commitee [sic] of the American 
Accounting Association 1916-1996. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 10(2), 247-264. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.1998.0229.  
Lehman, C. R. (2019). Reflecting on now more than ever: Feminism in accounting. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting. 65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2019.04.001. 
Lesage, C., Hottegindre, G., & Baker, C. R. (2016). Disciplinary practices in the French auditing 
profession: Serving the public interest or the private interests of the profession? Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 29(1), 11-42. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-12-2012-
1169. 
192 
 
Lillis, A. (2008). Qualitative management accounting research: Rationale, pitfalls and potential: 
A comment on Vaivio (2008). Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 5(3), 239-
246. https://doi.org/10.1108/11766090810910236. 
Llewelyn, S. (2003). What counts as ‘theory’ in qualitative management and accounting 
research? Introducing five levels of theorizing. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 16(4), 662-708. 
Lowe, A. D., De Loo, I., & Nama, Y. (2016). Cutting the Gordian knot [?]: A response to Lukka and 
Vinnari (2014). Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 29(2), 305-316. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-04-2015-2025. 
Lukka, K. (2010). The roles and effects of paradigms in accounting research. Management 
Accounting Research, 21(2), 110-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2010.02.002. 
Lukka, K., & Kasanen, E. (1995). Methodological themes: The problem of generalizability: 
Anecdotes and evidence in accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 8(5), 71-90. 
Lukka, K., & Vinnari, E. (2014). Domain theory and method theory in management accounting 
research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 27(8), 1308-1338. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-03-2013-1265. 
Lukka, K., & Vinnari, E. (2016). Domain theory and method theory revisited: A reply to Lowe, De 
Loo and Nama. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 29(2), 317–322. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-06-2015-2080.  
Lupu, I., & Empson, L. (2015). Illusio and overwork: Playing the game in the accounting field. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 28(8), 1310-1340. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-02-2015-1984. 
Macdonald, K. (1995). The Sociology of the Professions (2nd edn). London: Sage. 
Mahama, H., & Khalifa, R. (2017). Field interviews. Process and analysis. In Hoque, Z., Parker, L. 
D., Covaleski, M. A., & Haynes, K. (Eds): The Routledge Companion to Qualitative Accounting 
Research Methods, Taylor & Francis (pp. 321-338). Retrieved from 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=PzQlDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=ro
utledge+companion+to+qualitative+accounting+research+methods&ots=ta-
nAVIAB9&sig=G6E-
pjG5ZakLmGuk3QvyZ8EWMLo#v=onepage&q=routledge%20companion%20to%20qualitati
ve%20accounting%20research%20methods&f=false. 
Malsch, B., Gendron, Y., & Grazzini, F. (2011). Investigating interdisciplinary translations: The 
influence of Pierre Bourdieu on accounting literature. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 24(2), 194-228. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513571111100681. 
Marriage, M. (2018, March 30). Big Four accountants grapple with gender pay gaps. Retrieved 6 
April 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/4625c9b2-2e96-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381. 
Matthews, D. R. (2017). Accountants and the professional project. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 30(2), 306-327. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-01-2015-1953. 
McFarland, J. (2014, June 23). Canadian accountants merge under CPA designation. Retrieved 
from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canadian-accountants-merge-
under-cpa-designation/article19299464/. 
McKinnon, J. (1988), "Reliability and Validity in Field Research: Some Strategies and 
Tactics", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 1(1), 34-54. https://doi-
org/10.1108/EUM0000000004619. 
193 
 
Messner, M. (2009). The limits of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(8), 
918-938. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2009.07.003. 
Messner, M., Moll, J., & Stomsten, T. (2017). Credibility and authenticity in qualitative 
accounting research. In Hoque, Z., Parker, L. D., Covaleski, M. A., & Haynes, K. (Eds): The 
Routledge Companion to Qualitative Accounting Research Methods (pp. 432-443). Taylor & 
Francis. 
Michels, R. (1968). Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy. (2nd edn). New York: The Free Press. 
Mintz, S. (2018). Accounting in the Public Interest: An Historical Perspective on Professional 
Ethics. CPA Journal, 88(3), 22-29. 
Mishler, E. G. (1991). Research Interviewing. Harvard University Press. 
Mitchell, A., Puxty, T., Sikka, P., & Willmott, H. (1994). Ethical statements as smokescreens for 
sectional interests: The case of the UK accountancy profession. Journal of Business Ethics, 
13(1), 39-51. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877153. 
Mitchell, A., & Sikka, P. (2004). Accountability of the accountancy bodies: The peculiarities of a 
British accountancy body. The British Accounting Review, 36(4), 395-414. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2004.07.015. 
Morgan, G., & Smircich, L. (1980). The Case for Qualitative Research. Academy of Management 
Review, 5(4), 491-500. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1980.4288947. 
Mulgan, R. (2000). ‘Accountability’: An ever‐expanding concept?. Public administration, 78(3), 
555-573. https://doi.org /10.1111/1467-9299.00218. 
Nadin, S. and Cassell, C. (2006). The use of a research diary as a tool for reflexive practice: Some 
reflections from management research. Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 
3 (3), 208-217. https://doi.org/10.1108/11766090610705407. 
Nesbit, R., & Gazley, B. (2012). Patterns of Volunteer Activity in Professional Associations and 
Societies. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 23(3), 
558-583. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-011-9218-0. 
Neu, D. (2006). Accounting for public space. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(4-5), 391-
414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2005.03.001. 
Neu, D., Cooper, D. J., & Everett, J. (2001). Critical Accounting Interventions. Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, 12(6), 735-762. https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.2001.0479. 
Neu, D., Friesen, C., & Everett, J. (2003). The changing internal market for ethical discourses in 
the Canadian CA profession. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 16(1), 70-103. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570310464291. 
Noguchi, M., & Edwards, J. R. (2004). Accounting Principles, Internal Conflict and the State: The 
Case of the ICAEW, 1948–1966. Abacus, 40(3), 280-320. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6281.2004.00160.x. 
Noguchi, M., & Edwards, J. R. (2008a). Harmonising intergroup relations within a professional 
body: The case of the ICAEW. The British Accounting Review, 40(2), 123-147. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2008.01.007. 
Noguchi, M., & Edwards, J. R. (2008b). Professional Leadership and Oligarchy: The Case of the 
ICAEW. The Accounting Historians Journal, 35(2), 1-42. 
Oakes, L., Townley, B., & Cooper, D. J. (1998). Business planning as pedagogy: Language and 
control in a changing institutional field. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(2), 257-292.  
194 
 
O’Dwyer, B. (2004). Qualitative Data Analysis: Illuminating a Process for Transforming ‘Messy’ 
but ‘Attractive’ ‘Nuisance’. In Humphrey, C., & Lee, B. H. (Eds): The Real Life Guide to 
Accounting Research: A Behind-the-Scenes View of Using Qualitative Research Methods. 
Elsevier (pp. 391-407). 
O’Regan, P., & Killian, S. (2014). ‘Professionals who understand’: Expertise, public interest and 
societal risk governance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 39(8), 615-631. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2014.07.004. 
Osborne, S. P. (2010). The New Public Governance: Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and 
Practice of Public Governance. Routledge. 
Osterman, P. (2006). Overcoming Oligarchy: Culture and Agency in Social Movement 
Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51(4), 622-649. 
https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.51.4.622. 
Paisey, C., & Paisey, N. J. (2018). Protecting the public interest? Continuing professional 
development policies and role-profession conflict in accountancy. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting. 67-68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.04.002. 
Parker, L. D. (1994). Professional accounting body ethics: In search of the private interest. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(6), 507-525. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-
3682(94)90021-3. 
Parker, L. D. (2007). Boardroom Strategizing in Professional Associations: Processual and 
Institutional Perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 44(8), 1454-1480. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00713.x. 
Parker, L.D. (2014). Qualitative Perspectives: Through a Methodological Lens. Qualitative 
Research in Accounting & Management, 11(1), 13-28. https://doi.org/ 10.1108/QRAM-02-
2014-0013. 
Portes, A. (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 24(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.1. 
Poullaos, C. (2016). Canada vs Britain in the imperial accountancy arena, 1908–1912: Symbolic 
capital, symbolic violence. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 51, 47-63. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2016.05.001. 
Qu, S. Q., & Dumay, J. (2011). The qualitative research interview. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management, 8(3), 238-264. https://doi.org/10.1108/11766091111162070. 
Radcliffe, V., Cooper, D. J., & Robson, K. (1994). The management of professional enterprises 
and regulatory change: British accountacy (sic) and the financial services act, 1986. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(7), 601-628. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-
3682(94)90026-4.  
Ramirez, C. (2001). Understanding social closure in its cultural context: Accounting practitioners 
in France (1920–1939). Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26(4), 391-418. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(00)00023-4. 
Ramirez, C. (2009). Constructing the governable small practitioner: The changing nature of 
professional bodies and the management of professional accountants’ identities in the UK. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(3-4), 381-408. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2008.05.004. 
Ramirez, C. (2013). ‘We are being pilloried for something, we did not even know we had done 
wrong!’ Quality control and orders of worth in the British audit profession. Journal of 
Management Studies, 50(5), 845-869. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12011. 
195 
 
Ramirez, C., Stringfellow, L., & Maclean, M. (2015). Beyond segments in movement: A “small” 
agenda for research in the professions. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 28(8), 
1341-1372. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-01-2015-1946. 
Richardson, A. J. (1989). Canada’s Accounting Elite: 1880-1930. The Accounting Historians 
Journal, 16(1), 1-21. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40697965. 
Richardson, A. J. (1997). Social closure in dynamic markets: The incomplete professional project 
in accountancy. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 8(6), 635-653. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.1997.0125. 
Richardson, A. J. (2017). Merging the Profession: A Social Network Analysis of the Consolidation 
of the Accounting Profession in Canada. Accounting Perspectives, 16(2), 83-104. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3838.12139. 
Roberts, J., & Scapens, R. (1985). Accounting systems and systems of accountability—
Understanding accounting practices in their organisational contexts. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 10(4), 443-456. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(85)90005-4. 
Robson, K. (1991). On the arenas of accounting change: The process of translation. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 16(5), 547-570. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(91)90041-C. 
Robson, K., Willmott, H., Cooper, D., & Puxty, T. (1994). The ideology of professional regulation 
and the markets for accounting labour: Three episodes in the recent history of the U.K. 
accountancy profession. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(6), 527-553. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(94)90022-1. 
Roslender, R., & Dillard, J. (2003) Reflections on the Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting 
Project. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14(3), 325-51. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/cpac.2002.0526. 
Rose, N. (1991). Governing by numbers: Figuring out democracy. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 16(7), 673-692. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(91)90019-B. 
Samsonova-Taddei, A., & Humphrey, C. (2014). Transnationalism and the transforming roles of 
professional accountancy bodies: Towards a research agenda. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 27(6), 903-932. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-05-2013-1345. 
Sellers, R. D., Fogarty, T. J., & Parker, L. M. (2015). The Center Cannot Hold: The AICPA and 
Accounting Professional Leadership 1997–2013. Accounting Horizons, 29(3), 485-506. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/acch-51087. 
Shackleton, K., & Walker, S. P. (2001). A Future for the Accountancy Profession. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland. Retrieved from 
https://www.icas.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/7765/90-A-Future-for-the-
Accountancy-Profession-ICAS.pdf. 
Shenkin, M., & Coulson, A. B. (2007). Accountability through activism: Learning from Bourdieu. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 20(2), 297-317. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570710741037. 
Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case studies. Academy of management journal, 50(1), 20-
24. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2007.24160882. 
Sikka, P., Willmott, H., & Lowe, T. (1989). Guardians of Knowledge and Public Interest: Evidence 
and Issues of Accountability in the UK Accountancy Profession. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 2(2). https://doi.org/10.1108/09513578910132286. 
196 
 
Sikka, P. (2001). Transparency and accountability of the professional accountancy bodies: Some 
observations on the Canning and O’Dwyer paper. European Accounting Review, 10(4), 751-
761. 
Sikka, P. (2018). Why is no one exposing our failing firms in advance? The Guardian, 22 February 
2018. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/22/expose-
failing-firms-accounting-firms-carillion-mps. 
Sikka, P., Haslam, C., Cooper, C., Haslam, J., Christensen, J., Driver, D. G., … Willmott, H. (2018). 
Reforming the Auditing Industry (171pp). Retrieved from 
http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/LabourPolicymaking-
AuditingReformsDec2018.pdf?dm_i=4N1C,FRQM,33M5SW,1TLL7,1. 
Sikka, P., & Willmott, H. (1995). The power of “independence”: Defending and extending the 
jurisdiction of accounting in the United Kingdom. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
20(6), 547-581. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(94)00027-S. 
Sinclair, A. (1995). The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 20(2), 219-237. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(93)E0003-Y. 
Social Mobility Commission (2019). Elitist Britain 2019: The educational backgrounds of Britain's 
leading people (108pp). Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/elitist-britain-2019. 
Sorauf, F. J. (1957). The Public Interest Reconsidered. The Journal of Politics, 19(4), 616-639. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2126954. 
Spear, R. (2004). Governance in Democratic Member-Based Organisations. Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 75(1), 33-60. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00242.x. 
Spence, C., & Carter, C. (2014). An exploration of the professional habitus in the Big 4 accounting 
firms. Work, Employment and Society, 28(6), 946-962. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017013510762. 
Spence, C., Voulgaris, G., & Maclean, M. (2017). Politics and the professions in a time of crisis. 
Journal of Professions and Organization, 4(3), 261-281. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jox001. 
SRA (2019). Solicitors Regulation Authority. Retrieved 20 July 2019, from 
http://www.sra.org.uk/home/home.page 
Stevens, G. (2002). The Favored Circle: The Social Foundations of Architectural Distinction. 
Retrieved 9 August 2017 https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/favored-circle. 
Stone, M. M., & Ostrower, F. (2007). Acting in the Public Interest? Another Look at Research on 
Nonprofit Governance. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36(3), 416-438. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764006296049. 
Stringfellow, L., McMeeking, K., & Maclean, M. (2015). From four to zero? The social 
mechanisms of symbolic domination in the UK accounting field. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 27, 86-100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2014.06.001. 
Suddaby, R., Cooper, D. J., & Greenwood, R. (2007). Transnational regulation of professional 
services: Governance dynamics of field level organizational change. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 32(4-5), 333-362. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.08.002. 
Sweet, P. (2019, March 6). ICAEW loses appeal over extending legal services regulatory work. 
Accountancy Daily. Retrieved 9 November 2019 https://www.accountancydaily.co/icaew-
loses-appeal-over-extending-legal-services-regulatory-work. 
197 
 
The Privy Council (2017, March 17). Chartered Bodies. Retrieved 17 March 2017 
https://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royal-charters/applying-for-a-royal-charter/. 
Topper, K. (2001). Not so Trifling Nuances: Pierre Bourdieu, Symbolic Violence, and the 
Perversions of Democracy. Constellations, 8(1), 30-56. 
Tremblay, M. S., Gendron, Y., & Malsch, B. (2016). Gender on board: Deconstructing the 
“legitimate” female director. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 29(1), 165-190. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-05-2014-1711. 
Tricker, R. I. (1983). Governing the Institute: A study commissioned by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, on the direction, control, and regulation of the Institute. 
London: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
Trigg, A. B. (2001). Veblen, Bourdieu, and Conspicuous Consumption. Journal of Economic Issues, 
35(1), 99-115. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2001.11506342. 
UNESCO (2017, October 6). Concept of governance. Retrieved 6 October 2017, from UNESCO 
website: http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/geqaf/technical-notes/concept-governance. 
Voss, K., & Sherman, R. (2000). Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the 
American Labor Movement. American Journal of Sociology, 106(2), 303-349. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/316963. 
Wacquant, L. J. (1989). Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. 
Sociological Theory, 7(1), 26-63. https://doi.org/10.2307/202061. 
Wacquant, L. J. (1993a). From Ruling Class to Field of Power: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu 
on La Noblesse d’État. Theory, Culture & Society, 10(3), 19-44. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/026327693010003002. 
Wacquant, L. J. (1993b). On the Tracks of Symbolic Power: Prefatory Notes to Bourdieu’s State 
Nobility. Theory, Culture & Society, 10(3), 1-17. 
Wacquant, L. J. (2014). Putting Habitus in its Place: Rejoinder to the Symposium. Body & Society, 
20(2), 118-139. https://doi.org/10.1177/1357034X14530845. 
Walker, S. P. (2004). The genesis of professional organisation in English accountancy. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(2), 127-156. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-
3682(02)00031-4. 
Walker, S. P. (2011). Professions and patriarchy revisited. Accountancy in England and Wales, 
1887–1914. Accounting History Review, 21(2), 185-225. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2011.581840. 
Walker, S. P., & Shackleton, K. (1995). Corporatism and structural change in the British 
accountancy profession, 1930–1957. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(6), 467-503. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(95)00011-W. 
Williams, G., & Filippakou, O. (2010). Higher education and UK elite formation in the twentieth 
century. Higher Education, 59(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-009-9229-6. 
Willmott, H. (1986). Organising the profession: A theoretical and historical examination of the 
development of the major accountancy bodies in the U.K. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 11(6), 555-580. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(86)90036-X. 
Willmott, H. (1990). Serving the Public Interest? A Critical Analysis of a Professional Claim. In 
Cooper, D. J., & Hopper, T. M. (Eds), Critical Accounts (pp. 315-331). Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09786-9_16. 
198 
 
Willmott, H., Cooper, D., & Puxty, T. (1993). Maintaining self-regulation: Making ‘interests’ 
coincide in discourses on the governance of the ICAEW. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 6(4), 68. 
Wilson, J., & Musick, M. A. (1997). Work and Volunteering: The Long Arm of the Job. Social 
Forces, 76(1), 251-272. https://doi.org/10.2307/2580325. 
Worsley, F. E. (1985). Governing the Institute: Report of a working party under the chairmanship 
of F.E. Worsley. London (Chartered Accountant’s Hall, Moorgate Place, EC2P 2BJ): Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
Yin, R. K. (2013). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. SAGE Publications. 
Zald, M. N., & Ash, R. (1966). Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change. Social 
Forces, 44(3), 327-341. https://doi.org/10.2307/2575833. 
 
 
  
199 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Participant information sheet 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Study title 
The governance of professional associations – the accountability of accountants. A 
case study of the ICAEW. 
 
Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or 
not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study explores the governance structures within the ICAEW and how they provide 
a relevant degree of accountability to the membership. In doing so it considers 
composition of Council, its roles and responsibilities, the relationship with the Executive 
function and the effectiveness of Council. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate as a member of Council. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
We expect the interview to last for around one hour and it may be followed up by email 
questions. The interview will be recorded and transcribed. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Benefits from participation include contributing to a study on governance of the 
professional body which may have both theoretical and policy implications. 
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Will my information in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). 
This will be achieved through the anonymisation of the individuals interviewed in file 
storage and publication of the research material.  
 
Consent forms will be stored separately.  
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
Please sign the attached consent form. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research study will be used for conference submissions and 
academic publications. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is being undertaken by Susan Smith of the University of Sussex  
 
Who has approved this study? 
The research has been approved by the Social Sciences & Arts Sciences & 
Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) ethical review 
process. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
Contact: Susan Smith, University of Sussex susan.smith@sussex.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please 
contact Jayne Paulin j.e.paulin@sussex.ac.uk 
University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this 
study. 
 
Thank you 
 
Date 
6/6/2017 
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Appendix 2 Participant consent form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
PROJECT TITLE: The governance of professional associations – the accountability 
of accountants. A case study of the ICAEW. 
  
 
Project Approval 
Reference: 
ER/SS706/11 
    
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project 
explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for 
records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to:  
* Be interviewed by the researcher 
* Allow the interview to be audio taped 
* Make myself available for a further interview should that be required 
 
I understand that my responses will be attributed to an anonymised respondent to prevent my 
identity from being made public. 
I understand that I will be given a transcript of data concerning me for my approval before 
being included in the write up of the research  
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or 
all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised 
or disadvantaged in any way. 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Name:  
 
Signature  
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Date:  
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Appendix 3 Outline interview questionnaire 
 
Interview Guide 
Background questions 
Member name   
Gender   
Career to date  
Current employer  
General questions 
 
1. What is the role of the ICAEW?  
 
Theme 1: Composition of Council 
How and by whom is the ICAEW governed? 
1. Why did you to stand for Council? (or Q4 if co-opted) 
1.1. When did you join Council? 
1.2. Which constituency do you represent? 
1.3. Why do you think you successful? 
 
2. Why does the election process encourage a representative group of candidates to stand 
for election?  
2.1. Why is the District Society structure important in the overall context of the ICAEW? 
2.2. Are certain groupings more likely to be successful in the election process? 
2.3. Why do you think so few members vote in the Council elections? 
 
3. Why were you co-opted to Council? (if not elected) 
3.1. What is the co-option process? 
3.2. What grouping of the membership were you co-opted to represent? 
3.3. How do you feel you fulfil this role? 
 
4. What is your employer’s attitude to your Council responsibility?  
4.1. Why do they take this view? 
4.2. How would you define your employment?  
 
5. In what way do you feel you have benefitted by being a Council member?  
 
6. Why is diversity on Council important? 
 
6.1. What factors are driving increased/reduced diversity? 
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Theme 2: Council Roles and Responsibilities 
How does Council manage its accountability role? 
1. Why is Council important? 
1.1. What is its role? 
 
2. What is your role on Council?  
2.1. How do you understand the role of an elected representative? 
2.2. How does Council serve the public interest responsibility of the ICAEW? 
 
3. Does the way in which Council is governed affect its accountability to members?  
3.1. Are some member groupings more important that others? Why? 
 
4. How do other stakeholders (i.e. outside of the membership) affect how the ICAEW is 
governed?  
4.1. What are their interests in the ICAEW?  
4.2. How does the ICAEW account to their interests? 
 
5. Do you sit on any committees? 
5.1. How and why were you appointed to the committee?  
5.2. How is the committee governed?  
5.3. Who sets the agenda and takes action points? 
 
Theme 3: Council-Executive relationships 
How does Council monitor the Executive function? 
1. Has power between the Council and Executive shifted over time? 
1.1 Why do you feel this is the case? 
 
2. How does Council interact with the Executive?  
2.1. Consider strategy setting 
2.2. Consider agenda setting 
2.3. To what extent is the Council structure and process helpful to senior executives in 
guiding their decision making? 
 
3. Do you consider you receive sufficient information on which to base your decisions in 
Council? (Materiality/Quality/Timeliness)  
3.1. What improvements could be made? 
 
4. Which KPIs are used to monitor the operational effectiveness of the ICAEW? 
4.1. Who determines these measures? 
4.2. How do they reflect the strategy of the body? 
4.3. To what extent are they useful/appropriate? 
4.4. Are there other KPIs which may be more effective? Why do you consider this to be 
the case? 
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Theme 4: Council effectiveness 
How effective is the existing governance structure in light of challenges facing ICAEW? 
1. What factors do you consider influence Council effectiveness? 
1.1. Why have you selected these matters? 
1.2. Provide an example Council effectiveness. Why have you chosen this example? 
 
2. What are the biggest challenges facing ICAEW?  
2.1. Can these challenges be overcome? 
2.2. Discuss challenges arising from the almost conflicting expectations of various member 
(stakeholder) groupings. How can they be reconciled? 
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Appendix 4 Member mailings from 2019 election campaign 
Reproduced with addressee’s consent. 
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Appendix 5 Social media images from 2019 election campaign 
 
Reproduced with the consent of the ICAEW and the individuals. 
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Appendix 6 Thematic analysis of candidate election statements (2015 and 2017) 
 
Thematic analysis 2017 
statements 
Successful Not Successful 
Passion 14S, 17S, 25S, 26S, 32S, 35S 23, 29, 41, 43 
Motivation 4S, 6S 18, 33, 36, 40, 43 
Representation 1S, 11S, 17S, 24S, 25S, 27S, 
32S, 35S 
2, 19, 37, 38, 40 
Younger members 8S, 9S, 11S, 25S 28, 31 
Environmental change 1S, 6S, 10S, 14S, 15S, 25S, 
26S, 32S, 42S 
2,5, 7, 18, 31, 36, 37, 38, 41, 
44 
Echo ICAEW strategy 1S, 14S 36,38 
Two way communication 14S, 20S, 24S, 27S, 35S 3, 33, 41 
Personalised ‘your views’ 4S, 8S, 15S, 20S, 25S 7 
Protection 13S, 15S, 26S  
 
Thematic analysis 2015 
statements 
Successful Not Successful 
Passion 15S, 30S 11, 32 
Motivation 4S, 20S, 33S  
Representation 14S, 15S, 17S, 19S, 27S  
Younger members 18S, 20S, 25S 26, 31 
Globalisation 6S, 10S, 12S, 25S 6, 32 
Echo ICAEW strategy 8S, 12S  
Two way communication 7S, 22S  
Members views 1S, 4S, 6S, 7S, 10S, 12S, 15S, 
16S, 18S, 22S, 25S, 28S, 33S 
11, 21, 23, 26, 29, 31, 32 
Protection - qualification 8S, 14S, 16S 5 
Regulation 10S, 14S, 20S, 27S, 33S 3, 11. 23, 29 
Influence 1S, 10S 2 
Engage practice and business 14S, 17S, 28S 2, 31 
Business members  34, 31, 24, 9 
 
 
 
